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This thesis consists of three essays in empirical corporate finance. In the
first chapter co-authored with April Klein and Tao Li, we document that a number
of sell-side healthcare analysts gain access to information outside the purview of
management through Freedom of Information Act requests to the Food and Drug
Administration for records on factory inspections, complaints, and drug and medical
device applications. Using a difference-in-differences methodology, we find that buy
(sell) recommendations and upgrades (downgrades) earn higher (lower) stock returns
over the year following the receipt of FDA records. We also examine the type of
information revealed in FDA factory inspection reports, and find that analysts are
less likely to downgrade and are less pessimistic in their recommendations than the
consensus recommendation when the information contained in the FDA report is not
particularly severe. Our findings are consistent with a subset of analysts utilizing
non-public information channels independent of management to gain value-relevant
information about their covered firms.
The second chapter of the thesis studies corporate political transparency
through the lens of shareholder engagements. We analyse factors explaining activist
shareholders’ target decisions and likelihood of successful engagements. Using hand-
collected public announcements of engagement outcomes, we find that stock market
reacts positively to successful engagements and negatively to a subset of unsuccess-
ful engagements in politically active companies. Similar reactions are also found
using institutional investors’ holding data. Investors’ aversion to hidden risk and
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disciplinary effect of increased transparency could potentially explain the market re-
actions. Collectively, the results suggest that stock market investors value political
transparency, especially in politically active companies.
In the third chapter co-authored with Zhou Zhang, we study the impact of
corporate fraud revelation on linked firms along the supply chain. We show em-
pirically that the revelation of corporate misconduct results in negative short-term
market reactions for the stocks of suppliers and customers. The determinants of
suppliers’ and customers’ abnormal returns are analysed to further uncover the
main channel of shock propagation. In contrast to previous literature on produc-
tion shocks, we do not find evidence in support of operation channel. Our results
provide support for the reputation channel. We also find the negative shock is
amplified by low-quality information environment. Overall, our research suggests
that the revelation of corporate fraud imposes negative externalities on upstream
and downstream firms, and enhanced corporate information environment and social




The thesis consists of three essays in empirical corporate finance. Chapter two doc-
uments that a subset of sell-side analysts utilizing non-public information channels
independent of management to gain value-relevant information about their covered
firms. Chapter three studies corporate political transparency through the lens of
shareholder engagements. Chapter four investigates the impact of corporate fraud
revelation on linked firms along the supply chain.
The importance of sell-side analysts in capital market has been extensively
supported in both academic research and practice. They produce research reports
and generate earnings forecasts and stock recommendations on covered firms, which
move stock prices [Bradshaw, 2011] and create liquidity within the U.S. stock mar-
ket [Kelly and Ljungqvist, 2012]. Even though most early studies concentrate on
analysts’ use of public, quantitative information (e.g., financial statements), a bur-
geoning area of research has emerged examining their acquisition of private and
qualitative sources of information. A common theme in existing researches is that
the channel of private information acquisition goes primarily from firm management
to analyst. However, many sell-side analysts profess to engage in the acquisition of
information outside the purview of management [Brown et al., 2015]. Yet, little
has been known on how analysts gather and utilize data not generated by the firm,
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primarily because it is difficult for researchers to identify specific outside sources
analysts use and the dates in which they receive these data.
In chapter two, we seek to bridge the gap by identifying a source of ex-
ternal information used by some healthcare analysts: Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) requests to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for FDA-generated
records pertaining to healthcare firms. The healthcare industry provides an ideal
setting for examining how analysts engage in private information searches. High
R&D firms in general, and healthcare firms specifically, are difficult to value with
public information only [Lehavy et al., 2011; Bushee et al., 2018; Lev and Zarowin,
1999]. Further, the information is generated by agency independent of company
management. Therefore, FOIA requests to the FDA give healthcare analysts a ve-
hicle to gather qualitative information to supplement their public and other private
information about their covered firms.
Empirically, we find that buy (sell) recommendations and upgrades (down-
grades) earn higher (lower) stock returns over the year following the receipt of FDA
records. We also examine the types of information revealed in FDA factory in-
spection reports, and find that analysts are less likely to downgrade and are less
pessimistic in their recommendations than the consensus recommendation when the
information contained in the FDA report is not particularly severe. Our findings
provide a new peek into a different “black box” of inputs used by sell-side equity
analysts when formulating their stock recommendations.
With ever growing corporate political spending and recent regulatory changes
on political spending, corporate political transparency (CPT) receives massive pub-
lic attention. There are voices from politicians, academic scholars, and industry
practitioners either supporting or criticising transparency of corporate political
spending, as Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is considering the possibil-
ity to form related regulations in this area. However, until now, we still lack quan-
titative evidences in many aspects to understand corporate political transparency.
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In chapter three, we explore the drivers and implications of corporate polit-
ical transparency through the lens of shareholder engagements. We first find that
there are many more successful shareholder engagements than previous literature
have recognized. Most voluntary disclosure classified by previous literature are as-
sociated with successful shareholder engagements. They are mostly in the form of
settlement agreements between activist shareholders and management. We then find
that activist investors tend to target companies with political action committee and
lower political transparency level. We also find evidence of repeated engagements.
Consistent with institutional investors’ superior ability to accumulate shares and
coordinate with other investors, we find engagements launched by institutional in-
vestors are more likely to be successful. Among the domain of institutional activist
investors, we find that SRI funds are best performers and labor unions are worst
performers.
In terms of implication, we show that successful shareholder engagements
indeed result in much bigger improvement in corporate political transparency, mea-
sured by CPA-Zicklin index, compared to unsuccessful engagements. Using market-
based tests, we show that stock market reacts positively to successful engagements
and negatively to a subset of unsuccessful engagements in politically active com-
panies. Consistent with corporate political transparency lowering hidden risk to
investors, the market reactions are stronger when political uncertainty is high. Con-
sistent with the disciplinary effect of corporate political transparency, successful
shareholder interventions result in a slower growth of PAC expenditure than unsuc-
cessful interventions in politically active companies. Using quarterly institutional
holding data, we find that institutional ownership of successfully engaged companies
experiences an increase whilst that of unsuccessfully engaged companies experiences
a decrease in medium to long-term, suggesting that institutional investors have a
preference for corporate political transparency. Our findings provide support for
corporate political transparency from a market perspective.
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Corporate fraud revelation has been shown to be detrimental to accused firms
themselves [Karpoff et al., 2008b,a]. In an interlinked economy, however, the impact
of such revelation is not restricted to accused firms themselves. On the contrary, di-
rect costs imposed on fraudulent firms may only constitute a small portion of overall
economic impact of corporate fraud. Prior literature has examined the effect of cor-
porate fraud on industry peers and household stock market participation [Goldman
et al., 2012; Giannetti and Wang, 2016]. Given the growing corporate production
network and its importance in the economy, it is also crucial to understand the
implication of corporate fraud revelation for linked firms along the supply chain.
In chapter four, we study how the revelation of corporate misconduct affects
upstream and downstream firms drawing on a large sample of corporate fraud events
and corporate supplier-customer links. We show empirically that the revelation
of corporate misconduct results in negative short-term market reactions for the
stocks of suppliers and customers. We further validate this finding by showing that
the effect is not driven by a particular firm at a specific period of time, industry
trend, or business cycle. By analysing the cross-sectional determinants of suppliers’
and customers’ market reactions, we show that the negative market reactions are
not attributed to operation channel, which is in contrast to previous literature on
production shocks [e.g. Barrot and Sauvagnat, 2016; Wu, 2016]. Rather, we provide
evidences in support of reputation channel. We also find that the negative shock is
amplified by low-quality information environment. Our market-based tests provide
support for the negative spillover effect of corporate fraud revelation on upstream
and downstream firms. Our results also highlight the importance of distinguishing





and the Freedom of Information
Act
2.1 Introduction
Sell-side analysts are important to capital markets. They produce research reports
and generate earnings forecasts and stock recommendations on covered firms, which
move stock prices [Bradshaw, 2011] and create liquidity within the U.S. stock mar-
ket [Kelly and Ljungqvist, 2012]. Bradshaw [2011] and Brown et al. [2015] refer to
the process by which analysts use both public and private sources of information to
generate their outputs as a “black box”, and call for more research on understand-
ing how analysts acquire and use various sources of information. Whereas most
early studies concentrate on analysts’ use of public, quantitative information (e.g.,
financial statements), a burgeoning area of research has emerged examining their
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acquisition of private and qualitative sources of information. These sources include
management conference calls [Frankel et al., 1999]1, broker-sponsored conferences
[Francis et al., 1997; Bushee et al., 2011; Green et al., 2014], analyst/investor days
[Kirk and Markov, 2016], site visits [Cheng et al., 2016] and private meetings with
management [Soltes, 2014].
A common thread running through these papers is that the channel of private
information acquisition goes primarily from firm management to analyst. However,
many sell-side analysts profess to engage in the acquisition of information outside the
purview of management [Brown et al., 2015]. Yet, little has been written on under-
standing how analysts gather and utilize data not generated by the firm, primarily
because it is difficult for researchers to identify specific outside sources analysts use
and the dates in which they receive these data.
In this paper, we identify a source of external information used by some
healthcare analysts: Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests to the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) for FDA-generated records pertaining to healthcare
firms. The healthcare industry is an ideal setting for examining how analysts engage
in private information searches. High R&D firms in general, and healthcare firms
specifically, are difficult to value with public information only [Lehavy et al., 2011;
Bushee et al., 2018; Lev and Zarowin, 1999]. Thus, FOIA requests to the FDA give
healthcare analysts a vehicle to gather qualitative information to supplement their
public and other private information about their covered firms.
Using our own FOIA requests to the FDA, we received a pdf file delineating
all FOIA requests and outcomes made to the FDA between 1999 and 2014. The
file contains over 180,000 requests; we are able to identify 873 of these requests as
originating from sell-side analysts.2 We use the full I/B/E/S database to identify
1Beginning on March 28, 2003, Regulation G requires public companies to furnish a Form 8-K
to the SEC within five business days after issuing an earnings release. These releases are usually
part of a conference call, suggesting that after this date, conference calls may be considered public
rather than private information.
2To understand the extent that healthcare analysts use FOIA, we sent out similar FOIA requests
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all healthcare analysts and classify them as FOIA analysts (treatment) and non-
FOIA analysts (control) based on whether they made a FOIA request to the FDA.
Consistent with Brown et al. [2015] that only a subset of analysts engage in the
acquisition of outside private information, and with Grossman and Stiglitz’s (1980)
contention that the acquisition of private information is inversely related to the
costs associated with acquisition (e.g., processing costs), we find that only 21% of
our sample of healthcare analysts made at least one FOIA request for FDA records.
A probit model explores cross-sectional differences in analyst traits associated with
the propensity to make these requests.
We conduct two main analyses on FOIA analysts’ efficiency in using these
records. Our analysis concentrates solely on analysts’ stock recommendations.
Groysberg et al. [2011] show that analyst compensation is influenced heavily by
whether the analyst is a “top stock picker” in his or her industry, and Brown et al.’s
(2015) survey of what factors are important to analysts’ compensation ranks the
profitability of stock recommendations above accuracy and timeliness of earnings
forecasts. Thus, using returns associated with stock recommendations aligns ana-
lysts’ benefits with their incentives to acquire private information.
In the first set of analyses, we do difference-in-differences (DiD) regressions
of long-term stock returns for portfolios of buy (sell) recommendations for analysts
covering the same company. In these regressions, the FOIA analyst and all non-
FOIA analysts must have a buy (sell) recommendation both in the year before
and after the FDA record receipt date. Thus, we keep analyst ability constant in
both time periods, only varying the model by whether the treatment analyst has
or does not have his/her requested FDA records. We control for analyst ability
and effort, the information environment surrounding the firm, public information
about the firm or the FDA record itself, and stock risk factors. Our regression
to the Federal Aviation Administration (airlines) and the Department of Energy (utilities and oil).
From the pdf files they sent us, we found no analyst requests to the FAA and only 13 analyst
requests to the DOE. We interpret this finding as indicative of analysts using different sources of
information for different industries (see, for example Cheng et al. [2016]).
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findings are consistent with buy portfolios following the receipt of FDA records
outperforming buy portfolios of analysts without these records. We find similar
results for portfolios of sell portfolios – portfolios of sell/hold recommendations
perform worse after receipt of FDA records when compared to portfolios of sell/hold
recommendations without these records. In economic terms, the extra monthly
return on the buy portfolio is 1.69% per month, and the extra return on the sell/hold
portfolio is -1.38% per month.
We also exploit our setting of healthcare firms and the FOIA request channel
by creating new variables related to both. Similar to papers investigating analysts’
backgrounds, for example, whether the analyst has a CFA or prior period industry
experience [De Franco and Zhou, 2009; Bradley et al., 2017], we use LinkedIn to
determine if treatment and control healthcare analysts have an MBA, a PhD in
science, and/or an MD degree. In our DiD regressions, we find a positive association
between stock picking and the PhD/MD degree, but no association with an analyst
having an MBA degree. These results are consistent with De Franco and Zhou [2009],
who find little to no evidence that a CFA aids analysts in forecasting earnings, and
also with Bradley et al. [2017], who show a positive association between past industry
experience and earnings forecasting accuracy for firms in that industry. We also
create variables based on how FOIA healthcare analysts use the FOIA requesting
process. Our findings are consistent with long-term stock returns being associated
with analysts who frequently make FOIA requests to the FDA and with analysts
who use the FOIA process to gain private information about other (non-covered)
healthcare firms.
Although our stock return results are consistent with analysts using FDA
records when issuing new recommendations, the evidence can be considered circum-
stantial. To somewhat remedy this criticism, our second analysis looks into the FDA
records themselves to try to determine what information in these records is related
to the likelihood that an analyst would downgrade the covered stock. We choose
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two types of ex ante “bad news” records to examine – Warning Letters and Forms
483, both containing a list of violations resulting from an FDA inspection of a firm’s
factory. Using two FOIA requests, we obtain copies of 39 usable FDA records that
also were requested and received by our sample of analysts. We manually read each
record and determine that the violations in these records can be classified generally
into four general categories - product, manufacturing, testing, and documentation.
Consistent with expectations that the first two categories might be more damaging
to the firm than the latter two categories, we find evidence that (1) stock returns
following the new stock recommendation are inversely related to whether the re-
quested FDA record contains a manufacturing violation, and (2) the likelihood of
a downgrade is inversely related to whether the record contains a documentation
violation.
Our paper extends the current literature on analysts’ acquisition of private
information along several new dimensions. First, our setting differs from most pre-
vious papers in that FDA records are a source of information independent of man-
agement. Thus, this is the first paper to do an extensive examination into a process
by which analysts gather private information from a source not emanating from the
firm itself. In fact, a discussion with a FOIA analyst reveals that her main purpose
for asking for FDA records is to evaluate the veracity of management’s claims during
conference calls and other face-to-face meetings.
To illustrate, on January 10, 2012, Hospira participated in a brokerage con-
ference sponsored by J.P. Morgan, by giving a corporate presentation (see Bushee
et al. 2011; and Green et al. 2014). The presentation was upbeat, but it also
included a slide on a Form 483 issued by the FDA on January 4, 2012 on a factory
located in Kansas.3 Notably, the slide stated that the Kansas factory accounted for
approximately 12% of net sales, that the FDA raised six “observations”, but that
these observations “can be addressed with minimal or no disruption.” One week
3Hospira placed the 34 slides of its presentation on an 8-K filing prior to the presentation. This
discussion is based on those slides as well as the records sent to us by the FDA in a FOIA request.
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after the conference, a Citigroup analyst filed a FOIA request to the FDA asking
for that particular Form 483. Our reading of the Form 483 reveals three manu-
facturing violations, including the “propagation of microbial contamination” within
the factory’s drug products. Prior to the request, the analyst’s recommendation was
a hold (IBES = 3). On February 16, 2012, shortly after receiving the Form 483, the
analyst lowered his recommendation to a strong sell (IBES = 5).
Second, our setting is novel in that FOIA requests are private to the extent
that each request is made by one analyst only, and unless another analyst sends in
a FOIA request for the identities of previous requesters (we found none in the FDA
pdf file), other analysts are not aware the FOIA request was made. These joint
properties of privacy and being the sole recipient of the private information are
similar to Soltes [2014], who examines private meetings between analysts, but differ
from papers with settings involving groups of analysts or pre-announced meeting
dates [Bushee et al., 2011; Green et al., 2014; Kirk and Markov, 2016; Cheng et al.,
2016].
Third, our study extends the literature that uses content analysis to discern
the types of private information analysts use in their outputs. Huang et al. [2018]
analyze analyst reports using this approach. We use a subset of actual FDA records
received by analysts to examine the types of information they use when making
their first post-receipt stock recommendations.
Fourth, our study generally speaks to the costs and benefits of acquiring non-
public information. One of the central tenets of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) is that
investors search for nonpublic information only if the benefits exceed the costs of
finding the information. Our findings are consistent with their theory. Specifically,
despite the fact that any analyst can make a FOIA request, only a minority of
healthcare analysts avail themselves of this information channel, suggesting a cost
to processing the information.4 On the other hand, when the information is asso-
4The direct dollar costs of filing a FOIA request to the FDA are trivial. According to the
FDA website, the current charges for filing a FOIA request are: search and review charges: $23.00,
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ciated with a subsequent recommendation, the benefits, i.e., the stock returns, are
economically significant. Therefore, even though our setting is analysts covering
healthcare firms only, it is applicable to other industries or settings. For example,
analysts can make FOIA requests to other public agencies, including the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) or state-level agencies [Bolton et al., 2018].
Like all research studies, this paper has its limitations. Its main limitation
is that, although we can observe the timing and the source of non-public infor-
mation, we cannot unambiguously map the direct link from FDA records to the
analysts’ stock recommendations. Unlike financial data or management forecasts,
FDA records contain qualitative information about the firm and give no indication
of the future economic effects that the FDA’s decision or regulatory action will have
on the firm. Further, we do not know the full extent of each analyst’s information
set about his/her covered firm prior to the receipt of the requested records. Thus,
we are unable to place the contents of the FDA record(s) within the mosaic of the
analyst’s information. Despite these caveats, our study opens a new window into the
realm of non-public information that analysts access to better value their covered
firms.
2.2 FDA and FOIA Requests
The FDA is an agency within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices. Since its creation in 1906, the U.S. Courts and Congress have expanded and
contracted the scope of its oversight. Today, the FDA has three main roles: (1) over-
sight of the process leading up to the marketing of new products, particularly drugs
and medical devices, (2) post-marketing monitoring of products, and (3) factory
inspections.
$46.00 and $83.00 depending on the grade level of the FDA employee filling the request; duplication:
$0.10 per page for standard-size paper or actual cost per page for odd-size paper, with no charge
for the first 100 pages of duplication; certification: $10 each; computer charges: actual cost for time
involved; electronic forms/formats: actual cost for form/format requested.
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Under the FOIA, analysts may ask the FDA for a copy of any record(s) the
agency holds pertaining to the requested firm. These reports are non-public in that
firms are not required to share them with investors, analysts, or other individuals.
The FDA, with discretion, places some of these records on its website. However,
the timing and choice of which records to post are completely within the FDA’s
discretion, and are sporadic at best [Mullins and Weaver, 2013; Bruser and McLean,
2014].
Figure 2.1 describes the FDA drug approval process. The process begins with
preclinical animal testing and winds it way through three separate human testing
phases. If Phases I though III are each successful, the firm most likely will file an
application with the FDA seeking approval to begin marketing the new drug. On
average, the FDA takes approximately six months to a year to make its decision on
the application.5 The FDA decision issued to the company is called an “approval
recommendation” (REC); it can be either (i) a rejection, (ii) a conditional approval
or a non-approval (subject to further modifications, sometimes referred to as a Phase
IV), or (iii) an approval for the firm to begin marketing its new drug. Only the REC
is subject to a FOIA request; that is all documentation and records between firm
and the FDA up to and including the application are deemed by the FDA to be
proprietary and, therefore, are exempt from all FOIA requests.6 7
As Figure 2.1 shows, the FDA has an elaborate post-marketing surveillance
5The FDA’s vetting process is threefold. It first evaluates the results of the Phase I-III trials.
Next, it examines drug labeling on dosage, usage, and side effects. Lastly, it inspects the facilities
where the drug will be produced.
6In the FOIA, there are nine stated exemptions to the presumption of mandatory disclosure.
These exemptions include breaches of national security, individual privacy, trade secrets, financial
confidentiality, internal memoranda or letters that are privileged in civil litigation, confidential
sources to law enforcement agencies, documents that are related to financial institution regulation,
and, geological information. These exemptions have been upheld by various court decisions [Lurie
and Zieve, 2006].
7Companies are not precluded from voluntarily providing information to the public. Exami-
nation of select pharmaceutical and biotech companies’ Form 8-Ks reveals that some companies
include selective information on the three clinical phases and/or their FDA applications in their
earnings releases, or more rarely, in a stand-alone 8-K filing. We also find some but many fewer
cases, in which the Form 8-K includes selective information about factory inspections and post-
market surveillance records. Further, the FDA maintains a website, clinicaltrials.gov, in which
pharmaceutical companies sometimes place their trial results [Capkun et al., 2017].
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system. It maintains four databases of “adverse events,” based on either mandatory
or voluntary reports by the firm, consumers, doctors, hospitals, or other individuals.
These databases include records on drugs (FAERS), medical devices (MDR), food,
dietary supplements, and cosmetics (CAERS), and vaccines (VAERS). Each record-
type is subject to FOIA requests.
In 1938, the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic (FD&C) Act of 1938 gave
the FDA the authority to conduct factory inspections on food and drug companies.
The 1953 Factory Inspection Amendment required the FDA to give manufacturers
written reports of conditions observed during inspections and analyses of factory
samples.
Figure 2.2 describes the factory inspection process [McDuffee, 2011]. Under
the FD&C Act, registered domestic drug factories are to be inspected by the FDA
at least once every two years. Notice is not required. Instead, an FDA inspector
arrives at the factory with his/her credentials and a Form 482, the latter being a
general form of what the inspector can and cannot examine. After the inspection,
which can take several days or weeks, the FDA issues an Establishment Inspection
Report (EIR) if the inspection produces no violations, or a Form 483, which is
a list of violations. The firm has a right to remediate the violations or appeal
to the FDA; often there will be correspondences between the firm and the FDA
about either process. After the FDA determines all violations are corrected, it
issues an EIR. Tangentially, the FDA issues Warning Letters (WL) to manufacturers
about “significant” violations of FDA regulations, for example, a mislabeling of an
ingredient in a drug or food supplement, or its inability to correct factory inspection
violations. EIRs, Form 483s, warning letters and related correspondences between
the company and the FDA are subject to FOIA requests.
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2.3 Sample Selection and Summary Statistics
2.3.1 Analysts’ Identities and FOIA Requests
On January 29, 2014, February 11, 2014, March 21, 2014, and June 10, 2015, respec-
tively, we filed FOIA requests to the FDA. The information we requested was a list
of all FOIA requests by outsiders to the FDA between January 1, 1999 and Decem-
ber 31, 2014. The FDA responded to our inquiries by giving us pdf files containing
182,149 individual requests. The information provided to us are (i) requester’s iden-
tity [both person (“Signature”) and company (“Requester”), if applicable]; (ii) date
of request; (iii) outcome date; (iv) target firm or individual; (v) outcome of the
request (e.g., sent, withdrawn, denied); and (vi) and a short description of which
agency records were requested 8
We identify FOIA analysts through the following process: First, we use “Re-
quester” to identify all brokerage firms. Next, we manually use several Internet sites
to determine the “Signature’s” job at the time of the request. Most “Signatures”
have both first and last names, although we have a few cases with last name but only
an initial for the first name. Our first search engine is LinkedIn. If LinkedIn does
not have the needed information, we turn to BrokerCheck, a website maintained by
the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) containing background infor-
mation on current and former FINRA-registered security industry professionals. If
BrokerCheck does not have the needed information, we search Bloomberg, company
websites and Zoominfo.com, the latter being a search engine that collects biograph-
ical data using publicly available information. These steps result in a file of 76
brokerage firms and 221 equity analysts, the latter including associates, assistants,
or administrative assistants.
8We submitted the second and third requests to the FDA to better understand the dates provided
by the FDA. What we call the request date, the FDA calls the “record date;” what we call the
outcome date, the FDA calls the “close date.” In both requests, the FDA’s record and close dates
align with our request and outcome dates, which was included in the FDA’s file to us. We use our
terminology for the sake of clarity.
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Table 2.1, Panel A shows the 182,149 FOIA requests from 1999 through 2014
by year (column 6). We have 873 individual requests from the 221 sell-side analysts
we identify from the FDA pfd file (column 2), with the 181,276 remaining requests
coming from non-analysts, including hedge funds, insurance companies, public and
private companies, hospitals, doctors, law firms, consulting firms, and individuals
(column 5).
To derive our final sample, we manually match the 221 equity analysts from
the pdf file to the I/B/E/S translation file9 If the requesting person (“Signature”)
is on I/B/E/S, we keep that analyst. However, sometimes the “Signature” is not
an analyst, but instead is an equity analyst associate, assistant or administrative
assistant. In this case, we assume the “Signature” works for the chief analyst from
the brokerage firm who covers the stock at the time of the FOIA request, and we
include that chief analyst in our sample.
Our final sample contains 62 brokerage houses, comprising 199 equity ana-
lysts making 528 individual requests (column 3). Table 2.1, Panel B presents the
identity and frequency of requests for all brokerage firms with 20 or more requests
over our time period. As the panel shows, Favus Institutional Research (a private
firm providing healthcare consulting services to institutional investors), Cowen and
Company, and Collins, Stewart LLC (a mid-cap stockbroker before being acquired
by Canaccord in 2012; Mundy 2011), are not in the I/B/E/S database. These three
firms account for a reduction of 144 requests from the original FDA pdf file.
9The I/B/E/S translation file is for the year 2008. Thus, our matching criteria will not capture
sell-side analysts working in the years 2009 through 2014 who are not already working as an analyst
in 2008. Nor will it capture analysts working in earlier years who have left the field by 2008. To give
the reader some idea of the possible temporal attrition, Panel A presents the percent of analysts
included in I/B/E/S who we identify as sell-side analysts from the FDA pdf file. On average, the
I/B/E/S match retains 60% of the FDA pdf file sell-side analysts. Interestingly, we do not see
patterns of attrition from 2008 outwards – instead we see random deviations from the mean over
time. However, one should not draw conclusions from these patterns since our sample selection
does not allow us to examine the contra factual.
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2.3.2 Analysts’ Characteristics: FOIA Requesters and Non-FOIA
Requesters
Using the I/B/E/S database, we identify 924 unique healthcare analysts covering
each FOIA requested stock in our sample over 1999-2014. Of these analysts, 199
are FOIA requesters and 725 never used FOIA to request an FDA record. Thus,
FOIA requesters represent 21.5% of our full sample of I/B/E/S analysts covering
these specific healthcare stocks.
Table 2.2, Panel A contains descriptive statistics for FOIA and non-FOIA
(control) analysts. All variable definitions are in Appendix A. FOIA analysts, on
average, have 5.8 years of direct analyst experience, cover 8.6 stocks, work in bro-
kerage firms with 82.7 analysts, and are designated Star Analysts 15.3% of the time.
Table 2.2, Panel B reports summary statistics for a probit model on whether the
analyst is a FOIA requester (FOIA Requester = 1 ) or a non-FOIA requester (FOIA
Requester = 0 ) for any individual FOIA-requested stock in the year of the FOIA
request.
Our probit findings are similar to previous studies in that an analyst’s propen-
sity to seek FDA records is positively related to analyst effort (#Forecasts; Barth
et al. 2001; Kirk et al. 2014), to the resources available to the analyst (#Analysts
at Brokerage Firm; Clement 1999), and to previous forecasts errors (Past Forecast
Error). It is also negatively related to Analyst Experience, suggesting that newer
analysts are more likely to request FDA records. New to this study, we consider both
advanced degrees in business (MBA) and advanced degrees in biology, chemistry,
other sciences, and medicine (PhD /MD) as being useful to healthcare analysts.
We find no difference between groups. Finally, based on a private conversation
with a biotech sell-side analyst, we predict and find that analysts are more likely
to use FOIA requests to monitor firms after the issuance of more negative stock
recommendations (Past Recommendation).10
10Stock recommendations are taken from the I/B/E/S numeric recommendation code, which as-
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2.3.3 FDA Records Requested under FOIA
Table 2.3 contains summary statistics on FOIA analysts’ FDA requests. Panel A
presents a breakdown of record requests by type. (See Appendix B for definitions).
Since many analysts request more than one FDA record-type, for example, an ana-
lyst may request an EIR and a Form 483 on the same date, the number of records
exceeds the number of requests from Table 2.1. For our final sample of analysts,
226 out of 655 total requests are for a Form 483, a list of factory inspection vio-
lations. Other possibly adverse information documents requested are post market
surveillance complaints (127), EIRs (54), and warning letters (57). As for poten-
tially positive news, there are 65 requests for approval recommendation documents
(RECs).
Panel B has the outcomes of these requests. The FDA can send all or some
of the requested documents (“Sent” or “Partial Sent”) or can deny the release of the
document(s) to the requester (“Denial” or “Other Reason”). As the panel shows,
393 requests (385+8) were either fully or partially granted, which accounts for 74.4%
of the total individual requests. The other 25.6% consists of requests in which the
analyst received no information. To compare this with the full FDA population, we
gather the percentage of requests granted (partial or full) from the FDA website for
all processed requests over our time period. Full or partial grants, as a percentage
of all processed requests are 74%, a number highly consistent with our sample.
Panels C and D present some cross-sectional data on how healthcare analysts
use FOIA to obtain information. As Panel C shows, FOIA analysts, on average,
made at least one request for 31.7% of their covered companies, which translates to
approximately three out of 8.6 covered companies. However, there is variation in the
percentage of requested firms across analysts, with the bottom quartile requesting
FDA records on less than 9.1% of their covered firms and the top quartile making
signs recommendations on a scale of 1 through 5, representing strong buy, buy, hold, underperform,
and sell.
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FOIA requests on 41.7% of their covered firm portfolio.
As Panel D illustrates, analysts use FOIA requests in different ways. Some
analysts target multiple stocks with simultaneous FOIA requests – 65 of the 199
FOIA analysts (32.7%) sent out multiple FOIA requests in any one month at least
once. For example, in March 2002, a Goldman Sachs analyst sent out FOIA requests
for AERs for Amgen and Johnson & Johnson, respectively. Some analysts are
frequent FOIA users — 63 FOIA analysts (31.7%) made at least three FOIA requests
to the FDA over our sample period. Some analysts use FOIA to make requests on
healthcare stocks not covered by the analyst — 46 FOIA analysts (23.1%) made
requests on non-covered stocks in the same industry. Of these 46 analysts, 17
requested FDA records on a company in which the analyst covered at a later time.
Thus, even among our FOIA analysts, we observe variability in how and when
analysts request FDA records.
2.3.4 Subsequent Recommendation Changes
Table 2.4, Panel A presents a breakdown of new stock recommendations by FOIA
analysts occurring within one year after receipt of the requested record(s). The
receipt of FDA records is associated with a subsequent upgrade, downgrade, or a
new affirmation 46.3% of the time, with the percentages being 11.0% for upgrades,
15.3% for downgrades, and 20.0% for affirmations. Looking across record-types,
most new recommendations fall within a 50% range, with the exception of REC,
which elicits new recommendations only 33% of the time. RECs are the FDA’s
final decision as to whether the new drug or medical device has been approved
for subsequent sale and marketing. Since 2007, the FDA requires pharmaceutical
firms to register their clinical trials and to publish the results of these trials on the
clinicaltrials.gov website within 12 months of completion.11 Thus, for many trials,
11Enforcement of these rules, however, is weak with only 41% of trial results actually appearing
on the website [Zarin et al., 2015; Capkun et al., 2017] and an even smaller percentage appearing
within the 12 month window.
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analysts have access to prior information leading up to FDA approval, which may
explain the relatively small number of recommendation changes following the receipt
of these RECs.
To better understand the frequencies in which FDA records are followed by
new stock recommendations, we compare the percent changes from Panel A with
percent changes in recommendation changes by analysts without FDA records. We
provide three separate comparisons. Table 2.4, Panel B, column (1) shows the same
percentages as the last column of Panel A - this is the treatment group where the an-
alyst receives at least one FOIA-requested record from the FDA. In column (2), we
keep the analyst and the stock the same, but we examine changes in recommenda-
tions made in year t-2 (year t-2 through year t-1) by that analyst for the same stock
from column (1).12 As the column illustrates, the overall percent of new recommen-
dations made in year t-2 is 31.9%, compared to 46.3% in the year when the analyst
receives the records; testing for differences in percentages yields a z-statistic of 4.44,
significant at the 0.01 level. When examining upgrades/downgrades/affirmations,
we see evidence that all three types of recommendation changes are significantly
lower for the year in which the FOIA analyst did not have FDA records.
In column (4), we keep the analyst and the time period the same by exam-
ining the FOIA analyst’s same-year recommendations for covered stocks in which
the analyst did not make a FOIA request. For these stocks, the analyst issued new
recommendations 29.3% over the same year, a percentage significantly lower than
the 46.3% for the stocks in which FDA records were requested and received. When
comparing the breakdown of upgrades/downgrades/affirmations, we see that this
difference hails from downgrades and affirmations, but not from upgrades.
In column (6), we keep the stock and the time period the same by examining
new recommendations by non-FOIA analysts who cover the same stocks as those in
12Using a two-year look-back period instead of the year immediately prior to the request year
(year 0) allows us to better isolate the recommendation period from containing information that
may have led the analyst to issue the FOIA request.
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which the FOIA analyst receives the requested FDA records. For this group, we see a
markedly lower percentage of new recommendations — 11.8% compared to the 46.3%
for the FOIA-requesting analysts. The differences in new recommendations are sig-
nificantly different for all three classifications of upgrades/downgrades/affirmations.
These comparisons support the view that some requested FDA records con-
tain new information to the FOIA requester. FOIA requesters are more likely to
issue new stock recommendations after receiving FDA records when compared to
other stocks they cover over the same time period (column 4) and the same stock
in a period prior to receiving the FDA records (column 2). Further, FOIA analysts
are more likely to make new stock recommendations after receipt of FDA records
when compared to analysts not receiving these records (column 6).
2.4 Stock Returns From Sell-side Analyst Stock Rec-
ommendations
In this section, we test whether healthcare analysts provide more timely stock rec-
ommendations after receiving requested FDA records. We measure timeliness by
differences in stock returns generated in the year after a new recommendation is
made.
2.4.1 Calendar Time Portfolio Approach
We employ a standard calendar time portfolio approach to measure stock returns
[Fama, 1998; Lyon et al., 1999; Cohen et al., 2010]. We construct two treatment
portfolios: (1) a BUY portfolio of stocks consisting of FOIA analyst upgrades to
buy or strong buy from the previous recommendation, or initial coverage with a
buy or strong buy rating, or reiterations of buy or strong buy recommendations,
and (2) a SELL portfolio of stocks consisting of FOIA analyst downgrades to hold,
underperform, or sell from the prior recommendation, or initial coverage with a
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hold, underperform, or sell recommendation, or reiterations of hold, underperform
or sell recommendations. A stock is included in each portfolio only if a new recom-
mendation appears within 12 months after receipt of FDA records.
We create two similar control sample portfolios for healthcare analysts cov-
ering the same stocks as the FOIA analysts, but who do not request (nor receive)
FOIA FDA records. The main difference between the FOIA analysts’ BUY (SELL)
portfolios and the control analysts’ BUY (SELL) portfolios is the timing as to when
an analyst makes his/her respective stock recommendation. To illustrate, suppose a
FOIA analyst receives an FDA record for Eli Lilly on June 1, 2010. If that analyst
issues a buy recommendation on June 15, 2010, that buy recommendation would
be included in the FOIA analysts’ BUY portfolio. We next examine all other ana-
lysts covering Eli Lilly from June 1, 2010 forward, placing all buy recommendations
from these non-FOIA requesting analysts in a separate BUY portfolio. For exam-
ple, suppose a non-FOIA analyst issues a buy recommendation on July 10, 2010;
that analyst’s recommendation would be in the non-FOIA analyst’s BUY portfolio.
Thus, the difference between the two portfolios would be the timing of their buy
recommendations. We use the same criteria to create two SELL portfolios – one for
the FOIA requesting analysts and one for the non-FOIA requesting analysts.
Having created the BUY and SELL portfolios, we next accrue daily stock
returns. Figure 2.3 demonstrates the time line following the FOIA analyst’s receipt
of FDA records on day t0. Using a buy recommendation as an example, we designate
day t1 as the day in which the FOIA analyst upgrades, initiates or reiterates a buy
or strong buy recommendation after receiving FDA records. Consistent with Cohen
et al. [2010], we skip day t1 and begin accruing returns on day t1 + 1. We keep
the stock in the portfolio only until the analyst downgrades it (day t2) or until the
end of one year after the receipt of FDA records (day t0 + 1 year), whichever is
shorter. If no new recommendation is issued over the year following day t0, we do
not include that stock in the portfolio. If more than one FOIA analyst covers the
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stock, we keep the duplicate stock in the portfolio and treat them as distinct stocks
[Cohen et al., 2010]. Portfolio returns are equally weighted by calendar day; raw
returns are calculated on a daily basis and averaged across all FOIA analysts.
We do the exact same procedure for non-FOIA (control) analysts, except
that each control analyst’s day t1 is the day in that analyst issues the upgrade/buy
recommendation. Because day t1 differs between FOIA and non-FOIA analysts, our
approach assesses the timing abilities of the FOIA analyst vis-à-vis the non-FOIA
analyst covering the same stock after the FOIA analysts’ receipt of FDA records.
We use the same approach to calculate raw stock returns prior to the receipt
of FDA records. For a stock to be included in a specific portfolio, for example,
the FOIA BUY portfolio, the same FOIA analyst must give a buy or strong buy
recommendation on the same stock within one year prior to day t0. As shown
in Figure 2.3, we designate this new recommendation as day t−2. We keep the
stock in the FOIA BUY portfolio until the FOIA analyst either issues an opposite
recommendation on day t−1, or until day t0. We follow the same procedure for
the FOIA analyst’s SELL portfolio and for the control analysts’ BUY and SELL
portfolios, respectively. Our approach creates a balanced sample in terms of having
the same analyst and similar recommendation in both the pre- and post-receipt
return portfolios.
2.4.2 Timing Differences
We calculate the average timing difference in days between FOIA and control an-
alysts’ first post-receipt date recommendations. For the BUY portfolio, the mean
(median) difference is 104 (92) days, consistent with FOIA analysts providing more
timely recommendations than non-FOIA analysts following the receipt of an FDA
record. For the SELL portfolio, the mean (median) is 95 (69) days, a finding also
consistent with FOIA analysts issuing more timely recommendations following the
receipt of an FDA record.
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2.4.3 Univariate Comparisons of Stock Returns
Table 2.5, Panel A presents monthly calendar time portfolio stock returns and their
differences across analyst-type or time period. These statistics are descriptive be-
cause we do not control for differences in risk, analyst characteristics, firm charac-
teristics, or other available information. For the BUY portfolios, post-receipt date
returns across analysts with and without FOIA records produces an average dif-
ference in monthly returns of 1.21% (t-statistic = 2.22), which translates into a
yearly return of 14.52%. Since each portfolio is predicated on the analyst provid-
ing a buy/strong buy recommendation and/or an upgrade, the primary difference
between the two portfolios is the receipt of information. In contrast, we cannot re-
ject the hypothesis of no difference in post-receipt date returns for SELL portfolios
between requesting FOIA Analysts and our sample of control analysts. The differ-
ence in post-receipt date returns between FOIA and non-FOIA analysts is -0.45%
(t-statistic = -0.96).
2.4.4 Multivariate Analyses
To examine whether our univariate results are driven or affected by other factors,
we employ a difference-in-differences regression methodology. The regressions are
run on daily stock returns (Return), but consistent with Cohen et al. [2010], the
coefficients on all independent variables are adjusted to represent monthly returns.
Variable definitions are in Appendix 2.A. For the portfolio of BUYS or SELLS,
respectively, we estimate the following regression:
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(2.1)
FOIA Analyst is one if the analyst receives FDA records, and zero otherwise.
Post is one if the stock recommendation is made after the FDA receipt date, and
zero otherwise. The interaction between FOIA Analyst and Post tests whether
stock returns after the receipt of the FDA records are different for analysts with
and without these records.
We create two new analyst ability measures based on how FOIA analysts
use FOIA to request FDA records. Presumably, frequent FOIA requesters find
FDA records to be useful. Frequent FOIA Requester is an indicator if the analyst
filed at least three FOIA requests over our time period.13 According to Brown et al.
[2015], 83.42% of surveyed sell-side analysts consider “industry knowledge” to be
an important input when making stock recommendations; FOIA Industry Expertise
is an indicator if the analyst made at least one FOIA request to the FDA for an
uncovered healthcare stock. We interpret this practice as the FOIA analyst seeking
out information on competing firms, or more broadly, on his/her covered industry.
PhD/MD and MBA measure whether an analyst has these post-graduate
degrees, respectively. To control for the timeliness of the information contained in
the FDA record, we include Previous 8K Filing as an independent variable. For our
sample of FOIA receipts, 208 (39%) Form 8-Ks were filed with the SEC prior to
the request with some information about the requested FDA record. On average,
13Conversely, we create an indicator if the FOIA analyst request is the first FOIA request to
the FDA. Because this indicator and Frequent FOIA Requester are highly negatively correlated, we
re-do our analyses with this indicator instead of Frequent FOIA Requester. The empirical results
are qualitatively the same with either variable and therefore, we only show the empirical results
with Frequent FOIA Requester.
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these Form 8-Ks preceded the formal FOIA request by 10.3 days, with a median
lead-time of 7.0 days. To understand the contents of these filings, we manually
downloaded and read through each 8-K filing. Notably, the filings do not contain
the FDA record itself, but only reveal the existence of the record. Thus, the FDA
record itself contains more information than what is on the 8-K filing. Multiple
FOIA Requests on Stock is an indicator if at least two separate analysts placed
FOIA requests with the FDA on the same stock within a month of each other.
Our multivariate regression includes many controls based on the prior litera-
ture on stock returns (Firm Size, B/M, Momentum) and analysts’ recommendations
or forecast errors. We control for analyst’s ability and available resources (Analyst
Experience, #Stocks Covered, #Analysts at Brokerage Firm, and Star Analyst), and
for the firm’s information environment (Forecast Dispersion, Institutional Owner-
ship, and #New Articles). We include fixed effects (FE) for month and for firm.14
Table 2.5, Panel B presents covered firms’ characteristics. Other variables are in
Tables 2.2 and 2.3.
Column (1) of Table 2.6 presents the regression results for BUYS. The co-
efficient on (FOIA Analyst × Post) is significantly positive at the 0.05 level. In
economic terms, the 0.0169 coefficient is the extra monthly return a BUY portfolio
earns after a FOIA analyst receives the requested FDA records. Thus, after control-
ling for equity risk, analyst characteristics, and the firm’s information environment,
we find evidence consistent with FDA records providing value-relevant information
to FOIA requesting analysts.
We find a significantly positive coefficient on PhD/MD, consistent with ana-
lysts with terminal science or medical degrees leveraging their specialized knowledge
to better assess future stock values for healthcare companies. This finding is con-
14Alternatively, we include a fixed effect for the analyst. With this FE, we cannot include time
invariant analyst characteristics such as MBA or PhD/MD into the regression equation. The em-
pirical results with this FE are qualitatively the same as those without the analyst FE. Specifically,
the coefficients on FOIA Analyst × Post are qualitatively the same and remain significant at the
same levels.
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sistent with Bradley et al. [2017], who find that analysts with prior experience in
their covered industries are better predictors of future earnings. In contrast, hav-
ing an MBA degree provides no significant additional expertise, a finding somewhat
consistent with De Franco and Zhou [2009], who find weak evidence that having a
CFA improves analyst’s ability to forecast earnings.
The significantly positive coefficient on Multiple FOIA Requests on Stock
supports the view that FOIA analysts interpret the requested FDA record(s) in
similar ways. The statistically negative coefficient on Prior 8K Filing is consistent
with an 8-K filing muting an analyst’s advantage in using the information contained
in the requested FOIA record. Frequent FOIA Requester has a significantly positive
coefficient, consistent with the view that analysts who use FOIA requests more fre-
quently are the ones who benefit most from these records. The coefficient on FOIA
Industry Expertise, however, is insignificantly different from zero. The other vari-
ables support those found in prior literature (Firm Size, B/M, Momentum, Analyst
Experience, #Stocks Covered, Forecast Dispersion, Institutional Ownership, #News
Article).
Column (2) contains the regression results on stock returns on SELL portfo-
lios. Stock returns are negatively related to the receipt of FDA records by requesting
analysts, as seen by the significantly negative coefficient on (FOIA Analyst × Post),
(p-value < 0.10). In economic terms, FOIA analysts issuing sell recommendations
after the receipt of a requested FDA record, on average, avoid a monthly loss of
1.38% when compared to analysts without these records.
Similar to BUY portfolios, stock returns on SELL portfolios are significantly
related to the risk factors Firm Size, B/M, and Momentum. SELL portfolios
earn more negative stock returns for analysts with science or medical knowledge
(PhD/MD) or have an expertise with respect to the FOIA process (Frequent FOIA
Requester). We also find that returns on sell recommendations are associated with a
better information environment in general (Forecast Dispersion, Institutional Own-
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ership), with #News Articles, and with other analysts requesting the same FDA
record (Multiple FOIA Requests on Stock). Similar to the results on BUY port-
folios, the filing of a Form 8-K prior to the receipt of the FDA record mutes the
negative return on the SELL portfolios. The other independent variables are in-
significantly different from zero. In summary, Table 2.6 presents evidence consistent
with analysts finding FOIA requested FDA records to be informative in making
their future stock recommendations.
2.4.5 Information or Better Skill: Alternative Control Sample
An alternative explanation is that FOIA analysts are better stock pickers than non-
FOIA analysts. That is, even though we control for many analyst characteristics,
we cannot rule out the possibility that omitted analyst characteristics might be
driving our results. To examine this alternative explanation, we create a second
control sample and re-do our difference-indifferences regression analysis. Specifically,
we gather all FOIA requests that were rejected by the FDA (see Table 2.3) and
examine differences in subsequent stock returns between FOIA analysts receiving
their requested FDA records (treatment) and FOIA analysts not receiving their
requested FDA records (new control). Since both samples contain FOIA analysts
only, the primary difference between the two groups is the receipt/non-receipt of
requested FDA record(s).
We create a new indicator variable, Receipt of FOIA Request, if the FOIA
analyst received his/her requested record(s). We interact this variable with Post,
thus testing for differences in stock returns on BUY (SELL) portfolios before and
after receipt of FDA records. The regressions control for equity risk, the overall
information environment of the firm, the number of news stories, and the information
environment surrounding the FDA record itself. Since our sample includes only
those analysts making FOIA requests, we omit the analyst experience and ability
variables in our regression specifications.
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Table 2.7 contains the regression results. The empirical findings are consis-
tent with the information hypothesis associated with the receipt of the FDA records.
Specifically, the coefficient on (FOIA Analyst × Post) is significantly positive at the
0.05 level for the regressions on BUY portfolios and is significantly negative at the
0.10 level for the regressions on SELL portfolios. In economic terms, FOIA analysts
earn, on average, 2.32% higher monthly returns on their BUY portfolios and avoid
1.70% lower monthly returns on their SELL portfolios when in possession of the
FDA records. The equity risk variables and some of the information environment
variables remain significantly different from zero. In sum, Table 2.7 provides ev-
idence consistent with FDA records providing valuable information to requesting
analysts.
2.5 Inside the FDA Records
Our large sample stock return results are consistent with FOIA records provid-
ing value-relevant information to FOIA analysts. However, they do not lend much
insight into the type of information FOIA analysts use in revising their recommen-
dations. In this section, we go inside a subset of FDA records and examine (1) the
content of these records and (2) the types of information within these records most
associated with analysts’ revised stock recommendations.
To gain access to FDA records, we filed two separate FOIA requests to the
FDA in July 2017 asking for a subset of Form 483s and Warning Letters sent to
our FOIA analysts. Form 483s and most warning letters contain a list of factory
violations only. We select these two record-types because they are relatively easy (for
us) to read and understand when compared to EIRs or RECs, and the information
contained in these records are similar across records allowing us to classify the
information into various “buckets.”
To keep our sample manageable, we randomly selected 46 of the 92 Forms
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483 and all 16 Warning Letters from our initial sample that resulted in a post-receipt
recommendation by the FOIA analyst. The FDA sent us files on all our requests.
However, only 41 of the requested files contained all of the needed information for
this analysis — a record of the analyst’s request letter, a record of the FDA’s reply
to the analyst, and the FDA Form 483 or warning letter itself. Two of the warning
letters were not related to factory inspections, and therefore, were not used. Most
of the missing records are from requests by the analyst prior to 2011, leading us to
infer that the FDA only sent us records from their computer bank. Our final sample
has 27 Form 483s and 12 warning letters.
We printed and manually read each of the 39 FDA records. After a joint
consultation, we classified the factory violations into four distinct types: product,
manufacturing, testing, and documentation.15 A product violation is a mention of a
substandard drug or medical device. A manufacturing violation refers to a defect in
a factory’s manufacturing process. A test violation is when the firm fails to establish
a mandated test to monitor its processes or products, or receives a criticism as to
how a test was conducted. A documentation violation occurs when the firm fails to
adequately document its procedures or test results.
Appendix 2.C contains snapshots from the records the FDA sent us. The
blackened parts are redactions by the FDA. We classify the excerpt from the Thor-
atec Corporation Warning Letter as a product violation because it refers to a medical
device that “may have caused or contributed to a [patient’s] death.” The excerpt
from the Hospira Form 483 is a manufacturing violation because it discusses how
a factory “promotes the propagation of microbial contamination.” The Alpharma
Form 483 includes a “failure to perform the preparatory test for the validation of the
15The categorization of violations mirrors the standard operating process of typical pharmaceu-
tical and food companies. The product or device is fist designed (product) and then manufactured
by affiliated factories (manufacturing). In order to make sure the product or device reaches certain
criteria, testing procedures are implemented along the way to oversee the manufacturing processes
or product usage (testing). The activities in manufacturing and testing process are also recorded
for future reference (documentation). The categorization is consistent with key building blocks of
Quality System (QS) employed by FDA. It is able to capture all inspection violations from our
reading and analysis of FDA records.
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membrane filtration method. . . ” and, therefore, is classified as a testing violation.
The Genzyme Form 483 disclosure is an example of a documentation violation in
that it states that “activities performed during drug substance manufacture are not
adequately documented.”
Table 2.8, Panel A contains a numeration of our violation categories. On
average, each record contains 9.82 violations, with a range of 1 to 25 violations
[untabulated]. The two most prevalent violations relate to testing and documenta-
tion, with 82% and 74% of the records having at least one testing or documentation
violation, respectively. Manufacturing (44%) and product (33%) violations also are
commonly found. We further note that 21% of the records use the existence of a
current or previous complaint as an example of a product violation and therefore
we include it as a separate category.
Ex ante, we expect product, manufacturing, and complaints to be associated
with more negative news, as these violations may be indicative of more severe and
possibly more expensive problems within the firm. Conversely, we expect testing
and documentation violations to be less costly to the firm, thus being indicative of
less negative or problematic news.16 17
Regression Results We regress two measures of FOIA analysts’ post-receipt
stock recommendations on the number and type of each violation. NegConsensus
is an indicator if the FOIA analyst’s first post-receipt recommendation is more neg-
16If there are violations in product design and manufacturing process, then final products are
almost certainly flawed. By contrast, if testing procedure are not properly conducted or the docu-
ments are not appropriately maintained, the likelihood of final products being flawed will be sub-
stantially lower. Meanwhile, settlement costs and potential reputation damage brought by product,
manufacturing violations and complaints are much larger than those of testing and documentation
violations.
17Anecdotally, in 2014, an analyst at Leerink Partners wrote in a “research note” that she is not
changing her “outperform” rating on HeartWare after the company released a statement announcing
the receipt of a warning letter related to its Florida manufacturing facility [Seiffert, 2014]. Notably,
the warning letter found issues with the plant’s “procedures for validating device design, procedures
for implementing corrective and preventive action, maintaining records related to investigations
and validation of computer software.” [Seiffert, 2014] We would classify these issues as testing and
documentation violations.
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ative than the consensus recommendation on that date for all non-FOIA analysts.
Downgrade is an indicator if the FOIA analyst’s first post-receipt recommendation
is a downgrade from his/her previous stock recommendation. If our ex ante ex-
pectations are correct about the relative costs of correcting these violations, and if
the analyst is using this information, we would expect to see positive associations
between NegConsensus (Downgrade) and product, manufacturing, or complaint vi-
olations, and negative associations with testing or documentation violations.
Table 2.8, Panel B contains the regression results on NegConsensus. In col-
umn (1), we find no association between NegConsensus and the number of violations
contained in the FDA record, suggesting that the number of violations itself does
not influence the FOIA analyst’s post-receipt recommendation. However, in column
(2), we find evidence that the severity of the information contained in the FDA
records is associated with the FOIA analyst’s first post-receipt recommendation, as
evidenced by the significantly negative coefficient on Documentation and the sig-
nificantly positive coefficient on Complaint. Further, we note that the R-squared
value for the regression in column (2) is 0.19, explaining about 19% of variation in
NegConsensus. In Panel C, we present the regression results on Downgrade. The
results are consistent with FOIA analysts being less likely to downgrade stocks with
Documentation violations, as evidenced by its significantly negative coefficient in
column (2).18 Both panels support our expectations about associations between
recommendation revisions and the severity of the listed violations.
Finally, we discover that 7 of the 39 records resulted in subsequent class
action lawsuits in which plaintiffs specifically accuse the firm of hiding adverse in-
formation from investors by not revealing the existence or contents of the Form
18We also regress individual one-year stock returns following the first post-receipt recommenda-
tion on the number of violations and the type of violations, respectively for each record. Wong
et al. [2017] do a similar type of analysis for earnings forecast accuracy in China based on the
content of home based/international based analyst reports. Our results are consistent with our
analyst recommendation results in that we find significantly negative coefficients on ln(number of
violations) and on Manufacturing, respectively. That is, we find valuation effects associated with
the severity of the violations stated in the Form 483/Warning Letter.
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483 or warning letter. To see if FOIA analysts anticipate the ramifications sur-
rounding this negative event, we create an indicator (Lawsuit) for these 7 firms. As
column (3) of Panels B and C show, FOIA analysts are more likely to have a neg-
ative post-receipt stock recommendation vis-à-vis the consensus recommendation
(Panel B) and are more likely to downgrade the firm’s stock (Panel C) for firms
that ultimately are sued for not disclosing the contents of these specific records.
In summary, this section presents evidence consistent with analysts differentiating
among violation types when making their subsequent recommendations.
2.6 Additional Analyses
As we emphasized in the introduction, we focus mainly on analysts’ stock recom-
mendations as they best align analysts’ benefits with their incentives to acquire
private information [Groysberg et al., 2011; Brown et al., 2015]. In unreported re-
sults, we also examined analysts’ one-year ahead and two-year ahead earnings and
revenue forecast error both before and after the receipt of FDA records.19 We find
that FOIA analysts’ earnings and revenue forecasts are more accurate after the re-
ceipt of FDA records, both compared to non-FOIA analysts and FDA-denied FOIA
analysts. The results hold for both one-year and two-year ahead forecasts.
We conducted a quasi-placebo test in which we examine stock returns (Re-
turn) following two types of records – RECs and All Other Records. This division
divides our FDA records into ex ante good news (RECs) and ex ante bad news
(All Other Records). The main difference between this test and what we have done
already is that we do not condition these two portfolios on analysts’ stock recom-
19There are some cases in which companies issue 8-K filings related to requested FDA records after
analysts requesting the information. To gain a better understanding of how and when FDA records
affect future earnings and revenues, we manually downloaded and read those 8-K filings. From our
reading, we find that form 8-K filings almost never provide a timeframe connecting the requested
FDA record to its expected resolution; instead, they contain brief mentions of actual resolutions.
Further, resolutions of FDA violations or the time for a firm to roll out a new drug/medical device
varies substantively across events and can have a fairly long time horizon. Because of the varying
timeframes, we do our analyses on two forecasting windows: one-year and two-year ahead forecasts.
32
mendations. Thus, our quasi-placebo test aims to examine if the existence of the
record-type per se gives us the same stock return results as our BUY/SELL findings.
If the results with these two portfolios are the same as those found in Table 2.6, we
can infer that learning about the existence of the record itself generates positive or
negative stock returns – that is, there is no added value to the analyst examining
the content of FDA records. By examining returns spanning one-year prior to and
one-year after receipt date, we find that knowledge of an ex ante good (bad) news
FDA record does not, per se, result in subsequent positive (negative) stock returns.
Thus our findings are consistent with FOIA analysts examining the content of FDA
records and using requested FDA records in a timely fashion when issuing their
stock recommendations.
2.7 Concluding Remarks
This paper adds to the literature on sell-side analysts’ search for private information
by examining a source of not readily accessible information — FOIA requested FDA
records. We obtain our data through our own FOIA requests, asking the FDA to
send us information on past FOIA requests as well as copies of some specific records
sent to analysts.
Our findings are consistent with healthcare analysts using FOIA-requested
FDA records to make more timely (profitable) stock recommendations. We also
present evidence that these FOIA analysts revise their stock recommendations more
frequently and sooner than healthcare analysts not receiving FDA records. Further,
a content analysis of specific FDA records on factory inspections provides evidence
consistent with more serious violations (e.g., product or manufacturing) being more
aligned with downward recommendation revisions than less serious violations (e.g.,
testing or documentation).
Our study is the first to do an extensive analysis into the process by which
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analysts gather qualitative, non-public information from a source outside of firm
management. As such, it complements prior studies on analysts’ search for private
information by providing a new peek into a different “black box” of inputs used by
sell-side equity analysts when formulating their stock recommendations.
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Appendix 2.A Variable Definitions
 Definition 
Dependent Variables  
FOIA Requester Indicator equal to 1 for an analyst who filed FOIA requests to the FDA, and 
0 otherwise. 
Returns  Daily stock returns as reported by CRSP. 
NegConsensus Indicator equal to 1 if a FOIA analyst’s first post-receipt recommendation 
is more negative than the consensus recommendation on that date for all 
non-FOIA analysts. 
Downgrade  Indicator equal to 1 if an FOIA analyst’s first post-receipt recommendation 
is a downgrade. 
  
FOIA Variables  
FOIA Analyst  Indicator equal to 1 for an analyst who receives requested FOIA records, 
and 0 otherwise. 
Post Indicator equal to 1 for periods after the FOIA receipt date, and 0 otherwise. 
Receipt of FOIA Request Indicator equal to 1 if the FDA sends the FOIA requested record to the 




Analyst Experience Number of years the analyst has made recommendations as recorded in 
I/B/E/S. 
Distance Number of years between the forecast and the earnings announcement as 
recorded in I/B/E/S. 
#Forecasts  Number of the analyst’s forecasts on the FOIA stock within one year before 
the FOIA request as recorded in I/B/E/S. 
#Stocks Covered Number of stocks covered by the analyst from I/B/E/S. 
Past Earnings FE The analyst’s last one-year earnings forecast error for the previous fiscal 
year from I/B/E/S. 
Past Recommendation The last stock recommendation prior to the FOIA analyst’s request. It is 
equal to 1 for Strong Buy, 2 for Buy, 3 for Hold, 4 for Underperform, and 5 
for Sell; from I/B/E/S. 
PhD/MD (MBA) Indicator equal to 1 if the analyst has a PhD/MD (MBA) degree, and 0 
otherwise from LinkedIn and other websites. 
Star Analyst Indicator equal to 1 if the analyst is voted an all-American star analyst in the 
October issue of The Institutional Investor magazine for the given year, and 
0 otherwise. 
#Analysts at Brokerage 
Firm  




FOIA Industry Expertise Indicator equal to 1 if the analyst filed FOIA requests on uncovered stocks 
in the same industry, and 0 otherwise. 
Frequent FOIA 
Requester 
Indicator equal to 1 if the analyst filed at least three FOIA requests to the 
FDA, and 0 otherwise. 
Multiple FOIA Requests 
on Stock 
Indicator equal to 1 if there were more than one FOIA request on the same 
stock within a month of each other, and 0 otherwise. 
Prior 8K Filing Indicator equal to 1 if the FOIA request is preceded by a Form 8-K filing 
with some information about the FDA record, and 0 otherwise. 
FDA Record Violations  
Number of Violations Number of violations identified in the FDA record. 
Product Indicator equal to 1 if a FDA record mentions a substandard drug or medical 
device. 
Manufacturing Indicator equal to 1 if the FDA record refers to a defect in a factory’s 
manufacturing process. 
Testing Indicator equal to 1 if the FDA record refers to the firm’s failure to establish 
a mandated test to monitor its processes or products, or received a criticism 
as to how a test was conducted. 
Documentation Indicator equal to 1 if the FDA record mentions a failure to adequately 
document its procedures or test results. 
Complaint Indicator equal to 1 if the FDA record refers to the existence of a current or 
previous consumer complaint as an example of a product violation. 
Lawsuit Indicator equal to 1 for a subsequent class action lawsuit in which the 
plaintiffs specifically accuse the firm of hiding adverse information from 
investors by not revealing the existence or contents of the Form 483 or 
warning letter. 
Other Independent Variables 
B/M Ratio of the book value of equity to the market value of equity from 
Compustat. 
Firm Size Natural logarithm of lagged market capitalization in millions of dollars from 
CRSP. 
Forecast Dispersion Standard deviation of the current two-year ahead EPS forecasts from 
I/B/E/S. 
Institutional Ownership Proportion of shares held by institutional investors as reported by the 
Thomson Reuters Ownership Database. 
Momentum Firm’s buy-and-hold return in the past 12 months as reported from CRSP. 
#News Articles Number of daily newspaper articles by Dow Jones Newswires as reported 
by RavenPack. 
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Appendix 2.B FDA Record Types




Upon completion of an inspection, an EIR is written which 
details inspection findings.  
Form 483 A Form 483 is issued to firm management at the conclusion of 
an inspection when an investigator has observed any conditions 
that may constitute violations of the Food Drug and Cosmetic 




FDA Adverse Event 
Reporting System 
(FAERS) 
FAERS is a database that contains information on adverse e 
drug reactions (ADR) and medication error reports submitted to 
FDA. It supports the FDA's post-market safety surveillance 
program for all approved drugs and therapeutic biologics. 
Medical Device 
Reporting (MDR) 
MDR is FDA’s post-market surveillance tool to monitor device 
performance, detect potential device-related safety issues, and 
contribute to benefit-risk assessments of these products. Both 
mandatory and voluntary reports are included. 
Center for Food 





CAERS are reports about adverse health events and product 
complaints related to CFSAN-regulated products, including 
conventional foods, dietary supplements and cosmetics. Reports 
are mandatory and voluntary for dietary supplements, and are 




The purpose of VAERS is to detect possible signals of adverse 
events associated with vaccines.  Reports are voluntary only. 
Warning Letter (WL) When the FDA finds that a manufacturer has significantly 
violated FDA regulations, it notifies the manufacturer in the 




Approval recommendations (RECs) contain the FDA’s decisions 
on New Drug Application (NDA) and Biologic License 
Application (BLA). The NDA application is the vehicle through 
which drug sponsors formally propose to the FDA approval of 
the sale and marketing in the U.S of a new drug. BLA is a 
request for permission to introduce, or deliver for introduction, a 
biologic product into interstate commerce. 
Other Includes company responses to FDA reports, correspondence, 




Appendix 2.C Examples of Types of Disclosures in
Warning Letters and Forms 483 (Factory Inspections)






























Figure 2.1: FDA Drug Approval Process and Post-Market Monitoring
Preclinical Animal Testing 
 
 




Phase I: small sample test for toxicity 
 
Phase II: medium sample test for viability 
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*The shaded rectangles contain all FDA records subject to FOIA requests [REC, FAERS, 
MDR, CAERS, VAERS].  Everything above REC is not subject to FOIA requests. See 
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Figure 2.2: Factory Inspection Process




















* The shaded rectangles contain all records subject to FOIA requests. See Appendix B for a 
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Figure 2.3: Time Frames for Accruing Raw Stock Returns
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42
Appendix 2.E Tables
Table 2.1: FOIA Requests to the FDA

























1999 3 0 0% 3,637 3,640 
2000 6 4 67% 3,963 3,969 
2001 7 3 43% 4,540 4,547 
2002 45 24 53% 19,629 19,674 
2003 17 9 53% 16,586 16,603 
2004 19 12 63% 19,959 19,978 
2005 32 24 75% 17,458 17,490 
2006 37 23 62% 18,394 18,431 
2007 31 15 48% 10,946 10,977 
2008 31 18 58% 8,942 8,973 
2009 70 47 67% 9,980 10,050 
2010 73 57 78% 9,330 9,403 
2011 102 77 75% 9,341 9,443 
2012 133 68 51% 8,783 8,916 
2013 155 77 50% 9,830 9,985 
2014 112 70 63% 9,958 10,070 
Total 873 528 60% 181,276 182,149 
 
Panel B: Most Frequent Analyst Requests (Over 20 Requests) 
Brokerage House No. of 
Requests 
Rank No. of Requests in 
Final Sample 
Favus Institutional Research 87 1 0 
RBC Capital Markets 61 2 54 
Jefferies & Co 57 3 45 
Wells Fargo Securities 57 3 49 
Merrill Lynch 34 5 32 
Leerink Swan & Co 32 6 21 
Cowen and Company 32 6 0 
Morgan Stanley 29 8 21 
Northcoast Research 29 8 19 
Robert W Baird & Co 28 10 18 
Collins Stewart LLC 25 11 0 
Sanford Bernstein & Co  23 12 17 
Citigroup 23 12 15 
Deutsche Bank 22 14 18 
JP Morgan 21 15 16 
UBS 20 16 11 
Stifel Nicolaus & Co 20 16 12 
Panel A presents the number of requests by year. Requests in FDA pdf File are requests from sell-side 
analysts identified in the FDA pdf file. Requests with Analysts in I/B/E/S are requests from sell-side 
analysts in the FDA pdf file matched with the I/B/E/S database. Percent of FDA pdf File in I/B/E/S is 
Requests with Analysts in I/B/E/S divided by Requests in FDA pdf File. Requests from Non-Analysts 
include public and private companies, hospitals, doctors, law firms, consulting firms and individuals. Year 
is the year the request was made.  Panel B ranks the brokerage or research firm by the number of FOIA 
requests. 
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Table 2.2: Analysts’ Characteristics
Panel A: Analysts’ Characteristics 
 FOIA Analysts Control Analysts Difference with 
Control Analysts 




Analyst Experience 5.798 4.055 7.580 4.492 -1.782*** -6.74 
#Stocks Covered 8.606 4.279 8.365 5.358 0.241 0.86 
Star Analyst 15.3% 32.6% 10.4% 29.7% 4.9%** 2.32 
MBA 52.6% 49.2% 48.3% 49.8% 4.3% 1.34 
PhD/MD 26.2% 44.0% 31.4% 46.1% -5.2%* -1.82 
#Forecasts  6.208 2.811 5.002 2.924 1.206*** 6.59 
Past Recommendation 2.437 1.037 2.216 0.937 0.221*** 3.29 
Past Forecast Error 0.006 0.017 0.004 0.012 0.002** 2.33 
#Analysts at Brokerage Firm 82.669 70.077 70.988 62.192 11.681** 2.57 
 
 
Panel B:  Probit Model for the Prediction of FOIA Requests 
Dependent Variable: FOIA Requester Coefficient t-statistic Marginal 
Probability 
Analyst Experience  -0.049*** -5.61 -0.3% 
Ln (#Stocks Covered) 0.021 0.52 0.1% 
Star Analyst 0.099 1.03 0.6% 
MBA 0.095 1.58 1.0% 
PhD/MD -0.111 -1.60 -1.0% 
Ln(# Forecasts) 0.343*** 6.03 2.0% 
Past Recommendation 0.099*** 3.25 0.6% 
Past Forecast Error 4.374** 2.35 25.5% 
Ln (#Analysts at Brokerage Firm) 0.082** 2.54 0.5% 
Observations  7,253   
Pseudo R-squared 0.06   
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively (two 
tailed). Panel A presents characteristics of FOIA analysts and control analysts, respectively. Panel B presents 
a probit model for predicting FOIA requests. We report coefficients, their heteroscedasticity-robust t-
statistics, and the marginal probability change induced by a one-unit change in the value of specific covariate 
from its sample average. See Appendix A for variable definitions. 
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Table 2.3: FOIA Requests to FDA
















Total 54 226 127 57 65 126 655 
 
 
Panel B: Outcomes of Requests by Analysts for FDA Records 







Total 385 8 18 52 37 25 3 528 
 
 
Panel C: Percent of Unique Firms in the FOIA Analyst’s Portfolio with FOIA Requests 
Average 25 percentile Median  75 percentile Std. Dev. 
31.7% 9.1% 16.7% 41.7% 31.8% 
 
 
Panel D: Variations in FOIA Requests with Receipts 
 Number of 
Analysts 




FOIA Requests on Multiple Stocks        
in at Least One Month 
65 32.7% 218 
Analyst’s Requests ≥ 3 63 31.7% 234 
Requests on Non-Covered Stocks 46 23.1% 66 
  Of Which Covered Later 17 8.5% 20 
This table presents descriptive data on the type of FDA records analysts request under the FOIA (Panel A) 
and the outcomes of these requests (Panel B). For Panel A, see Appendix B for a description of each FDA 
report type. Post Market Surveillance Database is a combination of FAERS, MDR, CAERS, and VAERS. 
In Panels B Sent is when the FDA grants FOIA information to the investment company requester, Partial 
Sent is when at least one, but not all, of the requested records is sent, Denial is when no record is sent, No 
Record is when the FDA’s response is that the requested record does not exist, Withdrawn involves cases 
in which the requester voluntarily withdraws its FOIA request, and Other Reason refers to cases when the 
request is closed due to other reasons and no information is released to the requester. A single FOIA request 
may cover multiple categories. Panel C reports the percent of unique firms in the FOIA analyst’s portfolio 
with FOIA requests.  Panel D reports variations in how FOIA analysts use FOIA to make their requests. 
45
Table 2.4: Analysts’ Stock Recommendations Following Receipt of FDA Records
Panel A:  Number of New Recommendations After Receipt of FDA Records  
Direction of First New 
Recommendation 
EIR Form 483 Complaints WL Other REC Total/ 
Percent of Total 
Upgrade 6 25 4 4 8 2 49/11.0% 
Downgrade 3 27 12 6 15 5 68/15.3% 
Affirmation 6 40 14 6 17 6 89/20.0% 
Total 15 92 30 16 40 13 206/46.3% 





Panel B:  Comparisons of Percent of New Recommendations by Whether Analyst Received or 
Did Not Receive FOIA Requested Records 
 









































of (1) – 
(6) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Upgrade 11.0% 6.3% 2.51** 10.4% 0.39 3.9% 4.76*** 
Downgrade 15.3% 11.2% 1.78* 8.8% 3.68*** 4.7% 6.19*** 
Affirmation 20.0% 14.4% 2.23** 10.1% 5.05*** 3.2% 8.82*** 
Total Percent 46.3% 31.9% 4.44*** 29.3% 6.85*** 11.8% 14.49*** 
 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively 
(two tailed). Panel A describes the direction of the first new stock recommendation by FOIA analysts after 
receiving FDA records.  See Appendix B for a description of the record types. Panel B presents the 
percentages of the first new recommendation and compares them to (a) FOIA analysts’ recommendation 
changes on the same stocks in the year t-2, (b) FOIA analysts’ recommendation changes on other stocks 
covered by FOIA analysts in the same year as the FOIA stocks, and (c) Non-FOIA analysts’ 
recommendation changes on FOIA stocks during the same year as the FOIA analysts’ new 
recommendations. 
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Table 2.5: Descriptive Statistics
Panel A:  Monthly Stock Returns Before and After the Receipt Date 
 
 
Panel B:  Firm Characteristics 
 Average Median Std. Dev. 
Market Capitalization ($Billion) 23.76 6.43 44.43 
B/M 0.61 0.34 1.89 
Momentum (Buy, Past 12 Months) 28.99% 12.71% 64.73% 
Momentum (Sell, Past 12 Months) 16.35% 7.79% 50.50% 
Forecast Dispersion 0.29 0.17 0.34 
Institutional Ownership 68.45% 78.30% 29.20% 
# News Articles 0.67 0 1.38 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively (two 
tailed). Panel A shows the average calendar-time monthly returns of stocks based on buy or sell recommendations. 
BUY encompasses both buys and upgrades in columns (1) through (3); SELL has holds/sells and downgrades in 
























































Table 2.6: Regressions on BUY and SELL Portfolios
Dependent Variable Returns on BUY Portfolios Returns on SELL Portfolios 
 (1) (2) 
FOIA Analyst -0.0026 -0.0077 
 [-0.33] [-1.10] 
Post 0.0099 0.0184* 
 [1.11] [1.95] 
FOIA Analyst × Post 0.0169** -0.0138* 
 [2.38] [-1.89] 
Firm Size -0.0085*** -0.0407*** 
 [-4.12] [-4.42] 
B/M 0.0053** 0.0151** 
 [2.05] [2.41] 
Momentum -0.0904*** -0.5827*** 
 [-3.11] [-6.35] 
Analyst Experience 0.0005* 0.0005 
 [1.64] [1.02] 
Ln (# Stocks Covered) -0.0090** 0.0031 
 [-2.44] [1.21] 
Ln (#Analysts at Brokerage Firm) 0.0010 -0.0002 
 [0.57] [-0.15] 
PhD/MD 0.0101** -0.0189*** 
 [2.56] [-2.69] 
MBA -0.0009 -0.0012 
 [-0.35] [-0.36] 
Star Analyst -0.0015 -0.0089 
 [-0.31] [-0.60] 
Frequent FOIA Requester 0.0229** -0.0472*** 
 [2.10] [-2.70] 
FOIA Industry Expertise 0.0034 -0.0064 
 [0.26] [-0.22] 
Forecast Dispersion -0.0292*** 0.0548** 
 [-3.16] [3.69] 
Institutional Ownership 0.0190** -0.0465*** 
 [2.48] [-3.00] 
Ln (# News Articles) 0.0145* -0.0577*** 
 [1.69] [-3.94] 
Previous 8K Filing -0.0104*** 0.0130* 
 [-3.55] [1.66] 
Multiple FOIA Requests on Stock 0.0117** -0.0783*** 
 [2.40] [-2.60] 
Constant 0.0556*** 0.0470 
 [6.63] [0.55] 
Month and Firm FEs Yes Yes 
Observations 363,234 352,931 
R-squared (%) 0.88 0.93 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively (two 
tailed). This table presents regression results on daily stock returns for BUY and SELL portfolios.  t-statistics 
are in parentheses. Returns are winsorized at 0.01%, and standard errors are clustered at the month level. See 
Appendix A for variable definitions. 
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Table 2.7: Regressions on Alternative Control Sample
Dependent Variable Stock Returns on BUY 
Portfolios 
Stock Returns on SELL 
Portfolios 
 (1) (2) 
Receipt of FOIA Request -0.0040 -0.0032 
 [-0.38] [-0.33] 
Post 0.0131 0.0157** 
 [1.01] [2.34] 
Receipt of FOIA Request × Post 0.0232** -0.0170* 
 [2.12] [-1.71] 
Firm Size -0.0091*** -0.0164*** 
 [-2.71] [-4.19] 
B/M 0.0322*** 0.0072* 
 [3.96] [1.73] 
Momentum -0.1399** -0.7285*** 
 [-3.29] [-8.46] 
Forecast Dispersion -0.0146 0.0550*** 
 [-1.38] [2.98] 
Institutional Ownership 0.0070 -0.0546*** 
 [0.50] [-3.69] 
Ln(# News Articles) 0.0528*** -0.0926*** 
 [3.51] [-4.46] 
Multiple FOIA Requests on Stock 0.0034 -0.0244** 
 [0.25] [-2.05] 
Constant 0.1675*** 0.2972*** 
 [4.11] [5.29] 
Month and Firm FEs Yes Yes 
Observations 24,987 33,497 
R-squared (%) 0.58 0.84 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively (two 
tailed). This table presents regression analyses of daily stock returns on BUY and SELL portfolios.  The 
control sample consists of FOIA analysts who did not receive a requested FDA record. t-statistics are in 
parentheses. Stock returns are winsorized at 0.01%, and standard errors are clustered at the month level. See 
Appendix A for variable definitions. 
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Table 2.8: Information Contained in Warning Letters and Form 483s
 















      
Number 9.82 13 17 32 29 8 
 %  33% 44% 82% 74% 21% 
       
Warning 
Letters 
 7 5 12 6 5 
Form 483s  6 12 20 23 3 
 
 
Panel B: FOIA Analyst First Post-Receipt Recommendation is More Negative  
                than Consensus Recommendation 
Dependent Variable NegConsensus 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Ln (Number of Violations) 0.0376   
 [0.46]   
Product  0.0588  
  [0.29]  
Manufacturing   0.0310  
  [0.12]  
Testing  0.0234  
  [0.07]  
Documentation  -0.4754**  
  [-2.45]  
Complaint   0.3133*  
  [1.66]  
Lawsuit   0.6240** 
   [2.09] 
Constant 0.5678*** 0.9530*** 0.6800 
 [2.82] [2.87] [7.02] 
Observations 39 39 39 
R-squared 0.01 0.19 0.05 
 
50
Panel C: FOIA Analyst’s First Post-Receipt Recommendation is a Downgrade  
Dependent Variable: Downgrade 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Ln (Number of Violations) 0.0872   
 [0.90]   
Product  -0.3187  
  [-1.60]  
Manufacturing   -0.0060  
  [-0.02]  
Testing  0.1129  
  [0.34]  
Documentation  -0.5730***  
  [-2.69]  
Complaint   0.1109  
  [0.33]  
Lawsuit   0.4583*** 
   [4.32] 
Constant 0.5422** 1.0146*** 0.5417*** 
 [2.39] [2.73] [5.11] 
Observations 39 39 39 
R-squared 0.01 0.29 0.04 
 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively (two 
tailed). t-statistics are in parentheses. Panel A has a numeration of the types of violations (See Appendix A for 
definitions). Panel B presents summary statistics for regressions on whether the FOIA analyst’s post-receipt first 
stock recommendation is more negative than the consensus stock recommendation.  Panel C presents summary 
statistics for regressions on whether the FOIA analyst downgraded the stock recommendation after receipt of 









In 2016 election cycle, record-breaking $6.8 billion were spent on presidential and
congressional elections.1 Although it is difficult to pin down the exact number, a
large fraction of these election funding comes from U.S. public companies and their
employees. For instance, the Political Action Committee (PAC) of Honeywell Inter-
national spent $9.2 million.2 Should public companies give shareholders the right
to know their political spending? Some argue that companies’ political spending
may not be in the best interest of shareholders and therefore should be disclosed
to shareholders.3 Others argue that disclosing political spending to shareholders
1See CBS news. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/election-2016s-price-tag-6-8-billion
2See Center for Responsive Politics Website.
https://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/lookup2.php?strID=C00096156&cycle=2016
3Bebchuk and Jackson(2013) provides this kind of argument. Some other public figures expressed
this kind of concern as well. For example, U.S. Senators Richard Blumenthal and Chris Murphy
joined a letter, led by U.S. Senator Bob Menendez, to the new SEC Chair and reintroduced the
Shareholder Protection Act—two actions aimed at requiring public companies to disclose political
52
would merely incur additional costs and would put the company at a disadvantage
by revealing confidential corporate strategy.4 Currently this is under heated debate
as Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is considering the possibility to form
regulations requiring public companies to disclose their political spending. How-
ever, until now, we still lack quantitative evidences in many aspects to understand
corporate political transparency (CPT).
In this paper, we explore the drivers and implications of corporate political
transparency (CPT) through the lens of shareholder engagements. The rise of share-
holder engagements on corporate political transparency began in recent decade.5
They usually file shareholder proposals with targeted companies in order to pursue
changes.
We first document that there are substantial amount of successful shareholder
engagements. Past research [e.g. Bebchuk and Jackson Jr, 2012; Cohn et al., 2016;
Copland and O’Keefe, 2016] generally focuses on the low success rate of CPT-related
shareholder proposals in shareholder meeting. They classify the sudden disclosure of
political spending by companies as “voluntary”. We find that in those cases, share-
holder proponents and company management reach agreement before the meeting,
leading to withdrawal of shareholder proposals in exchange for improved corpo-
rate political transparency. This finding echoes the widespread behind-the-scenes
intervention documented in the literature [e.g. McCahery et al., 2016]. Our find-
ing shows the importance of shareholder democracy in driving corporate political
spending to their shareholders. They wrote “. . . it is imperative that the SEC move swiftly to
provide investors and the public with transparency about corporate political spending. Without
this disclosure, executives will remain free to spend corporate funds to influence election and policy
outcomes without any accountability or oversight.”
4For example, Warren Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway has been continuously objecting sharehold-
ers’ effort in improving corporate political transparency. In the 2017 proxy statement, the board
replied “. . . To the contrary, the Board of Directors believes the adoption of the reporting being pro-
posed, in addition to creating unnecessary administrative costs, could expose Berkshire subsidiaries
to competitive harm without commensurate benefit to our shareholders.” Some other public fig-
ures, such as Tom Quaadman, executive vice president of U.S. Chamber Center for Capital Markets
Competitiveness, also expressed similar views.




We then analyse activist shareholders’ target decisions. We find that activist
shareholders tend to target companies with PAC committee, suggesting that PAC
activities influence shareholders’ perception of corporate political activism. Target
companies have lower political transparency level than non-target companies in all
dimensions. Consistent with literature on governance-related shareholder proposals
[Karpoff et al., 1996], targeted companies have larger size and poorer long-term per-
formance in terms of book-to-market ratio and past stock returns. Not surprisingly,
companies with higher percentage of politically connected directors are more likely
to be targeted. Targets also exhibit relatively higher institutional ownership, which
makes it easier for activist shareholders to acquire stakes and coordinate with other
stakeholders [Agarwal, 2007; Brav et al., 2016].
Conditional on activist investors’ target decision, we find the likelihood of
successful engagement depends on activist types. Consistent with institutional in-
vestors are superior in accumulating shares and coordinating with other investors,
we find that institutional investors are more likely to succeed. We further document
that, engagements by SRI funds, among different types of institutional investors,
are most likely to be successful. This is consistent with SRI funds, due to their ex-
pertise in areas related to social aspects of firms, are more able to provide relevant
guidance to targeted firms. As the stated objectives of SRI funds involve delivering
social benefits to stakeholders apart from financial benefits to their investors, SRI
funds might also be more aggressive in achieving social objectives than other types
of active investors in order to attract more investment. In line with labor unions
suffering conflict of interest with company management [Agrawal, 2012], we find
that labor unions are less likely to achieve progress in their engagements than other
institutional investors.
Turning to ex-post implications, we first provide evidences that successful
shareholder engagements lead to bigger improvement in political transparency. We
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rely on CPA-Zicklin index to measure political transparency level, which significantly
shrank the sample in this part of analysis due to its limited coverage. We still find
that successfully engaged companies experience a bigger improvement in political
transparency at the event year than unsuccessfully engaged companies. This finding
reassures that CPT-related shareholder engagements can indeed bring in changes to
targeted companies.
We next examine the impact of political transparency based on short-term
stock market reactions to shareholder engagement outcomes. Our approach has
several advantages. First, the stock market is able to aggregate and process the in-
formation in a timely manner and impound the information in stock prices. Second,
we use the public announcement date and therefore ensures that stock market par-
ticipants are aware of the outcome. Third, the outcome of shareholder engagement is
unlikely to be fully anticipated by the market participants before the announcement
date. The biggest challenge in the analysis is lack of archival data on the pub-
lic outcome announcement date. To solve this problem, we hand collect outcome
announcement dates of both successful engagements and unsuccessful engagements
from various sources. We find that stock market responds favorably to success-
ful engagements in politically active companies. The cumulative abnormal return
(CAAR) during the (-1,10) announcement window is 3.16%. Comparing successful
engagements and unsuccessful engagements reveals that the market reaction to suc-
cessful engagements is statistically more positive. However, the effect is not present
in politically inactive companies.
We next investigate the channels through which political transparency affects
firm value. Market reaction is more favourable to successful engagements in high
political uncertainty environment. This finding suggests that corporate political
transparency is more valuable when hidden political risk is higher. Consistent with
the disciplinary effect of corporate political transparency, we also find that successful
shareholder engagements result in slower growth of PAC expenditure in politically
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active companies. In asset pricing sense, these findings suggest that increased corpo-
rate political transparency reduces firms’ cost of capital (discount rate) by lowering
associated risk premium and thus raises firms’ stock prices. Positive market reac-
tions to successful engagements in politically active companies are more likely to be
attributed to decreased cost of capital rather than revised cash flow projections.
Lastly, we examine the institutional investors’ behavior in the medium to
long-term. We find that successfully engaged companies, relative to unsuccessfully
engaged companies, experience an increase in institutional ownership following the
outcome announcement date. The effect persists more than one quarter after out-
come announcement date. This finding supports institutional investors’ preference
for sustainability and corporate social responsibility [Hartzmark and Sussman, 2018;
Gibson and Krueger, 2018].
Overall, we find that shareholder engagements help shape corporate politi-
cal transparency. Our market-based tests provide empirical support for corporate
political transparency. The evidences lend support to the petition requesting that
SEC develop rules on the transparency of corporate political spending [e.g. Bebchuk
and Jackson Jr, 2012].
Our paper is closely related to growing literature on political uncertainty.
Political uncertainty is shown to increase volatility, risk premia, and correlations
among stocks [Pastor and Veronesi, 2012; Pástor and Veronesi, 2013; Boutchkova
et al., 2011; Brogaard and Detzel, 2015]. Political uncertainty also affects corporate
real decisions, such as investment [Durnev, 2010; Julio and Yook, 2012; Gulen and
Ion, 2015; Jens, 2017]. Overall, existing literature focuses exclusively on “external”
political uncertainty from firms’ point of view. We contribute to the literature by
examining the effect of “internal” political uncertainty from shareholders’ perspec-
tive.
Our paper is also closely related to the literature on corporate political con-
nection. Prior literature has established the value implications of corporate politi-
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cal connection. Faccio [2006] finds that overlap between controlling shareholders or
managers and politicians provides significant benefits to the firm although connected
firms under-perform their peers on an ex–ante basis. Faccio and Parsley [2009] finds
the negative market response around sudden death of connected politicians. Cooper
et al. [2010] documents that companies’ PAC contributions are positively related to
their long-term stock returns. Using different events and international data, other
studies also find the value effect of political connection [e.g. Borisov et al., 2015; Lee
et al., 2013; Acemoglu et al., 2016, 2017; Aggarwal et al., 2012; Unsal et al., 2016].
These findings provide the foundation for shareholders’ concern about corporate
political transparency.
Another related area is the burgeoning literature on active ownership. Prior
research has documented the active role of investors in firms’ decisions and man-
agement, such as capital structure, business strategy, merger and acquisition, and
general corporate governance. [Karpoff et al., 1996; Smith, 1996; Brav et al., 2008;
Klein and Zur, 2009; Wahal, 1996; Carleton et al., 1998; Del Guercio and Hawkins,
1999; Gillan and Starks, 2000; Appel et al., 2016; Dimson et al., 2015]. However, re-
searches examining the impact of shareholder activism on corporate political trans-
parency are very limited.6 This is surprising given the importance of corporate
political connection for firm value and heavy media coverage on the issue. Our
paper intends to bridge this gap.
Last but not the least, we contribute to the literature on information asym-
metry between shareholders and management. Previous literature, especially theo-
retical literature, assumes that to some extent managers are able to take undesired
action from shareholders’ standpoint without notifying shareholders. Our paper
6Bebchuk and Jackson Jr [2012] provides only summary statistics on the CPT-related share-
holder proposals. A contemporaneous working paper by Baloria et al. [2017] uses shareholder en-
gagements on company political activities but their main focus is on the determinants of shareholder
activism, especially activist types. We focus exclusively on CPT-related shareholder proposals since
we recognize that the effect of transparency and prohibition could be dramatically different. Most
importantly, we place more emphasis on the ex-post implication of shareholder engagements which
is crucial for policy makers.
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adds to the literature by documenting that significant information asymmetry ex-
ists in corporate political engagement. Increasing corporate political transparency
helps reduce information asymmetry and align both parties’ interests.
The rest of paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines institutional back-
ground. Section 3 develops research hypotheses. Section 4 describes data and pro-
vides summary statistics. Section 5 presents empirical findings. Section 6 concludes.
3.2 Institutional Background
In this section, we explain corporate political transparency and show that it is his-
torically low in U.S. public companies. According to the definition by Center for
Political Accountability, corporate political transparency comprises of three compo-
nents, namely disclosure, policy and oversight.
Lack of disclosure is reflected in two aspects. First, some corporate political
spending has no public records. Companies can channel political spending through
third parties that do not have the legal obligation to disclose their donors. Some
non-profit organizations, primarily trade associations or business associations, often
act as intermediaries through which corporations anonymously influence politics.7
This type of corporate political spending started long time ago. Citizens United v.s.
Federal Election Commission in 2010 makes this type of political spending even more
convenient by permitting corporations, including some non-profit organizations, to
spend unlimited amounts of money on advertisements and other political tools as
long as they are not coordinated or prearranged with a candidate or a campaign. Be-
bchuk and Jackson Jr [2012] provides some statistics on the overall magnitude of this
type of spending. Total political spending of eight active non-profit organizations,
such as US Chamber of Commerce, Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers
Association, American Petroleum Institute, America’s Health Insurance Plans, Fi-
nancial Services Roundtable and etc., reaches $1,559.6 million between 2005 and
7Those organizations are mainly formed under sections 501(c)(4) and 501(c)(6) of the tax code.
58
2010.8 Further, companies’ state lobbying expenses, i.e., expenses that are incurred
to influence state legislators, are not disclosed on a mandatory basis in half of U.S.
states. Meanwhile, companies also influence politics via indirect lobbying (some-
times called grassroot lobbying) where companies try to influence the legislators via
general public. Investors can only speculate this type of corporate political spend-
ing at best. Second, even for those spending that does have public records, it is
difficult and time-consuming for investors to assemble those information. Accord-
ing to existing election-law, companies may have to report some of their political
spending, such as spending of political action committees, key executives, to federal
election commission (FEC). But these information is generally distributed through-
out separate filings in various formats. Assembling those information together is not
straight-forward and would incur significant amount of costs. Some investors argue
that companies should include these information on its website to reduce their costs.
Historically, most of public companies do not have and disclose internal poli-
cies governing the companies’ political contributions and expenditures and the set
of people who are accountable for the decisions. Lack of oversight is reflected by the
fact that most of companies do not have supervisory board committee for corporate
political spending in early 2000s.
Political opacity exposes investors to significant political risk. Not only could
the revelation of hidden political engagement result in reputation damage and public
mistrust, companies’ political connection could expose themselves to unexpected
regulatory change. In recent decade, a group of shareholder activists started filing
shareholder proposals requesting corporate political transparency.
8Bebchuk and Jackson Jr [2012] extracts those eight non-profit organizations’ lobbying and
political expenditures from their Internal Revenue Service (IRS) filings.
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3.3 Hypotheses Development
3.3.1 Development of Hypothesis 1
The first hypothesis concerns how activist shareholders select their target companies
for improving corporate political transparency. Since the purpose of engagements
is to bring transparency to corporate political spending, it is reasonable to expect
that they would target companies with higher political spending and lower past
transparency level. Prior literature and media reports have repeatedly emphasized
the importance of Political Action Committee (PAC) in influencing the perception
of general public [e.g. Sorauf, 1984; Burris, 2010]. Taken together, we put forward
the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis H3.1 Shareholders target companies with Political Action Committee
(PAC) and lower political transparency level.
3.3.2 Development of Hypothesis 2
The second hypothesis concerns what affects the likelihood of shareholder engage-
ments being successful. Institutional investors, due to their superior ability to accu-
mulate shares and coordinate with other investors, are more likely to achieve their
goals [Barber and Odean, 2000; Jones and Lipson, 1999; Brav et al., 2016]. This
is especially true for SRI funds. SRI funds specialize in influencing environmental,
social, and governance (ESG) aspects of firms and thus are in a better position to
provide relevant guidance and support for targeted firms. Further, the stated ob-
jectives of SRI fund typically involve achieving positive social impact in addition to
financial gain.9 Thus SRI funds might be more aggressive than other types of active
investors in their engagements to attract potential investment.10 Putting together,
9For example, in the homepage of Domini Social Investments (https://www.domini.com/), the
fund’s objectives include “engaging with issuers, civil society organizations, and policymakers to
create financial, environmental, and societal value” and “encouraging corporate responsibility”.
10For instance, Domini Social Investments identifies its potential investor as those “committed
to the Fund’s social and environmental investment standards”.
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we propose the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis H3.2 Institutional activist investors, especially SRI funds, are more
likely to succeed in their engagements.
3.3.3 Development of Hypothesis 3
The third hypothesis is on how overall stock market reacts to outcomes of CPT-
related shareholder engagements in the short term.
On one hand, investors might react more positively to successful share-
holder engagements since information asymmetry and agency costs are reduced
after successful shareholder intervention. On the other hand, increasing political
transparency would impose additional costs on companies. Explicit costs include
compilation costs, publication costs, costs to set up special supervisory committees
and costs to set up and implement related policies, etc. Implicit costs include po-
tential loss of competitive advantage due to the revelation of political engagement
strategy to competitors. Taken together, investors would evaluate the benefits and
costs and react accordingly. Based on above arguments, we propose two competing
hypotheses on overall stock market reactions.
Hypothesis H3.3n Stock market reacts more positively to successful engagements
than unsuccessful engagements.
Hypothesis H3.3a Stock market reacts more negatively to successful engagements
than unsuccessful engagements.11
3.3.4 Development of Hypothesis 4
The fourth hypothesis is on how institutional investors, as an important category
of investors emphasized by previous literature on corporate governance, react to
11The ideology of shareholder activists might be different from that of the broad investor base [e.g.
Bolton et al., 2018]. Therefore even if broad investor base views corporate political transparency
negatively, shareholder activists might still have the incentive to launch these campaigns.
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outcomes of CPT-related shareholder engagements in the medium to long term.
Following the same reasoning as in hypothesis 3, we propose two competing hy-
potheses on institutional investors’ holding behaviour.
Hypothesis H3.4n Institutional investors increase their holdings after successful
shareholder engagements.
Hypothesis H3.4a Institutional investors decrease their holdings after successful
shareholder engagements.
3.3.5 Development of Hypothesis 5
This last hypothesis is on how companies’ PAC expenditure change in reaction to
outcomes of shareholder engagements.
As shareholder activists typically request more oversight, responsibility and
business rationale for corporate political spending, company management will have
significantly less discretion over political spending. For example, in a 2010 share-
holder proposal to Waste Management Inc., the activist (International Brotherhood
of Teamsters) requests disclosure of policies and procedures for political contribu-
tions and expenditures, identification of the person or persons in the company who
is responsible for making the decisions to make the political contribution or ex-
penditure, internal guidelines governing the company’s political contributions and
expenditures, and presentation to relevant oversight committee in the board. There-
fore, we expect corporate political spending to decrease (or increase less fast) after
successful shareholder engagements.
Hypothesis H3.5 PAC expenditure decreases (or increases less fast) after success-
ful shareholder engagements.
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3.4 Data and Summary Statistics
3.4.1 Data
The main data we use is shareholder proposals on corporate political transparency.
The shareholder proposal data is from Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS)
database. ISS covers shareholder proposals for Russell 3000 companies from 2006.
We first screen out shareholder proposals on corporate political transparency.12 We
supplemented the data by a few additional proposals which are obtained through
internet searches and are not in the ISS database. The outcomes of shareholder
proposals could be classified into successful shareholder engagement and unsuccess-
ful shareholder engagement. Successful shareholder engagement includes proposals
that passed in the shareholder meeting and proposals that are withdrawn after
shareholders reached agreement with company management to increase political
transparency. Unsuccessful shareholder engagement includes proposals that failed
in the shareholder meeting and proposals omitted by the company management
after approval from Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).13
Since we want to examine the market reaction, outcome announcement dates
are needed. We manually collect outcome announcement dates from several sources.
For proposals that passed or failed in the shareholder meeting, we collect announce-
ment dates of shareholder meeting results in 8K filings from SEC Edgar database
if possible.14 If announcement dates are not available in 8K filings, especially be-
fore requirements on reporting enhancement in 2010, we use shareholder meeting
12The proposals are labelled as “Political Contributions Disclosure” or “Political Lobbying Dis-
closure” in ISS shareholder proposal resolutions.
13Omission of shareholder proposals provides a way for company management to fight against
shareholders. Matsusaka et al. [2018] provides some explanations and analysis of omitted share-
holder proposals.
14Company management are generally against CPT related shareholder proposals in proxy state-
ment. The only exception is in Amgen Inc. 2006 shareholder meeting where company management
voiced support for the shareholder proposal. In this case the final outcome is almost surely de-
termined before shareholder meeting. Therefore we use the filing date of proxy statement as the
outcome announcement date since it is the earliest date when management publicly announced
support for the shareholder proposal.
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dates as outcome announcement dates.15 For proposals that are withdrawn after
shareholder-management agreement, we collect announcement dates of agreement
using extensive web searches, mostly from filing shareholders’ press releases and
centre for political accountability’s joint press releases. Figure 3.9 presents a snap-
shot of announcement of the agreements. Not in all cases do shareholders publicly
announce the agreement. Since testing market reaction requires the outcome to be
public knowledge, we rely on withdrawn proposals for which public announcement
dates of agreements can be identified for ex-post analyses. For omitted proposals, we
obtain SEC approval dates as the outcome announcement dates from SEC Division
of Corporation Finance website.
To remove confounding effects, in ex-post analysis we drop unsuccessful en-
gagements if there are preceding successful engagements for the same company in
the same election cycle.16 The final sample contains 636 events from 2005 through
2016.
Consistent with the argument in Bebchuk and Jackson Jr [2012], we use
sample companies’ PAC expenditure to measure corporate political activism. There
are two reasons for this measure. First, PAC expenditure is most direct measure
shareholders could observe. Media frequently cites a company’s PAC expenditure
to indicate its political activism. It proxies for the market’s perception of corporate
political activism. Second, PAC expenditure is correlated with companies’ hidden
political spending through intermediaries. Bebchuk and Jackson Jr [2012] collects
some data on corporations’ political spending through intermediaries after disclo-
sure and provides some examples. We then cross check these example companies’
political spending through intermediaries with their PAC expenditure. For example,
in 2011 Prudential Financial spent $570,000 through U.S. Chamber of Commerce
while EMC corp. with similar size spent nothing. Correspondingly, Prudential Fi-
15During this procedure, we corrected several mistaken dates and outcomes in ISS database.
16The election cycle is two year as the Senate and the House of Representatives both hold election
every two years. This definition is consistent with politics literature and practice. The results are
similar if we include those unsuccessful engagements.
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nancial PAC spent $911,371 in 2012 election cycle while EMC corp. PAC only spent
$87,642. The PAC expenditure data is obtained from Federal Election Commission
(FEC).17
Index on corporate political transparency is also used in part of this study.
The index is also called CPA-Zicklin index since it is produced by Center for Political
Accountability (CPA) in conjunction with the Zicklin Center for Business Ethics
Research at The Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania. The index
measures corporate political transparency from three dimensions (disclosure, policy
and oversight) on an annual basis. Detailed description of the index components
can be found in appendix 3.C.B. The index becomes available in 2011 and gradually
increases its coverage.18 Since its horizon and coverage are limited, our sample size
reduces significantly when we analyse the change in political transparency around
shareholder engagements. The data I use in this study is from 2011 to 2016.
Data on Russell 3000 index constituents is obtained from Blommberg. We
use index constituents at the end of each year. Stock price and market capitalization
is obtained from CRSP. Accounting data is from Compustat. Analyst coverage is
extracted from I/B/E/S. We use BoardEx to get information on companies’ board
of directors. Institutional ownership is obtained from 13F data.
3.4.2 Summary Statistics
Table 3.1 lists the top ten shareholder activists in terms of filing frequency in our
sample. New York State Common Retirement Fund is the most active investor in
this area. In Panel A of Figure 3.1, we provide statistics on activist types. Pu-
bic pension fund, socially responsible investment (SRI) fund, labor union, religious
group are the most common activist types. In Panel B of Figure 1, we find that
financial and energy industry are most likely to be targeted by activists perhaps due
17The PAC names in FEC data are matched with company names in our sample first through a
computerized fuzzy matching algorithm based on probabilistic record linkage. Then we manually
inspect the matches to ensure accuracy.
18Please refer to Figure 3.7 for index coverage.
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to their close nature with politics.
[Place Table 3.1 about here]
[Place Figure 3.1 about here]
Figure 3.2 presents the distribution of sample events used in ex-post analysis.
The sample starts from 2005 and ends in 2016. Note that number of events is small
in 2005 relative to other years. This is due to the fact that ISS shareholder proposal
data starts from 2006 and we supplement the data by a few additional proposals
obtained through web searches which leads to a few cases in 2005. There is a general
increasing trend in the incidences of CPT-related shareholder engagements.
Observe that there are non-negligible amount of successful shareholder en-
gagements, mostly in the form of settlement agreements between activist sharehold-
ers and management. This contrasts the argument in previous studies [e.g. Bebchuk
and Jackson Jr, 2012; Cohn et al., 2016; Copland and O’Keefe, 2016] that CPT-
related shareholder proposals rarely succeed and the sudden disclosure of political
spending by companies is on a “voluntary” basis. The reason is previous litera-
ture focuses exclusively on the proposals that went to the final stage of shareholder
meeting. However, by further investigation we find that in those cases activists
and company management reached agreement before the meeting and subsequently
pull back their proposals in exchange for improved corporate political transparency.
This is in line with McCahery et al. [2016] where they find that behind-the-door
discussions between shareholder and management are prevalent and effective. Note
that the percentage of successful shareholder proposal is on a decline in recent years.
However, this is not necessarily an evidence of companies’ increasing objection to
corporate political transparency since it is perhaps due to company management and
shareholders already reaching agreement before shareholder proposals were filed.
[Place Figure 3.2 about here]
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Russell 3000 sample from 2005 to 2015 is used in ex-ante analysis because
from 2006 to 2016 we can collect complete shareholder proposal data in Russell 3000
universe from ISS. In ex-ante analysis we do not remove events without outcome
announcement dates or events that could potentially result in confounding ex-post
effects. The summary statistics of variables of Russell 3000 Sample are provided
in Panel A of Table 3.2. In addition, summary statistics of variables of the sample
used in ex-post analysis are provided in Panel B of Table 3.2.




In this section I test which companies are more likely to be targeted by shareholder
activists for improving corporate political transparency. Using Russell 3000 panel
from 2005 to 2015, I run the following multivariate probit regression
P(Targeti,t) =Φ(β0 + β1PAC Existencei,t + β2Transparencyi,t−1
+ β3Targeted in the pasti,t + β4Sizei,t−1 + β5BMi,t−1
+ β6Ret12Mi,t−1 + β7Analyst Coveragei,t−1 + β8BoardSizei,t−1
+ β9CEO-Chairman Dualityi,t−1 + β10%Outside Directorsi,t−1
+ β11Director Tenurei,t−1 + β12%Connected Directorsi,t−1
+ β13Institutional Onwershipi,t−1 + εi,t) (3.1)
where Target is a dummy variable that takes value one if shareholder activists
file a proposal for the company in the subsequent year and zero otherwise.
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We consider a large set of explanatory variables. PAC Existence is a dummy
variable that equals one if the company has a Political Action Committee(PAC)
and zero otherwise. Transparency corresponds to the company’ pre-target political
transparency level measured by CPA-Zicklin index. Targeted in the past is a dummy
variable equal to one if the company was previously targted by shareholder activists
and zero otherwise. Size is the natural logrithm of market capitalization of the
company. BM is the book value of equity divided by market value of equity. Ret12M
is the stock return in past 12 months. Analyst Coverage is the number of analysts
that make annual earnings forecasts for the company in previous twelve months.
BoardSize is the total number of directors on the board. CEOChairman Duality is
a dummy variable that equals one if the CEO is also the chairman of the board,
and zero otherwise. %Outside Directors is the percentage of outside (independent)
directors on the board. Director Tenure is the average tenure of all directors sitting
on the board. %Connected Directors is the percentage of government-connected
directors on the board. Institutional Onwership is the percentage of outstanding
shares held by institutional investors.
Since Transparency, measured by CPA-Zicklin index, is only available for a
small number of firms within a short period of time (2011 - 2016), including Trans-
parency in the regression would significantly shrink sample size. Based on above
considerations, we run both regressions, with and without adding Transparency as
explanatory variables. Regression results and marginal effects at the mean are re-
ported in Table 3.3.
Results are generally consistent in all regressions. Shareholders are signifi-
cantly more likely to target companies with political action committee (PAC). This
shows that PAC activities are important in influencing shareholders’ perception of
corporate political activism. Consistent with the purpose of shareholder engage-
ments, activist investors are more likely to target companies with lower political
transparency level.
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We also find the evidence of repeated engagements. Being targeted in the
past increases the target probability by about 1.1%. Consistent with companies
that receive governance-related shareholder proposals have larger size and poorer
long-term performance [Karpoff et al., 1996], companies with larger size, lower stock
return and higher book-to-market ratio are more likely to be targeted by shareholder
activists. Analyst coverage, however, is unrelated to activists’ target decision.
Coefficients on characteristics associated with board monitoring are generally
insignificant. Consistent with board of directors’ political connection and corporate
political spending are two complementary ways of political investment19, companies
with a larger fraction of politically connected directors are more likely to attract
shareholder activists’ attention. Lastly, targeted companies exhibit higher institu-
tional ownership. This is consistent with institutional ownership is positively related
to sophistication of shareholder base [Brav et al., 2008]. Thus high institutional own-
ership makes it easier for activist shareholders to gain support and understanding
from fellow shareholders.
Taken together, the set of explanatory variables are quite successful in ex-
plaining activists’ target selection, yielding a Pseudo R2 of 44.1%.
[Place Table 3.3 about here]
Likelihood of Successful Engagement
In this section we test which types of activist investors are more likely to succeed in
their engagements. Using the sample of final events from 2005 to 2016, we run the
following multivariate probit regression
P(Successi,t) = Φ(β0 + β1Sponsor Typei,t + γControls+ εi,t) (3.2)
19This is also confirmed using our sample as the correlation between percentage of connected
directors and PAC expenditure is significantly positive.
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where Success is a dummy variable that takes value one if the shareholder
engagement is successful and zero otherwise.
Sponsor Type represents a set of dummy variables with respect to activist
types. The first variable considered Sponsor is an institutional investor is a dummy
variable equal to 1 if the sponsor of the proposal is an institutional investor (SRI
fund/public pension/religious group/labor union). Then we further break down the
variable into four dummy variables (Sponsor is a SRI fund/public pension/religious
group/labor union) and include them in a horse race type regression. Controls
represents a set of control variables, including PAC Existence, firm size, book-to-
market ratio, past one-year return, analyst coverage, board characteristics, and
institutional ownership. Regression results and marginal effects at the mean are
reported in Table 3.4.
First we find that institutional investors are more likely to succeed in their
engagements. The probability of successful engagement is about 11% higher for
institutional activist investors than for other investors. This is consistent with insti-
tutional investors, due to expertise and scale advantage, possess superior ability to
accumulate shares and coordinate with other investors [Agarwal, 2007; Brav et al.,
2016]. Next, we compare different types of investors within the institutional investor
domain by running the horse race type regression with four sponsor type dummies.
We find that SRI funds are most likely to achieve progress in their engagements.
This finding supports the view that SRI funds, as having more expertise in areas
related to social aspects of firms, are more able to work with targeted companies
by offering appropriate guidance and support. It is also consistent with SRI funds
are more aggressive in their engagements to achieve their advocated objectives and
attract more investment. Among institutional activist investors, labor unions are
found to be less successful. This finding supports the view that labor unions suffer
more conflict of interest with company management [Agrawal, 2012].
Most control variables, such as PAC existence, size, book-to-market ratio,
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past one-year return, analyst coverage, and institutional ownership, do not show
significant explanatory power over engagement outcomes. The only exception is that
larger board size contributes positively to the likelihood of successful engagement.
[Place Table 3.4 about here]
3.5.2 Ex-post Analysis
Change in Corporate Political Transparency around Events
This section examines change in corporate political transparency around events.
This also acts as a validation test so that we are sure successful shareholder engage-
ments would result in better corporate political transparency.
All events with available outcome dates are merged with CPA-Zicklin index
which is an annual measure of corporate political transparency. In order to compare
changes, we require the final sample to have CPA-Zicklin index from one year prior
to event year until one year after event year. As the coverage and length of CPA-
Zicklin index is limited, we am able to obtain 10 successful engagements and 176
unsuccessful engagements with available CPA-Zicklin index. The sample size is
consistent with the fact that CPA-Zicklin index starts coverage from 2011 and the
percentage of successful shareholder engagements is on a decline since 2010.
In Figure 3.3, we plot the average CPA-Zicklin index from one year prior
to event year (t − 1) until one year after event year (t + 1), both for successful
shareholder engagements and unsuccessful shareholder engagements. All indices,
including disclosure, policy, oversight, and grand total, feature a significant jump in
year t for successful engagements relative to unsuccessful engagements. The trend
becomes parallel in year t+ 1.
[Place Figure 3.3 about here]
Table 3.5 provides some statistical tests. In most panels, t− 1 to t political
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transparency change is statistically higher in successful engagements. Consistent
with the parallel trend, t to t+ 1 political transparency change is statistically indif-
ferent between successful engagements and unsuccessful engagements.
[Place Table 3.5 about here]
This finding shows that successful shareholder engagements would lead to
concrete positive changes in corporate political transparency.
Stock Market Reaction
In this section we examine short-term stock market reactions to different shareholder
engagement outcomes. We use event study methodology to perform the analysis.
A brief review of event study methodology is provided first and then results are
reported.
Event Study Methodology Event study methodology is used to estimate ab-
normal return attributed to corporate event. The abnormal return is defined as the
actual return of the stock over the event window minus the normal return of the
stock over the same window. The normal return is defined as the expected return
without the event taking place.
ARi,t = Ri,t − E(Ri,t|It) (3.3)
where ARi,t represents the abnormal return, Ri,t is the actual return and It
represents the conditioning information. Here we use Carhart four-factor model to
compute the normal return.
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Ri,t −Rf,t = αi + βi1(Rm,t −Rf,t) + βi2SMBt + βi3HMLt + βi4MOMt + εi,t
(3.4)
where Ri,t is the return of stock i on day t, Rm,t and Rf,t are the market
return and risk-free rate on day t respectively, SMBt is the size factor which is
computed as the return difference between portfolios of small cap stocks and large
cap stocks, HMLt is the value factor which is computed as the return difference
between portfolios of high book-to-market stocks and low book-to-market stocks,
MOMt is the momentum factor which is computed as the return difference between
portfolios of high performing stocks and low performing stocks.
To get the average effect of events, abnormal returns are aggregated over the









where CAR is cumulative abnormal return over event window [t1, t2], N is
total number of events.
Event Study Results Based on reasoning provided before, shareholders could
potentially react differently to engagement outcomes in companies with different
level of political activism. Therefore we partition the sample into two groups based
on PAC expenditure. A company is classified as being politically active if its PAC
expenditure is higher than or equal to sample median PAC expenditure in the two-
year election cycle of the event.20 Further, we consider four event windows: [−1, 5],
[−1, 10], [−1, 15], and [−1, 20]. Unlike financial information (e.g. earnings announce-
20Average PAC expenditure of politically active companies is about $1.85 million. By contrast,
average PAC expenditure of politically inactive companies is about $0.24 million.
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ment), shareholders may not immediately gather, process and interpret this type of
non-financial information and thus we use relatively longer event windows.
Table 3.6 provides event study results. The results for politically active com-
panies are displayed in Panel A. Successful engagements lead to positive abnormal
returns in politically active companies. The cumulative abnormal return is 3.16%
within 12 days. Unsuccessful engagements are decomposed into three categories:
omission of shareholder proposal, fail in shareholder meeting but with high support
(i.e. “For” votes >= 30%), fail in shareholder meeting and with low support (i.e.
“For” votes < 30%). Engagements that fail in shareholder meeting but with high
support result in negative stock market reaction with a cumulative abnormal return
of -1.14% from −1 to 10. The stock market reaction to omission of shareholder
proposal and engagements that fail in shareholder meeting and with low support
is statistically indifferent from zero. Taken together, the results suggest that stock
market investors value political transparency in politically active companies. In
other words, the benefit of corporate political transparency to shareholders out-
weighs the cost borne by shareholders in politically active companies. Panel A of
Figure 3.4 depicts the short-term abnormal return for politically active companies.
Panel B shows the results for politically inactive companies. Short-term stock
market reactions are statistically indifferent from zero in all categories. This suggests
that in politically inactive companies, the benefit of corporate political transparency
to shareholders is mitigated by the cost borne by shareholders. Panel B of Figure
3.4 depicts the short-term abnormal return for politically inactive companies.
[Place Table 3.6 about here]
[Place Figure 3.4 about here]
In order to further remove noise and control for other explanatory variables,
we compare market reactions to successful engagements with that to unsuccessful
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engagements in a multivariate regression framework. The comparison is important
because if there is some unobservable common trend influencing all firms targeted
by activists, then the effect of unobservable common trend can be mitigated by the
comparison. The following regression is estimated for both politically active and
inactive companies.
CAARi,t = α+ γSuccessi,t + βControls+ εi,t (3.6)
where CAAR is cumulative abnormal return in event window [−1, 10]. Success is a
dummy variable that takes value one if shareholder engagement is successful and zero
otherwise. Controls represents a set of control variables, including firm size, book-
to-market ratio, past one-year return, analyst coverage, board size, CEO-chairman
duality, percentage of independent directors, director tenure and institutional own-
ership.
Table 3.7 presents the estimation results. In politically active companies, the
difference between market reactions to successful engagements and those to unsuc-
cessful engagements is 3.48% as displayed in column one. The difference remains
statistically significant and becomes stronger after controlling for other explanatory
variables. In politically inactive companies, the difference is statistically insignifi-
cant.
[Place Table 3.7 about here]
Political Uncertainty and Market Reactions
In the previous section we find that stock market reacts positively to successful
engagements in politically active companies. The explanation could be that infor-
mation asymmetry and hidden risk to shareholders are alleviated after successful
intervention. To further test this explanation, we re-estimate regression 3.6 in two
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regimes separately: high political uncertainty regime and low political uncertainty
regime. The intuition is that hidden risk associated with corporate political opacity
is higher when political uncertainty is high. Using policy uncertainty index devel-
oped by Baker et al. [2016], we partition the sample into two groups. An event is
classified as in high policy uncertainty regime if the index is above sample median.
We use both overall index and news-based index.
Table 3.8 displays the regression results. In politically active companies
(Panel A), the difference between market reactions to successful engagement and
those to unsuccessful engagement is more positive when policy uncertainty is high.
By contrast, in politically inactive companies (Panel B), the coefficients on Success
dummy are not much different between two regimes.
[Place Table 3.8 about here]
Change in Political Spending
Increased transparency is associated with more effective monitoring and discipline
[Wang, 2010; Downar et al., 2017; De Franco et al., 2013; Berger and Hann, 2003].
This could offer another explanation for the stock market reactions to shareholder
engagements. We use change in companies’ PAC expenditure to test the disciplinary
effect. The intuition is that if successful shareholder engagements result in better
monitoring of company management, management would have less discretion over
the political spending. Thus political spending of successfully engaged companies
would increase less fast (or decrease) relative to that of unsuccessfully engaged
companies.
We require the company to have PAC expenditure information from two elec-
tion cycles before shareholder engagements to two election cycles after shareholder
engagements. The events in or after 2013 are excluded since PAC expenditure in-
formation are not available up to two election cycles after shareholder engagements.
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To remove confounding effects, we remove unsuccessful engagements that are subse-
quently targeted and end up being engaged successfully within the next two election
cycles. Figure 3.5 depicts the PAC expenditure of both successfully engaged compa-
nies and unsuccessfully engaged companies. In politically active companies (Panel
A), successful engagements indeed result in a smaller increase in PAC expenditure
relative to unsuccessful engagements. We also plot the differences in PAC expendi-
ture between successfully engaged companies and unsuccessfully engaged companies.
The pattern shows that the difference becomes more negative after shareholder inter-
vention, supporting the previous statement. In politically inactive companies (Panel
B), successful engagements result in a larger increase in PAC expenditure relative
to unsuccessful engagements. The difference plot also confirms this statement.
[Place Figure 3.5 about here]
To formally test the above discipline effect, we adopt the following difference-
in-differences framework.






Successi ∗ Postj + θControls+ εi,t
(3.7)
where PAC EXPi,t is the company’s PAC expenditure. Successi is a dummy vari-
able that takes value one if shareholder intervention is successful and zero otherwise.
Postj is a dummy variable that takes value one if shareholder engagement takes
place in election cycle t− j and zero otherwise. Controls represents a set of control
variables. The regression is estimated both with and without industry fixed effects.
Standard errors are clustered at firm level to account for within-firm correlation.
Regression Results are presented in column 1 and 2 of Table 3.9. Consistent
with the graphical results, the interaction term is significantly negative at time 0.
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The interaction term at time 1 and 2 is also negative although statistical significance
is dampened. The coefficient on Success ∗ Post0 in column 2 means that change in
PAC expenditure of successfully intervened companies is $82,120 less than that of
unsuccessfully intervened companies at time 0 (election cycle of shareholder engage-
ment). Graphically, the effect is mainly from politically active companies. In order
to test it, we perform the following triple difference regression.














Successi ∗Activei ∗ Postj + θControls+ εi,t (3.8)
where Activei is a dummy variable that equals one if the company is politically
active and zero otherwise. Other variables are the same as in previous regression.
The regression is estimated both with and without industry fixed effects. Standard
errors are clustered at firm level to account for within-firm correlation.
Regression results are presented in column 3 and 4 of Table 3.9. Consistent
with the discipline effect is more significant in politically active companies, the
triple interaction term Successi ∗Activei ∗ Postj is negative at time 0, 1, 2 though
insignificant. The magnitude of coefficients is economically significant.
[Place Table 3.9 about here]
Taken together, the results suggest that shareholder engagements have disci-
plinary effect on corporate political spending, mostly in politically active companies.
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Change in Institutional Ownership
In this section we investigate institutional investors’ behavior in response to en-
gagement outcomes. This analysis complements previous studies on the role of
institutional investors in general corporate governance and sustainability by prob-
ing deeper into one specific area in ESG: corporate political transparency. We use
quarterly holdings of institutional investors to perform the analysis. Therefore we
focus on institutional investors’ behaviour in medium to long-term.
The engaged companies need to have information on institutional ownership
from four quarters before shareholder engagements to four quarters after shareholder
engagements. The events in 2016 are excluded since information on institutional
ownership are not available up to four quarters after shareholder engagements. Fig-
ure 3.6 depicts the institutional ownership of both successfully engaged companies
and unsuccessfully engaged companies. Successfully engaged companies experience
an increase in institutional holdings. By contrast, unsuccessfully engaged compa-
nies experience an decrease in institutional holdings. The effect persists more than
one quarter after shareholder engagements. The difference between institutional
ownership of successfully engaged companies and that of unsuccessfully engaged
companies turns more positive after shareholder engagements, echoing the previous
finding.
[Place Figure 3.6 about here]
To formally test the above effect, we estimate the following difference-in-
differences regression.






Successi ∗ Postj + θControls+ εi,t (3.9)
where IOi,t is the company’s institutional ownership. Other variables have the
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same definitions as in previous regressions. The regression is estimated both with
and without industry fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at firm level to
account for within-firm correlation.
Table 3.10 provides the estimation results. The interaction term is signifi-
cantly positive at time 0, 1. The coefficient on interaction term is 2% at time 0
and 5% at time 1, which is economically large. This means that institutional own-
ership of successfully engaged companies increased by 2%(5%) more than that of
unsuccessfully engaged companies at time 0(1). Echoing previous literature that
documents the positive role of institutional investors in general ESG area [Appel
et al., 2016; He et al., 2017; Dimson et al., 2015], our finding provides support for
the view that institutional investors have a preference for political transparency of
their portfolio companies.
[Place Table 3.10 about here]
3.6 Concluding Remarks
With ever growing corporate political spending and recent regulatory changes on
political spending, it is crucial to understand the drivers and implications of corpo-
rate political transparency. This paper seeks to provide some insights by studying
corporate political transparency through the lens of shareholder engagements.
We begin by documenting that there are many more successful shareholder
engagements than previous literature have recognized. They are mostly in the form
of settlement agreements between activist shareholders and management. Therefore
shareholder engagements help shape corporate political transparency.
We then examine factors that drive activist investors’ target decision. Ac-
tivist investors tend to target companies with political action committee and lower
political transparency level. We also find evidence of repeated engagements. Next,
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we study which types of activist investors are more likely to succeed in their engage-
ments. Consistent with institutional investors’ superior ability to accumulate shares
and coordinate with other investors, we find engagements launched by institutional
investors are more likely to be successful. Among the domain of institutional activist
investors, we find that SRI funds are best performers and labor unions are worst
performers.
On the implication side, we find that successful shareholder engagements in-
deed lead to much bigger improvement in corporate political transparency, measured
by CPA-Zicklin index, compared to unsuccessful engagements. We provide market-
based tests on how market participants view corporate political transparency. Stock
market responses are significantly positive to successful engagements and negative
to a subset of unsuccessful engagements in politically active companies. We do not
find such responses in politically inactive companies. This suggests that the bene-
fit of corporate political transparency to shareholders outweighs the cost borne by
shareholders in politically active companies.
We then analyse the channels through which political transparency affects
firm value. Consistent with corporate political transparency lowering hidden risk
to investors, the market reactions are stronger when political uncertainty is high.
Consistent with the disciplinary effect of corporate political transparency, success-
ful shareholder interventions result in a slower growth of PAC expenditure than
unsuccessful interventions in politically active companies. Lastly, we also provide
evidences that institutional investors have a preference for corporate political trans-
parency. Institutional ownership of successfully engaged companies experience an
increase whilst that of unsuccessfully engaged companies experience a decrease in
medium to long-term.
Overall, our market-based tests provide support for corporate political trans-
parency. It would be interesting to examine whether corporate political transparency
would disadvantage companies by revealing their business-related information. We
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leave this question for future research.
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Appendix 3.A Figures
Figure 3.1: Activist Shareholder Type and Industry Distribution of Target Compa-
nies
This figure represents activist shareholder types (Panel (a)) and industry distribu-
tion of target companies (Panel (b)). We use collected shareholder engagements on
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Figure 3.2: CPT-related Shareholder Engagements from 2005 to 2016
This figure plots the number of shareholder engagements from 2005 to 2016 that
are used in ex-post analysis. Successful shareholder engagements include proposals
that passed in the shareholder meeting and proposals that are withdrawn after
shareholders reached agreement with company management to increase political
transparency. Unsuccessful shareholder engagements include proposals that failed
in the shareholder meeting and proposals omitted by the company management
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Year
Number of CPT-related Shareholder Engagements
Fail in Shareholder Meeting Omission of Shareholder Proposal
Successful Withdrawl after Agreement Pass in Shareholder Meeting
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Figure 3.3: Change in Corporate Political Transparency around Events
This figure represents the change in corporate political transparency measured by
CPA-Zicklin index around shareholder engagements. All indices are in annual fre-
quency. Grand Total is the company’s overall CPA-Zicklin index. Disclosure,
Policy, Oversight are individual components of CPA-Zicklin index with detailed
definitions in Table 3.11. t − 1, t, t + 1 correspond to one year before outcome
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Figure 3.4: Stock Market Reactions to Engagement Outcomes
This figure represents stock market reactions to different shareholder en-
gagement outcomes in politically active companies (Panel (a)) and politi-
cally inactive companies (Panel (b)). The engagement outcomes are classfied
into two categories: Successful Engagement and Unsuccessful Engagement.
Unsuccessful Engagement is further decomposed into three sub-categories:
Omissionof ShareholderProposal, Fail inshareholdermeetingwithhighsupport,
and Fail in shareholder meeting with low support. We consider a window from 1
days before to 10 days after the outcome announcement date (Day 0). Abnormal re-
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Figure 3.5: Change in PAC expenditure
This figure represents changes in PAC expenditure around shareholder engagements.
Top panels (Panel (a) and (b)) represent politically active companies. Bottom pan-
els (Panel (c) and (d)) represent politically inactive companies. Figures on the left
(Panel (a) and (c)) represent the average PAC expenditure and 95% confidence in-
tervals. Figures on the right (Panel (b) and (d)) represent the difference in PAC
expenditure between successfully engaged companies (PAC EXPSE) and unsuc-
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Figure 3.6: Change in Institutional Ownership
This figure represents changes in institutional ownership around shareholder engage-
ments. Panel (a) represents the average institutional ownership and 95% confidence
intervals. Panel (b) represents the difference in institutional ownership between suc-
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Table 3.1: Most Frequent Shareholder Activists
This table shows the top ten shareholder activists that have filed corporate political
tranprency (CPT) related proposals in terms of frequency.
Top Ten Shareholder Activists
Rank Sponsor Name Frequency
1 New York State Common Retirement Fund 89
2 New York City Pension Funds 84
3 AFL-CIO 55
4 Trillium Asset Management 38
5 Walden Asset Management 36
6 Sisters of Mercy 25
7 Nathan Cummings Foundation 24
8 Domini Social Investments 24
9 Green Century Capital Management 23
10 International Brotherhood of Teamsters 21
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics
This table shows the summary statistics of each variable for Russell 3000 sample
(Panel A) that is mainly used in ex-ante analysis and event study sample (Panel B)
that is mainly used in ex-post analysis. Size is the natural logrithm of market capi-
talization of the company. B/M is the book value of equity divided by market value
of equity. Past 12M Return is the past stock return for the previous twelve months.
Analyst Coverage is the number of analysts that make annual earnings forecasts for
the company in previous twelve months. Board Size is the total number of directors
on the board. CEO-Chairman Duality is a dummy variable that equals one if the
CEO is also the chairman of the board, and zero otherwise. %Outside Directors
is the percentage of outside (independent) directors on the board. Director Tenure
is the the average tenure of all directors sitting on the board. PAC Expenditure is
expenditure of the company’s political action committee (PAC) in a two-year elec-
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.4: Likelihood of Successful Engagement
This table examines the determinants of activists’ engagement outcomes using event study sample
from 2005 to 2016. The dependent variable Success is a dummy variable that equals one if share-
holder engagement is successful and zero otherwise. Sponsor is a SRI fund/public pension/religious
group/labor union is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the sponsor of the proposal is a SRI fund/public
pension/religious group/labor union. Sponsor is an institutional investor is a dummy variable equal
to 1 if the sponsor of the proposal is an institutional investor (SRI fund/public pension/religious
group/labor union). PAC Existence is a dummy variable that equals one if the company has a
Political Action Committee(PAC) and zero otherwise. Size is the natural logrithm of market cap-
italization of the company. B/M is the book value of equity divided by market value of equity.
Ret12M is the past stock return for the previous twelve months. Coverage is the number of analysts
that make annual earnings forecasts for the company in previous twelve months. BoardSize is the
total number of directors on the board. Duality is a dummy variable that equals one if the CEO
is also the chairman of the board, and zero otherwise. %Outside Directors is the percentage of
outside (independent) directors on the board. Tenure is the average tenure of all directors sitting
on the board. %Connected Directors is the percentage of government-connected directors on the
board. IO is the percentage of outstanding shares held by institutional investors. In each column,
we report coefficient estimates, their heteroscedasticity-robust t-statistics and the corresponding
marginal probability change induced by a one-unit change in the value of a specific covariate from
its sample average. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Success Mfx Success Mfx
Sponsor is an institutional investor 0.66538*** 0.11237***
[3.11] [4.30]
Sponsor is a SRI fund 1.12276*** 0.30494***
[4.67] [4.11]
Sponsor is a public pension 0.60641*** 0.14401**
[2.58] [2.33]
Sponsor is a religious group 0.47758 0.12146
[1.62] [1.38]
Sponsor is a labor union 0.20176 0.04505
[0.73] [0.69]
PAC Existence 0.25197 0.04865 0.34802 0.06047
[0.86] [0.99] [1.11] [1.37]
Size -0.08440 -0.01847 -0.12219* -0.02545*
[-1.32] [-1.31] [-1.79] [-1.78]
B/M -0.13419 -0.02937 -0.08069 -0.01681
[-1.16] [-1.17] [-0.81] [-0.81]
Ret12M -0.23862 -0.05222 -0.20644 -0.04300
[-0.83] [-0.84] [-0.71] [-0.72]
Coverage -0.00787 -0.00172 -0.01112 -0.00232
[-0.99] [-1.00] [-1.32] [-1.32]
BoardSize 0.05168* 0.01131* 0.06380** 0.01329**
[1.73] [1.72] [1.99] [1.99]
Duality 0.15525 0.03314 0.13549 0.02760
[1.07] [1.11] [0.90] [0.93]
%Outside Directors 0.35115 0.07684 0.00382 0.00080
[0.31] [0.31] [0.00] [0.00]
Tenure 0.02712 0.00593 0.02037 0.00424
[1.12] [1.13] [0.82] [0.83]
%Connected Directors -0.52469 -0.11482 -0.62679 -0.13055*
[-1.40] [-1.41] [-1.63] [-1.66]
IO 0.15161 0.03318 0.25799 0.05374
[0.46] [0.46] [0.74] [0.74]
Observations 626 626 626 626
Pseudo R2 0.048 0.048 0.092 0.092
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Table 3.5: Change in Corporate Political Transparency around Events
This table shows the change in corporate political transparency measured by CPA-
Zicklin index around shareholder engagements. All indices are in annual frequency.
Grand Total is the company’s overall CPA-Zicklin index. Disclosure, Policy, Over-
sight are individual components of CPA-Zicklin index with detailed definitions in
Table 3.11. t− 1, t, t+ 1 correspond to one year before outcome announcement, the
year of outcome announcement, and one year after outcome announcement, respec-
tively. We also report t − 1 to t changes, t to t + 1 changes, and their associated
t-statistics. Differences between Successful Engagement and Unsuccessful Engage-
ment are computed in the last row. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Grand Total
Obs t-1 t t+1 Changet-1t t-stat Changett+1 t-stat
Successful Engagement 10 27.28 57.26 63.86 29.98** 2.64 6.6 0.51
Unsuccessful Engagement 176 45.93 55.22 61.37 9.30*** 3.38 6.15** 2.36
Difference 186 -18.65 2.03 2.49 20.68*** 3.75 0.45 0.11
Panel B: Disclosure
Obs t-1 t t+1 Changet-1t t-stat Changett+1 t-stat
Successful Engagement 10 11.67 49.17 55.83 37.50*** 3.22 6.67 0.44
Unsuccessful Engagement 176 37.33 46.31 51.94 8.98*** 2.78 5.63* 1.75
Difference 186 -25.66 2.86 3.89 28.52*** 4.45 1.03 0.2
Panel C: Policy
Obs t-1 t t+1 Changet-1t t-stat Changett+1 t-stat
Successful Engagement 10 58.82 78.75 87.50 19.93 1.47 8.75 0.79
Unsuccessful Engagement 176 71.24 80.82 86.61 9.58*** 3.57 5.79** 2.56
Difference 186 -12.42 -2.07 0.89 10.35 1.52 2.96 0.67
Panel D: Oversight
Obs t-1 t t+1 Changet-1t t-stat Changett+1 t-stat
Successful Engagement 10 29.29 54.44 58.89 25.15* 1.91 4.44 0.33
Unsuccessful Engagement 176 39.94 50.45 57.80 10.51*** 3.46 7.35** 2.45
Difference 186 -10.64 4.00 1.09 14.64** 2.31 -2.91 -0.57
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Table 3.6: Stock Market Reactions to Engagement Outcomes
This table shows stock market reactions to different shareholder engagement out-
comes in politically active companies (Panel A) and politically inactive companies
(Panel B). The engagement outcomes are classfied into two categories: Successful
Engagement and Unsuccessful Engagement. Unsuccessful Engagement is further
decomposed into three sub-categories: Omission of Shareholder Proposal, Fail in
shareholder meeting with high support, and Fail in shareholder meeting with low
support. We consider four different windows surrounding the outcome annoucement
date (Day 0). Abnormal returns are calculated as the return in excess of expected
return predicted by Carhart four-factor model. *, **, *** indicate statistical signif-
icance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Politically Active Companies
N CAAR[-1,5] CAAR[-1,10] CAAR[-1,15] CAAR[-1,20]
Successful Engagement 33 1.46%** 3.16%** 3.80%** 3.88%*
[2.14] [2.57] [2.27] [1.77]
Unsuccessful Engagement
Omission of Shareholder Proposal 12 0.93% 0.08% 1.71% 0.97%
[0.98] [0.06] [0.99] [0.51]
Fail in shareholder meeting with high support 100 -0.66%** -1.14%*** -1.25%** -1.20%**
[-2.29] [-2.64] [-2.43] [-1.99]
Fail in shareholder meeting with low support 178 0.24% 0.12% 0.13% 0.20%
[1.22] [0.45] [0.39] [0.49]
Panel B: Politically Inactive Companies
N CAAR[-1,5] CAAR[-1,10] CAAR[-1,15] CAAR[-1,20]
Successful Engagement 63 -0.08% -0.28% 0.19% 0.10%
[-0.16] [-0.47] [0.24] [0.11]
Unsuccessful Engagement
Omission of Shareholder Proposal 7 1.34% 0.71% 0.38% -0.64%
[1.63] [0.5] [0.24] [-0.31]
Fail in shareholder meeting with high support 111 0.33% 0.32% 0.27% -0.08%
[0.80] [0.54] [0.42] [-0.12]
Fail in shareholder meeting with low support 132 0.23% -0.07% -0.20% 0.39%
[0.56] [-0.14] [-0.36] [0.61]
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Table 3.7: Regression on Short Term Abnormal Return
This table examines the difference in stock market responses between successful engagements and
unsuccessful engagements in a regression framework. The dependent variable CAAR[-1,10] is the
cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) within wndow [-1,10]. Success is a dummy variable
that equals one if shareholder engagement is successful and zero otherwise. Size is the natural
logrithm of market capitalization of the company. B/M is the book value of equity divided by
market value of equity. Ret12M is the past stock return for the previous twelve months. Coverage
is the number of analysts that make annual earnings forecasts for the company in previous twelve
months. BoardSize is the total number of directors on the board. Duality is a dummy variable that
equals one if the CEO is also the chairman of the board, and zero otherwise. %Outside Directors
is the percentage of outside (independent) directors on the board. Tenure is the average tenure of
all directors sitting on the board. IO is the percentage of outstanding shares held by institutional
investors. Column 1 and 2 reports the results for politically active companies. Column 3 and 4
reports the results for politically inactive companies. In each column, we report coefficient estimates
and their heteroscedasticity-robust t-statistics. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Politically Active Companies Politically Inactive Companies
CAAR[-1,10]
Success 0.0348*** 0.0359*** -0.0040 -0.0056



















Observations 323 321 313 305
R2 0.056 0.089 0.001 0.038
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Table 3.8: Political Uncertainty and Stock Market Reaction
This table examines the effect of political uncertainty on stock market responses
in both politically active companies (Panel A) and politically inactive companies
(Panel B). Sample events are classfied as in either high policy uncertainty environ-
ment or low policy uncertainty environment based on index developed by Baker
et al. [2016]. We use both overall index and news-based index. Depedent variable
and independent variables are the same as in Table 3.7. In each column, we re-
port coefficient estimates and their heteroscedasticity-robust t-statistics. *, **, ***
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Politically Active Companies
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Overall Index News-based Index
High Policy UncertaintyLow Policy UncertaintyHigh Policy UncertaintyLow Policy Uncertainty
CAAR[-1,10]
Success 0.0595** 0.0188* 0.0770*** 0.0188*
[2.55] [1.91] [2.67] [1.95]
Size -0.0034 0.0080** -0.0017 0.0078**
[-0.85] [2.57] [-0.42] [2.36]
B/M -0.0170** 0.0107 -0.0168** 0.0086
[-2.16] [1.13] [-2.12] [1.00]
Ret12M -0.0108 0.0134** -0.0101 0.0152**
[-1.28] [1.98] [-1.19] [2.18]
Coverage -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002
[-0.41] [-0.24] [-0.22] [-0.42]
BoardSize -0.0063*** 0.0006 -0.0055** 0.0014
[-2.81] [0.31] [-2.57] [0.80]
Duality -0.0018 -0.0018 -0.0029 0.0015
[-0.23] [-0.27] [-0.37] [0.23]
%ODirectors 0.1168 -0.0016 0.1119 0.0278
[1.44] [-0.03] [1.27] [0.49]
Tenure -0.0003 0.0020 -0.0003 0.0026**
[-0.20] [1.59] [-0.19] [1.99]
IO -0.0057 -0.0124 -0.0181 0.0017
[-0.22] [-0.92] [-0.79] [0.12]
Observations 170 151 168 153
R2 0.247 0.135 0.250 0.117
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Panel B: Politically Inactive Companies
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Overall Index News-based Index
High Policy UncertaintyLow Policy UncertaintyHigh Policy UncertaintyLow Policy Uncertainty
CAAR[-1,10]
Success -0.0081 -0.0051 -0.0065 -0.0108
[-0.82] [-0.48] [-0.58] [-1.11]
Size -0.0044 0.0091 0.0030 -0.0006
[-1.01] [1.36] [0.57] [-0.11]
B/M -0.0029 0.0013 -0.0014 0.0161
[-0.48] [0.08] [-0.24] [1.19]
Ret12M 0.0013 -0.0179 -0.0165 -0.0037
[0.08] [-0.95] [-0.95] [-0.25]
Coverage 0.0010** -0.0008 0.0008** -0.0005
[2.51] [-1.56] [2.02] [-1.01]
BoardSize 0.0013 -0.0007 0.0012 0.0011
[0.59] [-0.29] [0.55] [0.46]
Duality -0.0116 -0.0100 -0.0062 -0.0071
[-1.39] [-0.76] [-0.70] [-0.64]
%ODirectors 0.0612 0.1215 -0.0353 0.1996***
[0.70] [1.40] [-0.41] [2.67]
Tenure 0.0027* 0.0010 0.0019 0.0018
[1.85] [0.55] [1.36] [1.00]
IO -0.0259 0.0048 -0.0093 -0.0213
[-0.96] [0.15] [-0.34] [-0.70]
Observations 166 139 152 153
R2 0.077 0.054 0.096 0.077
98
Table 3.9: Change in PAC expenditure
This table examines changes in PAC expenditure around shareholder engagements. Column
1 and 2 estimate the following regression:
PAC EXPi,t = αSuccessi + β
∑2
j=0 Postj + γ
∑2
j=0 Successi ∗ Postj + θControls+ εi,t
Column 3 and 4 estimate the following regression:










j=0 Successi ∗Activei ∗ Postj + θControls+ εi,t
The dependent variable PAC EXP is the company’s PAC expenditure in a two-year election
cycle. Success is a dummy variable that equals one if shareholder engagement is successful
and zero otherwise. Postj is a dummy variable that takes value one if shareholder engage-
ment takes place in election cycle t − j and zero otherwise. Activei is a dummy variable
that equals one if the company is politically active and zero otherwise. Other variables have
same definitions as in Table 3.7. Industry fixed effects based on Fama-French 12 industry
classification are included in columns 2 and 4. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
In each column, we report coefficient estimates and their t-statistics. *, **, *** indicate
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PAC EXP
Success -362.76*** -221.70* -60.35 -22.62





Post0 181.28*** 181.28*** 32.05** 32.05**
[5.21] [5.19] [2.40] [2.39]
Success*Post0 -82.12* -82.12* 4.35 4.35





Post1 241.99*** 241.99*** 45.57** 45.57**
[4.87] [4.85] [2.17] [2.16]
Success*Post1 -93.09 -93.09 27.52 27.52






(1) (2) (3) (4)
PAC EXP
Post2 294.78*** 294.78*** 72.00** 72.00**
[4.47] [4.45] [2.43] [2.42]
Success*Post2 -58.06 -58.06 70.10 70.10





Size 229.38*** 328.47*** 52.91 126.51**
[3.23] [4.82] [0.90] [2.33]
B/M 54.38 113.70* -58.29 -6.26
[0.73] [1.66] [-1.05] [-0.14]
Ret12M -46.60 -91.00 83.89 58.73
[-0.30] [-0.64] [0.83] [0.62]
Coverage 15.27 13.60 14.51* 11.05*
[1.44] [1.57] [1.79] [1.76]
BoardSize 66.36* 14.31 4.22 -11.52
[1.77] [0.44] [0.16] [-0.51]
Duality 182.48 169.87 92.28 73.46
[1.17] [1.30] [0.71] [0.69]
%Outside Directors -114.20 -501.59 31.43 -144.17
[-0.14] [-0.57] [0.05] [-0.23]
Tenure -22.24 -35.68* -15.91 -19.18
[-0.98] [-1.73] [-0.87] [-1.04]
IO -221.27 -186.35 -429.87 -414.03
[-0.31] [-0.29] [-0.80] [-0.90]
Industry Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes
Observations 1540 1540 1540 1540
R2 0.258 0.405 0.513 0.600
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Table 3.10: Change in Institutional Ownership
This table examines changes in institutional ownership around shareholder engagements.
The following regression is estimated:
IOi,t = αSuccessi + β
∑4
j=0 Postj + γ
∑4
j=0 Successi ∗ Postj + θControls+ εi,t
The dependent variable IO is the percentage of outstanding shares held by institutional in-
vestors. Success is a dummy variable that equals one if shareholder engagement is successful
and zero otherwise. Postj is a dummy variable that takes value one if shareholder engage-
ment takes place in quarter t− j and zero otherwise. Other variables have same definitions
as in table 7. Industry fixed effects based on Fama-French 12 industry classification are
included in columns 2. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. In each column, we
report coefficient estimates and their t-statistics. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance
















































Appendix 3.C Additional Material
A. Introduction
This part contains 1) description of CPA-Zicklin index used in the paper,
2) examples of media report on corporate political transparency, 3) examples of
public announcements of successful shareholder engagements, 4) placebo test for
event study results, 5) tests of parallel trend assumption in difference-in-differences
analysis.
B. Description of CPA-Zicklin Index
CPA-Zicklin Index, which measures the level of corporate political trans-
parency, is produced by Center for Political Accountability, a non-profit organisa-
tion, in conjunction with the Zicklin Center for Business Ethics Research at The
Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania. Data on corporate political
transparency is collected from company websites twice a year. The compilation of
CPA-Zicklin index starts from 2011 with only 99 of S&P 500 companies. The cov-
erage has been gradually expanded to S&P 500 companies. Figure 3.7 displays the
coverage of CPA-Zicklin Index from 2011 to 2016.
CPA-Zicklin index has three major components: disclosure, policy and over-
sight. The detailed breakdown of scoring criteria is presented in Table 3.11.21
C. Examples of Media Report on Corporate Political Transparency
Corporate political transparency has been widely reported and discussed by
media in recent decade. To show importance of the topic, we provide some snapshots
of media coverage on this issue in Figure 3.8.
D. Examples of Public Announcements of Successful Shareholder Engagements
In this section, we provide some snapshots of public announcements of suc-
cessful shareholder engagements from which we collected announcement dates.

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3.7: Number of S&P 500 Companies Covered by CPA-Zicklin Index
This figure represents number of S&P 500 companies covered by CPA-Zicklin index
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Figure 3.8: Media Coverage on Corporate Political Transparency
This figure represents examples of media coverage on corporate political trans-
parency.
(a) Washington Post
(b) Wall Street Journal
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E. Placebo Test for Event Study Results
In this section we conduct robustness check of event study results in the form
of placebo tests. We examine the abnormal return when day 0 is two months before
the actual outcome announcement date. Table 3.12 presents the results.
Table 3.12: Placebo Test for Event Study Results
This table computes the abnormal return using the same classification and method-
ology as Table 3.6 except that we assume day 0 is two months before the actual
outcome announcement date. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Politically Active Companies
N CAAR[-1,10] CAAR[-1,20]
Successful Engagement 33 0.06% -1.35%
[-0.04] [-0.79]
Unsuccessful Engagement
Omission of Shareholder Proposal 12 0.24% 0.08%
[0.22] [-0.06]
Fail in shareholder meeting with high support 100 0.22% -0.41%
[0.43] [-0.63]
Fail in shareholder meeting with low support 178 0.21% 0.10%
[0.49] [0.18]
Panel B: Politically Inactive Companies
N CAAR[-1,10] CAAR[-1,20]
Successful Engagement 63 -2.42%*** -2.37%**
[-2.77] [-2.01]
Unsuccessful Engagement
Omission of Shareholder Proposal 7 -1.34% -1.91%
[-0.63] [-0.44]
Fail in shareholder meeting with high support 111 -0.55% -0.06%
[-0.94] [-0.08]
Fail in shareholder meeting with low support 132 0.57% -0.38%
[1.28] [-0.62]
Abnormal returns are statistically indifferent from zero in politically active
companies, including reactions to successful engagements and unsuccessful engage-
ments that obtained relatively high support. Abnormal returns are also statistically
insignificant in politically inactive companies, except for successful engagements.
Taken together, this evidence supports our event study methodology.
F. Tests of Parallel Pre-treatment Trend in Difference-in-differences Analysis
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In this section we test the parallel trend assumption for the variables of interest
used in difference-in-differences analysis. We first review the methodology to test
parallel pre-treatment trend and then present the results.
Methodology
The commonly used method to test parallel pre-treatment trend is to add in-
teraction terms with lag dummy variables. If the interaction terms with lag dummy
variables are jointly insignificant, then we can conclude that parallel trend assump-
tion holds. For the difference-in-differences analysis with companies’ PAC expendi-
ture, we adopt the following regression specification to test parallel trend assump-
tion.










Successi ∗ Postj + θControls+ εi,t (3.10)
where Pre−1 is a dummy variable that takes value one if shareholder en-
gagement takes place in election cycle t+ 1 and zero otherwise. Other variables are
the same as in regression 3.7. The regression is estimated both with and without
industry fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at firm level to account for
within-firm correlation. δ measures the pre-treatment trend and thus insignificant
δ would indicate non-existence of pre-treatment trend. We only include one lag
dummy variable since we have only two periods before the announcement.
Similarly, for the difference-in-differences analysis with companies’ institu-
tional ownership, we adopt the following regression specification to test parallel
trend assumption.
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Successi ∗ Postj + θControls+ εi,t (3.11)
where Prek is a dummy variable that takes value one if shareholder engage-
ment takes place in election cycle t − k and zero otherwise. Other variables are
the same as in regression 3.9. The regression is estimated both with and with-
out industry fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at firm level to account
for within-firm correlation. δ measures the pre-treatment trend and thus jointly
insignificant δ would indicate non-existence of pre-treatment trend.
Results
Table 3.13 presents the estimation results. In both Panel A and B, the inter-
action terms associated with pre-treatment trend are insignificantly different from
zero. F-test also indicates that the pre-trend interaction terms are jointly insignifi-
cant. Therefore the evidences suggest that parallel trend assumptions hold for the
variables of interest in the period before announcement of engagement outcomes.
The effects presented in the paper are likely to be causal assuming the trends would
have remained parallel in the absence of shareholder engagement.
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Table 3.13: Parallel Pre-treatment Trend Test for Difference-in-differences Analysis
This table shows the estimates of regression 3.10 (Panel A) and 3.11 (Panel B),
respectively. Industry fixed effects based on Fama-French 12 industry classification
are included in columns 2. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. In each
column, we report coefficient estimates and their t-statistics. We also report F-
statistics and associated p-value for testing joint significance of pre-trend interaction
terms. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.









F-stat for Pre-trend interaction terms 0.02 0.02
P-value for F-stat 0.89 0.89
Treatment Effect Terms Yes Yes
Control Variables Yes Yes

















F-stat for Pre-trend interaction terms 0.41 0.41
P-value for F-stat 0.66 0.66
Treatment Effect Terms Yes Yes
Control Variables Yes Yes




G. Joint Target-Outcome Dynamics
In this section we conduct the analysis in Table 3, 4, and 7 in a joint framework.
In equilibrium, the activists’ target selection and outcomes are likely to be endoge-
nously determined. One one hand, activists may selectively pick companies in which
they are more likely to win the battle, especially given the substantial costs incurred
[Gantchev, 2013]. On the other hand, market reactions might be correlated with
activists’ target decisions, to the extent that target decisions potentially indicate
negative governance concerns or positive monitoring effort by activist shareholders.
We thus employ a empirical specification in the spirit of Heckman [1979]
to capture the joint target-outcome dynamics [e.g. Renneboog and Szilagyi, 2011;
Cziraki et al., 2010]. The model is as follows:
y∗1i,t = X
′
1i,tβ1 + ε1i,t (3.12)
y1i,t =

1 if y∗1i,t > 0
0 if y∗1i,t ≤ 0
y∗2i,t = X
′






where ε1i,t, ε2i,t are drawn from a multivariate normal distribution with zero
mean, variance σ21 and σ
2
2, and correlation ρ1,2. The model contains two parts:
selection equations 3.12 and outcome equations 3.13. The variable y1i,t is a dummy
variable indicating whether firm i is targeted in year t, while the variable y2i,t is the
outcome of interest (i.e. engagement outcomes and market reactions to engagement
outcomes at the proposal level). Importantly, the model assumes that target decision
y1i,t is observed while the outcome of interest y2i,t is only observed when the firm is
targeted by an activist, i.e. y1i,t = 1. This is consistent with our data feature. The
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variables X1i,t and X2i,t are explanatory variables for target selection and outcomes
of interest. They do differ but are not mutually exclusive. The compostion of X1i,t
and X2i,t can be found in Table 3, 4, and 7. β1 and β2 correspond to cofficients of
interest.
The simultaneous nature of the model stems from the fact that the correla-
tion ρ1,2 between two error terms in selection equation and outcome equation are
potentially nonzero. Intuitively, we hypothesize that the correlation between error
terms in target selection and likehood of successful engagement are likely to be posi-
tive since unobserved factors that make the engagement more likely to be successful
should be taken into account by activist investors in making their target decisions.
However, we cannot unamiguously hypothesize the existence and the sign of corre-
lation between error terms in target selection and market reactions due to the lack
of direct link.
The model is estimated using Heckman [1979] two-step methodology. In the





where φ(·) and Φ(·) are the density function and distribution function of
normal distribution, respectively. In the second step, we include the inverse Mills
ratio in the outcome equation. Thus the outcome equation estimated becomes
y2i,t = X
′
2i,tβ2 + λ InvMilli,t + ε2i,t (3.15)
It could be shown that λ has the same sign as the correlation ρ1,2.
Table IA.4 presents the estimation results. The selection equations, shown in
Panel A, are configured identically in Panel A and Table 3. The outcome equations
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analysing the likelihood of successful engagement are provided in Panel B. The
conclusion in section A.2. that institutional activist investors, especially SRI funds,
are more likely to achieve success in ther engagements, continues to hold. The
likelihood of successful engagement is around 9% (26%) higher for institutional
activist investors (SRI funds) than for other investors. Coefficients of some control
variables differ from those in Table 4 after taking engodoneous target decision into
account. The existence of PAC committee, firm size, percentage of outside and
politically connected directors, average director tenure, and institutional onwership,
all contribute positively to the probability of successful shareholder engagement.
The significantly positive coefficient on inverse Mills ratio confirms our hypothesis
that activists tend to target companies in which they are more likely to win the
battle. The model’s explanatory power measured by R2 also increases from 9% in
Table 4 to 24%.
Panel C shows the outcome equations analysing stock market reactions. The
conclusions in section B.2. that in politically active companies, the stock market
reacts more positively to successful engagements than to unsuccessful engagements,
remains valid. The spread in market reactions remains statistically insignificant in
politically inactive companies. Consistent with Cziraki et al. [2010] and Renneboog
and Szilagyi [2011], we find no evidence that market reactions are endogenous to
activists’ target decisions, as shown by insignificant coefficients on inverse Mills
ratio.
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Table 3.14: Joint Target-Outcome Dynamics
This table shows the estimates of self-selection model presented in section G. Panel
A presents the results of selection equations. Panel B and C presents the results
of outcome equations (likelihood of successful engagement and market reactions).
The dependent variable in the selection equations (Panel A), Target, equals one if
a firm is targeted by a shareholder activist, and zero otherwise. The first depen-
dent variable in outcome equations (Panel B), Success, equals one if shareholder
engagement is successful, and zero otherwise. The second dependent variable in
outcome equations (Panel C), CAAR[-1,10], is the cumulative average abnormal re-
turn (CAAR) within wndow [-1,10] around the public announcement of engagement
outcomes. All independent variables in selection equations and outcome equations
are as defined in Table 3, 4, and 7. In Panel B and C, inverse Mills ratio, InvMill,
estimated from selection equations, is included as an independent variable. In each
column, we report coefficient estimates, their heteroscedasticity-robust t-statistics,
and when applicable, the corresponding marginal probability change induced by a
one-unit change in the value of a specific covariate from its sample average. *, **,
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Target Selection
(1) (2)
Target Mfx
PAC Existence 0.74782*** 0.00881***
[12.50] [6.81]























Pseudo R2 0.441 0.441
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Panel B: Likelihood of Successful Engagement
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Success Mfx Success Mfx
Sponsor is an institutional investor 0.72006*** 0.09232***
[3.19] [4.41]
Sponsor is a SRI fund 1.15852*** 0.26387***
[4.52] [3.67]
Sponsor is a public pension 0.81857*** 0.16282***
[3.23] [2.68]
Sponsor is a religious group 0.47139 0.09598
[1.52] [1.26]
Sponsor is a labor union 0.09870 0.01645
[0.34] [0.33]
PAC Existence 2.16660*** 0.12614*** 2.25583*** 0.11323***
[5.68] [8.05] [5.96] [7.41]
Size 0.62603*** 0.10994*** 0.64369*** 0.10292***
[5.60] [5.77] [5.41] [5.30]
B/M 0.16009 0.02811 0.19959* 0.03191*
[1.37] [1.34] [1.88] [1.83]
Ret12M -0.46212 -0.08116 -0.46581 -0.07448
[-1.25] [-1.29] [-1.26] [-1.29]
Coverage 0.00363 0.00064 -0.00041 -0.00007
[0.43] [0.43] [-0.05] [-0.05]
BoardSize 0.03591 0.00631 0.04737 0.00757
[1.17] [1.17] [1.41] [1.41]
Duality 0.05181 0.00901 0.03560 0.00565
[0.34] [0.34] [0.22] [0.22]
%Outside Directors 3.29829*** 0.57924*** 2.93237** 0.46885**
[2.59] [2.59] [2.15] [2.16]
Tenure 0.06928*** 0.01217*** 0.06069** 0.00970**
[2.71] [2.73] [2.28] [2.32]
%Connected Directors 1.05703** 0.18563** 1.09367** 0.17486**
[2.48] [2.45] [2.46] [2.39]
IO 0.67940* 0.11931* 0.79197** 0.12663**
[1.84] [1.83] [2.02] [2.00]
InvMill 2.41991*** 0.42498*** 2.55076*** 0.40784***
[8.43] [8.38] [8.68] [8.00]
Observations 626 626 626 626
Pseudo R2 0.197 0.197 0.243 0.243
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Panel C: Market Reactions
(1) (2)




























The Spillover effect of
Corporate Fraud: Evidence
from Firm-Level Supply Chain
Data
4.1 Introduction
Corporate fraud revelation is detrimental to accused firms themselves [Karpoff et al.,
2008b,a]. In an interlinked economy, however, the impact of such revelation is not
restricted to accused firms themselves. On the contrary, direct costs imposed on
fraudulent firms may only constitute a small portion of overall economic impact of
corporate fraud.
In this paper, we analyse the implication of corporate fraud revelation for
a particular type of stakeholders: economically linked firms through supply chain
relationship. This is important from the social welfare perspective since it points to
an indirect cost of corporate fraud largely overlooked in the literature.
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Our analysis, built on a large sample of 693 corporate fraud revelations with
supplier-customer links, aims to uncover the implication of fraud revelation for sup-
pliers and customer from a market perspective. Meanwhile, we also analyse which
factors contribute to the market reactions of suppliers and customers. This analysis
sheds light on the main channel of propagation of shocks.
Our corporate fraud events are mainly financial misreporting. Built on this
sample, we first document that on average fraudulent firms have 10.33 links, includ-
ing suppliers and customers.1 This shows the widespread connection between firms
in the economy.
We then demonstrate that suppliers and customers experience significantly
negative market reactions around fraud revelation. For example, three-day cumula-
tive abnormal return is -0.49% for suppliers and -0.30% for customers. The magni-
tude is small relative to the market reaction of fraudulent firms. However, it is still
economically and statistically significant.
Since corporate fraud revelations are likely to occur during economic down-
turn or in poorly-performing industries [Povel et al., 2007; Rosner, 2003], one might
wonder to what extent our results are driven by industry trend or business cycle. To
alleviate those concerns, we construct a sample of matched suppliers (customers)
in the same industry and year as the suppliers (customers) of fraudulent firms.
Matched suppliers (customers) and their linked firms, however, have not been ex-
posed to corporate fraud revelations. We find that the three-day abnormal returns
of event suppliers (customers) around fraud revelations are still significantly more
negative than those of matched suppliers (customers). This confirms our previous
finding that fraud revelations are viewed negatively by stock market investors for
the linked suppliers (customers).
We also examine whether the negative impact depends on the reporting party
of supplier-customer links with fraudulent firms. We find that both suppliers (cus-
1We restrict our analysis to suppliers and customers that are disclosed and in CRSP universe.
The implication can be generalized to some extent.
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tomers) with links reported by themselves and suppliers (customers) with links not
reported by themselves are negatively impacted within 10 days of fraud revelation.
The negative market reactions immediately materialize for suppliers (customers)
whose links are self-reported. By contrast, the negative market reactions gradually
materialize for suppliers (customers) whose links are not self-reported. This find-
ings supports the view that, due to limited attention and information processing
constraints, investors of suppliers and customers are slower in recognizing the link
with fraudulent firms and consequential spillover effect if suppliers and customers
do not self-report the links.
To understand the channel of propagation of shocks, we analyse the cross-
section of abnormal returns of affected suppliers (customers). We find that fraud
severity, as measured by the market reactions of fraudulent firms, is positively related
to the market responses of linked suppliers (customers). In stark contrast with
previous literature on the network effects of production shocks [e.g. Barrot and
Sauvagnat, 2016], we do not find the significant relationship between product market
conditions of fraudulent firms and market responses of linked suppliers (customers).
Instead, we find that information environment and corporate reputation are two
important determinants of the suppliers’ (customers’) market reactions to fraud
revelations. Robustness checks, such as removal of repeated events and utilization
of clustered standard error, also confirm our results.
Taken together, our market-based tests suggest that corporate fraud reve-
lation, especially financial fraud, negatively impacts linked firms mainly through
reputation and information shock channel. Our results provide empirical support
for enhanced corporate disclosure and social capital accumulation.
Our paper is closely related to the literature on implications of corporate
fraud. Prior literature has documented the effect of corporate fraud on accused
firms, industry peers, and household stock market participation. Karpoff et al.
[2008b] find that on average firms lose 38% of their market values when financial
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misconduct is revealed. Fraudsters appear to produce less innovation than non-
fraudsters [Wang and Li, 2014]. Giannetti and Wang [2016] demonstrate that after
the revelation of corporate fraud in a state, the equity holdings of households in
that state decrease significantly. Goldman et al. [2012] show that fraud revelation
benefits industry rivals in less competitive industries whilst it hurts industry rivals in
competitive industries. Since the nature of supplier-customer relationship is vastly
different from other parties, such as industry rival and householder, we contribute
to the literature by analysing the effect of fraud revelation on these important yet
under-explored stakeholders.
Our paper is also related to the literature on shock spillover along corporate
supply chain network. Prior literature has documented the effect of bankruptcy fil-
ings, financial distress, and production shocks on linked firms along the supply chain
[Hertzel et al., 2008; Hortaçsu et al., 2013; Barrot and Sauvagnat, 2016; Wu, 2016].
The shocks they identify all significantly affect firms’ operation. Therefore they find
the suppliers and customers are affected through operation channel. However, the
financial fraud we analyse has a less direct effect on accused firms’ operation. Ac-
cordingly, we find the channels through which suppliers and customers are affected
by fraud revelation are different from production shocks in the literature.
Another related area is literature on corporate disclosure and information
environment. Previous literature argue that enhanced disclosure has benefits and
costs [e.g. Diamond, 1985; Frankel et al., 1995; Wang, 2007; He and Tian, 2013].
Our research contributes to the debate by showing that enhanced information envi-
ronment can help alleviate the negative shock to suppliers (customers) brought by
corporate fraud revelation.
Last but not the least, we contribute to the literature on the implication
of corporate social responsibility (CSR). Edmans [2011, 2012] and Edmans et al.
[2017] all document the positive effect of CSR on firm market valuation. Lins et al.
[2017] find that firms with high social capital performs better during the 2008-2009
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financial crisis. Our research adds to the literature by showing that high social
capital can also mitigate the negative reputation shocks of fraud revelation.
The rest of paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops research hypothe-
ses. Section 3 describes data and provides summary statistics. Section 4 presents
empirical findings. Section 5 concludes.
4.2 Hypotheses Development
We hypothesize the public revelation of corporate fraud can potentially affect the
stock price of suppliers and customers though two channels. First, corporate fraud
might negatively impact the stock prices of suppliers and customers by directly
affecting their operations. Second, corporate fraud might result in the reputation
concerns of suppliers and customers since investors might worry about fraud in firms
that deal with fraudulent firms as well. Both mechanisms point to the following
hypothesis:
Hypothesis H4.1 The stocks of fraudulent firms’ suppliers and customers react
negatively to the fraud revelation.
When fraudulent firms are in less competitive industries, suppliers (cus-
tomers) are in weaker bargaining positions of production network. In other word, it
is more difficult for suppliers (customers) to opt out of their contracting relationships
with fraudulent firms in less competitive industries. Under operation channel, the
operations and stock prices of suppliers and customers are expected to be impacted
more negatively in less competitive industries. However, under reputation channel,
the level of competition should have no bearing on the stock prices of suppliers and
customers. Based on the above argument, we put forward the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis H4.2n The abnormal returns of suppliers (customers) are more neg-
ative when fraudulent firms are in less competitive industries.
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Hypothesis H4.2a The abnormal returns of suppliers (customers) are unaffected
by the level of industry competition of fraudulent firms.
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) are associated with corporate social
capital [e.g. Lins et al., 2017].2 Under reputation channel, higher CSR performance
of suppliers (customers) help restore public trust and therefore mitigate the reputa-
tion concerns of investors. By contrast, under operation channel, companies’ CSR
performance should have no bearing on the stock prices of suppliers and customers.
Based on the above argument, we put forward the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis H4.3n The abnormal returns of suppliers (customers) are less nega-
tive when they have a higher CSR score.
Hypothesis H4.3a The abnormal returns of suppliers (customers) are unaffected
by their CSR performances.
The information generated by the fraud revelation will be used by the stock
market investors to update their belief about the firm valuation. The more opaque
the information environment of suppliers (customers) is, the more weight the mar-
ket will put on the new negative information shock.3 This reasoning leads to the
following hypothesis:
Hypothesis H4.4 The greater opacity in suppliers (customers) is associated with
more negative abnormal returns.
2This is supported by both academic studies and industry practitioners. For example, Sacconi
and Antoni [2010] relates the definition of CSR to many aspects of social capital and shows that
firms can accumulate social capital through CSR investments. CEO surveys conducted by Price-
waterhouseCoopers in 2013 and 2014 also relate firms’ CSR investments to trust and social capital.
We refer to Lins et al. [2017] for a more detailed discussion of using CSR as a proxy for corporate
social capital.
3Detailed explanations are given in appendix 4.A.
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4.3 Data and Summary Statistics
4.3.1 Data
The data we use in our analysis are drawn from several sources. Data on corpo-
rate fraud is from Audit Analytics Litigation database. Audit Analytics Litigation
database provides detailed data on all federal securities class action claims and SEC
related litigation action against SEC registrants. Using this data has two advan-
tages. First, all cases are material legal proceedings which will have non-negligible
impact on accused firms. Second, the class period end date in legal proceedings
enables us to accurately identify when corporate fraud is publicly revealed.4 The
coverage of litigation data starts from 2000 to 2015.
We require the legal cases to have non-missing company identifier information
and the class period end date.5 The companies have to be defendant in each legal
proceeding. Based on the case information provided by the database and the level
of aggregation suggested by previous literature, we further classify each legal case
into the following 8 categories: 1) financial reporting, 2) breach of contracts, 3)
patent and copyright related, 4) product & service liability, 5) social responsibility
related, 6) antitrust violation, 7) operational malpractice, 8) others. Since the focus
of our paper is on corporate fraud, we exclude legal cases on ”social responsibility
related”, ”antitrust violation”, and ”others”.6 We then exclude fraud in financial
4In securities class action lawsuit, class period end date is typically defined as the date when
wrongdoing becomes public knowledge.
5Audit Analytics Litigation database uses Central Index Key (CIK) code as the company iden-
tifier.
6“social responsibility related” lawsuits include cases related to civil rights, disability law, em-
ployment law, environmental law, etc. “operational malpractice” lawsuits include cases related
to racketeering, corruption, and tax evasion. Broadly speaking, corporate fraud involves compa-
nies’ misrepresentation of accounting reports, contractual terms, intellectual property possession,
product quality, and key employees’ misconduct. “Antitrust violation”, on the other hand, mainly
includes corporate abusive behavior in product market instead of misrepresentation behavior. Sim-
ilarly, “social responsibility related” lawsuits include corporate exploitation behavior rather than
misrepresentation. Since “Antitrust violation” and “social responsibility related” lawsuits are differ-
ent in nature from items under corporate fraud, we exclude them from our corporate fraud sample.
Further, if we adopt the “stricter” definition of corporate fraud and include only cases related to
“financial reporting”, results remain qualitatively similar. This is expected as our current sample
consists predominately of “financial reporting” legal cases.
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firms (SIC codes between 6000 and 6999), utilities (SIC codes between 4900-4999),
and government entities (SIC codes of 9000 or above). As indicated in Panel A of
Table 4.1, this filtering process yields 2,580 corporate fraud events in 2,010 unique
firms. On average, there are 1.28 fraud events per firm.
Corporate supplier-customer link data is from Factset Revere database. Fact-
set Revere contains companies’ relationship information from primary public sources
such as SEC 10-K annual filings, 10-Q quarterly filings, investor presentations,
press releases, corporate announcements, and company websites. The coverage of
supplier-customer link data starts from 2003. Two features of the dataset make it
appealing to our study. First, the data contains the start date and end date for each
relationship. This allows us to unambiguously identify the fraudulent firms’ suppli-
ers and customers at the exact date of public revelation. Second, the data coverage
is comprehensive as compared to alternative data sources. Alternative data sources
for supplier-customer links, such as Compustat segment data, contains only a subset
of the most important customers of each firm on an annual basis.7
To get the most complete picture of companies’ suppliers and customers,
we capitalize on the information disclosed by both suppliers and customers. For
instance, an earnings statement from Mattel (NASDAQ: MAT) discloses Walmart
(NYSE: WMT) as its customer. The Factset relationship data would therefore iden-
tify Walmart as Mattel’s customer under ‘customer’ type. We invert the relationship
to label Mattel as the suppliers of Walmart even if Walmart did not disclose Mattel
as its supplier.8
We merge corporate fraud event sample with supplier-customer link data.
We also exclude financial firms (SIC codes between 6000 and 6999), utilities (SIC
codes between 4900-4999), and government entities (SIC codes of 9000 or above)
from suppliers and customers of fraudulent firms. After matching with supplier-
7This data is used in Cohen and Frazzini [2008] and other studies.
8This is a standard procedure in literature on supply chain. For instance, Gofman et al. [2018],
Wu [2016], Kolay et al. [2016] all adopt such procedure in forming supplier-customer links.
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customer link data, we have 693 fraud events with 7,156 supplier-customer links.
The sample period is from 2003 to 2015.
The stock price information is obtained from Center for Research on Security
Prices (CRSP) database. Accounting information is extracted from Compustat.
Analyst data comes from I/B/E/S database. Data on CSR is from the Kinder,
Lydenberg, Domini, & Co. (KLD) database. Following Cheng et al. [2013] and Hong
et al. [2012], we focus on five categories of CSR performance: community activities,
diversity, employee relations, environmental policies, and the social benefits of their
products.9 Each firm’ CSR score is then computed as the sum of the number of
CSR strengths across those five categories minus the sum of the number of CSR
concerns across those five categories.10
9KLD ratings consist of the following categories: community activities, diversity, employee re-
lations, environmental policies, human rights, social benefits of firms’ products, involvement in
controversial industries (e.g. alcohol, gaming, gambling, etc.), and corporate governance. We do
not classify corporate governance as part of corporate social responsibility for two reasons. First, as
argued by Servaes and Tamayo [2013] and Shleifer and Vishny [1997], corporate governance refers
to channels through which shareholders could effectively motivate company management to work
in their best interest. By contrast, corporate social responsibility refers to the positive externali-
ties companies impose on other stakeholders, such as community, employee, etc. The relationship
entities are very different. Second, corporate governance might be correlated with corporate fraud
which is the main subject in our study. This might affect our tests of the effect of CSR on spillover
effect of corporate fraud. The coverage of human rights score is very limited and inconsistent.
For instance, one subcategory “Positive Record in S. Africa” contains only ratings from 1994 to
1995. Another subcategory “Labor Rights Strength” starts from 2002 and discontinues after 2009.
Thus to avoid inconsistency and discontinuity in our measure, we exclude human rights category
from our CSR measure. Lastly, as there is virtually nothing firms can do to change its industry
affiliation, the involvement in controversial industries is not effective in capturing companies’ CSR
dynamics. Therefore we also do not use this item in generating our CSR measure.The representa-
tiveness of our CSR scores in measuring corporate social responsibility is supported by literature,
practice and some anecdotal examples. First, a large number of studies have pointed out that
the KLD ratings are “the largest multidimensional CSR databases publicly available” and “the de
facto research standard in CSR” [e.g. Deckop et al., 2006; Waddock and Graves, 1997; Cheng et al.,
2013; Hong et al., 2012; Servaes and Tamayo, 2013; Lins et al., 2017]. Chatterji et al. [2009] cross
checks the KLD environmental ratings with U.S. EPA environmental data and finds evidences that
support the effectiveness of KLD ratings in measuring firms’ environmental performance. Second,
KLD ratings are utilized by a number of asset management companies, especially SRI funds, in
evaluating companies’ CSR performance and forming their portfolios accordingly. Last but not the
least, Cheng et al. [2013] also gives some anecdotal examples on the effectiveness of CSR scores.
We cross checked those examples with our CSR scores and find that our CSR scores are able to
capture the CSR dynamics. For example, after Steve Jobs took over Apple’s CEO role in 1996 and
aggregatively cut Apple’s CSR programs, Apple’s CSR score featured a negative jump from 4 in
1995 to 0 in 2000. Google’s CSR score rose steadily from 2 in 2004 to 6 in 2010 after it announced
the famous “1% profit-for-social responsibility program”.
10The equal weighting scheme employed by us in computing overall CSR scores is consistent with
the methodology used in literature [e.g. Chatterji et al., 2009; Cheng et al., 2013; Hong et al., 2012;
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We use the industry concentration and product similarity data from Hoberg-
Phillips Data Library to measure market power and structure.11 The industry
concentration and product similarity is computed based on Text-based Network
Industry Classifications (TNIC) developed in a series of papers by Prof. Hoberg
and Prof. Phillips [e.g. Hoberg and Phillips, 2016].12
4.3.2 Summary Statistics
Table 4.1 gives summary statistics on corporate fraud events in our sample. As
described in the data section, the final sample contains 693 fraud events. Panel
B reports the distribution of fraud types. Most of our fraud events are related to
financial reporting (96.97%). Panel C reports the top five industries of fraudulent
firms in our final sample.13 Corporate fraud occurs most frequently in pharmaceu-
tical products (16.31%), business services (13.42%), electronic equipment (9.38%)
industry. Figure 4.1 presents the distribution of fraud events in our final sample
across different years. Note in 2003 the number of fraud events is relatively small
since the database just started coverage at that time.
[Place Table 4.1 about here]
[Place Figure 4.1 about here]
Table 4.2 presents summary statistics on the supplier-customer links in our
final sample. The sample fraudulent firms have in total 7,156 links, in which 4,175
are suppliers and 2,981 are customers. Each firm has, on average, 10.33 supplier-
customer links. Average number of suppliers each firm (7.88) is slightly higher than
Servaes and Tamayo, 2013; Lins et al., 2017].
11http://hobergphillips.usc.edu/
12Hoberg and Phillips [2016] describes and tests the superiority of their measures over measures
based on traditional industry classification, such as Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) and
North American Industry Classification System (NAICS).
13We use Fama-French 48 industry classifications.
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average number of customers each firm (5.83). This shows the widespread inter-
firm connection in the economy. Panel B and C report the top five industries of
fraudulent firms’ suppliers and customers respectively. Suppliers of fraudulent firms
are mainly in business services (24.89%), electronic equipment (16.26%), and phar-
maceutical products (8.62%) industry. Customers of fraudulent firms are mainly in
retail (17.04%), business services (14.06%), and wholesale (10.16%) industry.
[Place Table 4.2 about here]
Table 4.3 presents summary statistics on the company characteristics of sup-
pliers and customers.
[Place Table 4.3 about here]
4.4 Empirical Findings
4.4.1 Short Term Stock Market Reactions
In this section we examine suppliers’ and customers’ short-term stock market reac-
tions to corporate fraud revelation. We use event study methodology to perform the
analysis. A brief review of event study methodology is provided and then results
are reported.
Event Study Methodology
Event study methodology is used to estimate abnormal return attributed to corpo-
rate event.14 The abnormal return is defined as the actual return of the stock over
the event window minus the normal return of the stock over the same window. The
normal return is defined as the expected return without the event taking place.
14See MacKinlay [1997] for a comprehensive review of event study methodology and applications
in economics and finance.
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ARi,t = Ri,t − E(Ri,t|It) (4.1)
where ARi,t represents the abnormal return, Ri,t is the actual return and It
represents the conditioning information. In this study we use Carhart four-factor
model to compute the normal return.
Ri,t −Rf,t = αi + βi1(Rm,t −Rf,t) + βi2SMBt + βi3HMLt + βi4MOMt + εi,t
(4.2)
where Ri,t is the return of stock i on day t, Rm,t and Rf,t are the market
return and risk-free rate on day t respectively, SMBt is the size factor which is
computed as the return difference between portfolios of small cap stocks and large
cap stocks, HMLt is the value factor which is computed as the return difference
between portfolios of high book-to-market stocks and low book-to-market stocks,
MOMt is the momentum factor which is computed as the return difference between
portfolios of high performing stocks and low performing stocks.
To get the average effect of events, abnormal returns are aggregated over the









where CAR is cumulative abnormal return over event window [t1, t2], N is
total number of events.
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Event Study Results
Table 4.4 provides the event study results for four different event windows, 3 (-1 to
1), 4 (-1 to 2), 2 (-1 to 0), 4 (-2 to 1), with day 0 being the date of fraud revelation.
Panel A presents the cumulative abnormal returns (CAAR) of fraudulent firms.
Panel B and C present cumulative abnormal returns (CAAR) of fraudulent firms’
suppliers and customers respectively.
Consistent with Karpoff et al. [2008b], corporate fraud results in a highly
negative stock market reactions. The three-day abnormal return is -17.40% for
fraudulent firms on average. As displayed in Panel B and C, fraud revelations result
in significantly negative abnormal return for both suppliers and customers. For
example, on average the three-day abnormal return is -0.49% (-0.30%) for suppliers
(customers). This confirms our previous hypothesis on the negative externalities
of corporate fraud revelation. Notice customers’ market reactions are smaller in
magnitude than suppliers’ market reactions. Panel A (Panel B) of Figure 4.2 depicts
the short-term abnormal return of fraudulent firms’ suppliers (customers) around
fraud revelation.
[Place Table 4.4 about here]
[Place Figure 4.2 about here]
4.4.2 Robustness
In this section we conduct three robustness checks on the negative externalities of
corporate fraud revelation.
Repeated Events within a Firm
To ensure our results are not driven by a particular company and are not clustered
in time, we re-run event study on corporate fraud events that are not preceded by
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another event in the same company within two-year window prior to the date of
fraud revelation. We are then left with 603 fraud events.
Table 4.5 reports the event study results. All results remain similar in mag-
nitude and statistical significance. The abnormal returns of fraudulent firms and
their suppliers, in fact, become slightly larger. This is consistent with abnormal
returns do not fully reflect the extent of market reactions if there are prior events
since investors have already formed some expectations from previous events.
[Place Table 4.5 about here]
Comparison with Matched Firms
Previous literature argue that fraud revelation is more likely to take place during
economic downturn or in poorly-performing industries [Povel et al., 2007; Rosner,
2003]. One might argue that the negative market reactions of suppliers (customers)
are due to business cycle or industry trend.
To address these concerns, we construct a set of matched suppliers (cus-
tomers). We require matched suppliers (customers) to be in the same Fama-French
48 industry and year as event suppliers (customers). Further, we require the matched
suppliers (customers) and their linked firms, have not been exposed to corporate
fraud revelation within -2 year to 2 year window.15 To make sure the firm character-
istics of matched suppliers (customers) are as close to treated suppliers (customers)
as possible, we employ mahalanobis distance matching based on five dimensions:
log(Assets), book-to-market ratio, return on asset (ROA), book leverage, and past
12-month return.16 Lastly, if multiple treated events are matched to the same con-
15We take a conservative approach to ensure our matched firms are clean. When we construct the
sample of matched suppliers (customers), we also remove those firms that have supply or purchase
from fraudulent firms within -1 year to 1 year surrounding the date of fraud revelation. Again,
this conservative approach is to make sure that the undisclosed suppliers (customers) of fraudulent
firms are not in the control sample.
16Mahalanobis distance matching minimizes the mahalanobis distance between two datasets.
The mahalanobis distance between two data matrix Xi and Xj is computed as M(Xi, Xj) =
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trol event, we only keep one control event in our event study analysis to avoid double
counting. After applying the above procedure, we obtain 2,875 untreated suppliers
for 3,977 treated suppliers and 1,873 untreated customers for 2,801 treated cus-
tomers.
The event study results are presented in Table 4.6. In Panel A (Panel C),
we compare the abnormal returns between treated suppliers (customers) and un-
treated suppliers (customers) before the date of fraud revelation. Specifically, we
consider event window -10 to -5. This serves as a placebo test. We find no sig-
nificant difference between abnormal returns of treated suppliers (customers) and
untreated suppliers (customers) before the date of fraud revelation. Panel B (Panel
D) presents the abnormal returns of treated suppliers (customers) and untreated
suppliers (customers) within four event windows. The abnormal returns of treated
suppliers are statistically more negative than those of untreated suppliers surround-
ing the date of fraud revelation. For example, the average three-day abnormal return
of treated suppliers is -0.51% whilst that of untreated suppliers is 0.01%, with the
difference being about -0.51%. The abnormal returns of treated customers are also
more negative than those of untreated customers during event windows although
the difference is statistically significant only in window -2 to 1.
[Place Table 4.6 about here]
Taken together, the above tests ensure that the negative externalities of
corporate fraud revelation on suppliers and customers are not driven by business
cycle or industry trend.√
(Xi −Xj)′S−1(Xi −Xj), where S is the sample covariance matrix of Xi and Xj . The usage of
mahalanobis distance matching is supported by previous researches [e.g. King and Nielsen, 2016].
It adjusts for covariance in the data.
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Reporting Party and Market Reactions
There are two types of links used in our analysis: links that are reported by sup-
pliers (customers) and links that are not reported by suppliers (customers) but are
reported by fraudulent firms. In this section, we investigate whether the reporting
party of those links affects the market reactions to fraud revelation. We separately
conduct event study for above two types of linked suppliers (customers).
The composition of supplier-customer links in terms of link reporting party
are presented in Panel A and C of Table 4.7. A large fraction (85.58%) of supplier
links are reported by supplier themselves. Meanwhile, customer links are divided
more evenly between those reported by customer themselves (42.41%) and those
reported by fraudulent firms (57.59%).
Column 2 and 3 of Table 4.7’s Panel B (D) present market reactions of sup-
pliers (customers) within window [-1,1] and [-1,2], respectively. Even though both
are negative, market reactions of suppliers (customers) with links reported by them-
selves are significantly more negative than those of suppliers (customers) with links
not reported by themselves but reported by fraudulent firms, within a very short
period of time ([-1,1] and [-1,2]). The difference in CAAR[-1,1] between these two
types of suppliers (customers) is -0.49% (-0.32%). There are two potential expla-
nations for this finding. First, links with fraudulent firms might carry more weight
for suppliers (customers) who self-report these links. Therefore the negative shock
(either through operation or reputation channel) would be greater for suppliers (cus-
tomers) who self-report these links. Second, it might take more time for investors
of suppliers (customers) to gather information and infer links with fraudulent firms
if links are not self-reported by suppliers (customers). This is consistent with in-
vestor limited attention in Cohen and Frazzini [2008] and information processing
constraints of investors. Indeed, as links are scattered in various sources of fraudu-
lent firms’ disclosure, it might be difficult for investors of suppliers (customers) to
immediately notice and gather these information if those investors do not specialize
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in analyzing corporate supply chain information. Under this explanation market re-
actions of suppliers (customers) who do not self-report these links would be smaller
in magnitude compared to those of suppliers (customers) who self-report these links
within a very short period of time.
To test which of these explanations are valid in our sample, we examine stock
market reactions in a relatively longer event window. The intuition is that if the
second explanation is valid, then investors’ limited attention and information pro-
cessing constraints would lead to slower market reactions for suppliers (customers)
with links not reported by themselves. We would thus expect the stock market to
gradually adjust prices of suppliers (customers) that do not self-report the link with
fraudulent firms. Meanwhile, if the second explanation does not hold and first ex-
planation holds, the stock market would immediately impound the shock into prices
and there would be no further adjustment.
Column 4 of Table 4.7’s Panel B (D) presents market reactions of suppliers
(customers) within window [-1,10]. Figure 4.3 graphically displays the market reac-
tions of suppliers (customers) over time. Both types of suppliers (customers) have a
negative CAAR within ten days of fraud revelation. However, suppliers (customers)
with links reported by themselves feature a sharp drop in CAAR while suppli-
ers (customers) with links not reported by themselves feature a steady decrease in
CAAR. After ten days of fraud revelation, CAAR of these two types of suppliers
(customers) gradually converge to a comparable level. The difference in CAAR[-
1,10] between these two types of suppliers (customers) is insignificant. This finding
provides strong support for the explanation that investors of suppliers (customers)
are slower in recognizing the link with fraudulent firms and potential spillover effect
if suppliers (customers) do not self-report these links.
[Place Table 4.7 about here]
[Place Figure 4.3 about here]
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4.4.3 Cross-Sectional Determinants of Market Reactions
In this section we explore the cross sectional determinants of stock market responses.
This help shed light on the main channel of propagation of shocks.
Cross-sectional Regressions
To test hypothesis H4.2 to H4.4 and separate between two explanations (operation
channel and reputation channel) of negative stock market reactions, we estimate the
regression:
CAARi,j,t = α+ γXi,j,t−1 + βControls+ εi,j,t (4.4)
where CAARi,j,t is three-day cumulative abnormal return of fraudulent firm
j’s supplier i or customer i in event window [−1, 1].17 Xi,j,t−1 is a set of explanatory
variables that can be categorized into four categories.
The first category is fraud severity. We use the fraudulent firms’ three-day
cumulative abnormal return as the measure. This measure has two advantage. First,
alternative measures are almost imperfect. For instance, using settlement amount as
a measure will lead to significant data loss and bias since a non-negligible fraction of
cases are not settled and even for those settled cases, settlement amount only reflects
the direct costs while the indirect costs might be much larger in magnitude and more
significant in terms of impact. Second, the stock market is able to aggregate and
process the information in a timely manner and impound the information in stock
prices. In this sense the stock market reactions of fraudulent firms sever as a good
proxy for the overall fraud severity.
The second category is fraudulent firms’ product market conditions. As ex-
plained in the data section, we use two measures developed by Hoberg and Phillips
17We also use CAAR[-1,10] as a robustness check. The results are qualitatively similar.
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[2016]: TNIC-based industry concentration (Herfindahl-Hirschman index) and prod-
uct similarity. TNIC is a dynamic and firm-specific industry classification. It is
formed by examining the closeness of business descriptions between two firms. The
number of firms in each industry is calibrated to match three-digit SIC industries.
Both Herfindahl-Hirschman index and product similarity are real numbers in the
interval [0,1]. Higher Herfindahl-Hirschman index represents higher industry concen-
tration and less competition. Higher product similarity translates to more overlap
between the firm’s product and their competitors’ product.
The third category is suppliers’ (customers’) information environment. We
employ three distinct measures following the literature. The first measure we con-
sider is analyst coverage. Lang and Lundholm [1996] show that analyst coverage is
positively associated with information disclosure practice. Other studies have also
used it as a proxy for information asymmetry [e.g. Hong et al., 2000; Zhang, 2006].
For each year, we count the number of analysts following the firms in I/B/E/S.
Then we transform the raw analyst coverage into decile ranks to remove the effect
of outliers. The second measure is analyst forecast dispersion. It is widely sup-
ported in previous literature [Barron et al., 1998; Barron and Stuerke, 1998; Diether
et al., 2002; Imhoff Jr and Lobo, 1992; Lang and Lundholm, 1996; Zhang, 2006]
that high analyst forecast dispersion is associated with severe information asymme-
try. Consistent with Zhang [2006], we compute the forecast dispersion as standard
deviation of analyst earnings forecasts scaled by prior year-end stock price.18 Thus
a firm has to be followed by at least two analysts to enter the computation. We
then transform the raw analyst forecast dispersion into vigintile ranks to remove
the effect of outliers.19 The third measure is stock return volatility. It is recognized
by numerous prior literature [Zhang, 2006; Van Ness et al., 2001; Wang, 1993] that
18For each analyst, we retrieve the latest forecast in the fiscal year. We exclude stale or look-back
analyst forecasts in our computation, i.e. forecast horizon needs to be within 1 to 6 months prior
to forecast period end date.
19We choose vigintile ranks instead of decile ranks to capture more variation. The results are
robust to using decile ranks.
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higher stock return volatility is associated with more information asymmetry. We
use the standard deviation of monthly returns in past one year to compute stock
return volatility.
The fourth and last category is corporate reputation or social capital of sup-
pliers (customers). We use firm-level CSR scores computed using data from KLD
database. As explained in previous hypothesis development, using CSR perfor-
mance to measure corporate social capital is supported by various academic liter-
ature and industry practitioners [e.g. Lins et al., 2017; Sacconi and Antoni, 2010;
World Business Council for Sustainable Development, 2004]. Controls represents a
set of control variables, including suppliers’ (customers’) book leverage, fraudulent
firms’ book leverage and book-to-market ratio.
Regression results are presented in Table 4.8. Panel A (Panel B) reports the
results on cross-sectional determinants of suppliers’ (customers’) market responses.
In all models, we find a positive relationship between fraudulent firms’ market reac-
tions and suppliers’ market reactions. In column 1, the coefficient is 0.0259, which
means on average a 1% decrease in fraudulent firms’ abnormal return results in
about 0.026% decrease in suppliers’ abnormal return. This suggests that market
reactions increase with fraud severity. However, customers’ market responses do
not exhibit significant relationship with fraudulent firms’ market responses.
In model 2 and 3, the coefficients on variables associated with product market
conditions (TNIC HHI, TNIC Simmilarity) are not statistically significant, both for
suppliers and customers. This suggests that the negative market reactions are not
attributed to operation channel. This finding is in contrast to previous literature
on the network effects of production shocks [e.g. Barrot and Sauvagnat, 2016; Wu,
2016] where the spillover effect is more significant when shocked firms are in less
competitive industries. Unlike previous studies, the focus of our study is the revela-
tion of corporate fraud, especially financial misreporting, which has no direct effect
on firm production and operation. This could potentially explain these results.
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In model 4, 5 and 6, we demonstrate that better information environment
help reduce the negative shocks of fraud revelation along supply chain. For instance,
higher analyst coverage corresponds to more positive (less negative) abnormal re-
turns of fraud revelation. Both earnings forecast dispersion and stock return volatil-
ity are negatively related to abnormal returns of fraud revelation. These findings are
consistent with more opaque information environment of suppliers (customers) will
result in the more weight the market puts on the new negative information shock in
updating their beliefs of suppliers’ (customers’) firm valuation.
In model 7, we find that suppliers’ and customers’ CSR performance are pos-
itively related to their abnormal returns of fraud revelation. Suppliers’ (Customers’)
enhanced CSR performance help mitigate the negative impact of fraud revelation
on their investor trust and subsequently market reactions. This finding supports
previous hypothesis that the revelation of corporate fraud mainly affects the rep-
utation and trust of investors in the economically linked firms. To our knowledge
the positive role of CSR investment on firms’ ability to restore public trust facing
adverse shocks has rarely been empirically documented in previous literature.20
[Place Table 4.8 about here]
Overall, we find that the negative market reactions of suppliers’ (customers’)
stock to corporate fraud revelation are mainly attributed to reputation and infor-
mation shock channel. Our results also highlight the importance of distinguishing
shock types in determining the main channels of shock propagation.
In asset pricing sense, the findings reflect that the revelation of corporate
fraud mainly raises suppliers’ and customers’ cost of capital (discount rate) due to
potential representational risk and therefore lowers suppliers’ and customers’ stock
prices. The negative market reactions of linked firms are more likely to be attributed
to increased cost of capital instead of revised cash flow projections.
20The only exception is Lins et al. [2017] where they document the positive effect of CSR on
firms’ stock market performance during the 2008-2009 financial crisis.
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Clustering by Firm-Year
As a robustness check, in this section we re-estimate model 4.4 while clustering the
standard error at the firm-year level.21 This is to take into account the potential
correlation of returns within each firm-year.
Table 4.9 presents the estimation results. Significance levels of all variables
remain unchanged after clustering the standard error at the firm-year level. Thus
conclusions drawn are same as those in Table 4.8. For instance, consistent with
fraud severity negatively impacts the market reactions of suppliers in Table 4.8,
we find a significantly positive coefficient on fraudulent firms’ abnormal returns.
The insignificant coefficients on variables associated with fraudulent firms’ market
power are consistent with results in Table 4.8. Variables related to the information
environment of suppliers (customers) are shown to have the mitigating effect on the
suppliers’ (customers’) negative reactions to fraud revelation, as in Table 4.8. Lastly,
consistent with previous results, CSR scores of suppliers (customers), which are
utilized to measure corporate reputation or social capital, are found to be positively
related to the abnormal returns of suppliers (customers).
[Place Table 4.9 about here]
Repeated Events within a Firm
For same reasons described in section 4.4.2, in the cross-sectional analysis we also
remove corporate fraud events that are preceded by another event in the same
company within two-year window prior to the date of fraud revelation. We then
re-run the multivariate regressions in 4.4.
Regression results are presented in Table 4.10. Results are found to be similar
to Table 4.8. Thus, we conclude that our findings are not driven by a particular
company at a specific period of time.
21We also cluster the standard error at the industry-year level. The results are qualitatively
similar.
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[Place Table 4.10 about here]
4.5 Concluding Remarks
With ever growing corporate production network22, it is vital to understand how the
revelation of corporate misconduct affects economically linked firms along the supply
chain. Using a large sample of corporate fraud events and corporate relationship
data, this paper seeks to answer this question.
We use a market-based approach to examine its impact since the stock mar-
ket is able to aggregate and process the information timely and incorporates the
information in stock prices. We show empirically that the revelation of corporate
misconduct results in negative short-term market reactions for the stocks of suppli-
ers and customers. We show that the effect is not driven by a particular firm at
a specific period of time, industry trend, or business cycle. The reporting party of
supplier-customer links, i.e. whether the links are self-reported by suppliers (cus-
tomers) or not, affects how quickly the negative market reactions fully materialize.
We then analyse the determinants of suppliers’ and customers’ abnormal
returns to uncover channels through which corporate fraud influences upstream and
downstream firms. In contrast to previous literature on production shocks, we do
not find evidence in support of operation channel. We provide evidences in line
with reputation channel. In addition, we also find the negative shock is amplified
by low-quality information environment. Our results highlight the importance of
distinguishing shock types in determining the main channels of shock propagation.
Overall, our market-based tests provide support for the spillover effect of
corporate fraud revelation on upstream and downstream firms. Our results also
provide support for improving corporate disclosure and social capital accumulation
when facing negative reputation shocks in linked firms. Our paper extends the
22See Figure 1 in Wu [2016] for a visual comparison of supply chain network between 2002 and
2015.
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previous literature on the broader costs of corporate misconduct [Giannetti and
Wang, 2016; Goldman et al., 2012]. It would be interesting to analyse the effect of
corporate misconduct on other key stakeholders. We leave this question for future
research.
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Appendix 4.A Conceptual Framework of Information
Environment on Shock Spillover
To support our empirical findings, in this section we present a simple conceptual
framework explaining the effect of information environment on shock spillover. Let
x denote the suppliers’ (customers’) capital that can only be observed by market
investors with noise. Suppose before the arrival of new information shock the market
investors can only observe u, expressed as
u = x+ εu (4.5)
where εu ∼ N(0, 1pu ) and independent of u. In this sense pu measures the firms’
information environment. High pu corresponds to low variance of the noise term
and thus more informative of u on x.
Let v be the new information shock on suppliers’ (customers’) capital received
by market investors which also contains noise (e.g. fraud revelation of linked firms).
v is expressed as
v = x+ εv (4.6)
where εv ∼ N(0, 1pv ) and independent of x and εu. The market investors then use
information shock v to update their estimate of x. Bayes updating implies
E(x|u, v) = wvv + wuu (4.7)
where wv and wu are weights assigned to new information shock and prior consensus






Therefore we observe that the weights assigned to new information shock wv de-








Figure 4.1: Corporate Fraud Events from 2003 to 2015
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Figure 4.2: Market Reactions of Suppliers and Customers to Fraud Revelation
This figure presents cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) of suppliers
(Panel(a)) and customers (Panel (b)) around the date of fraud revelation. Ab-
normal returns are calculated as the return in excess of expected return predicted
by Carhart four-factor model. We consider a window of from 10 days before to 10
days after the date of fraud revelation (Day 0). For comparison purpose, we also plot
the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) of matched suppliers (Panel(a))
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Figure 4.3: Reporting Party and Market Reactions
This figure presents cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) of suppliers
(Panel(a)) and customers (Panel (b)) around the date of fraud revelation. The
red line plots the CAAR of suppliers (customers) with links reported by themselves.
The navy line plots the CAAR of suppliers (customers) with links not reported by
themselves but reported by fraudulent firms. Abnormal returns are calculated as
the return in excess of expected return predicted by Carhart four-factor model. We
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Table 4.1: Summary Statistics on Sample Corporate Fraud Events
This table presents summary statistics on sample corporate fraud events from 2003 to 2015.
Panel A reports sample sizes and number of firms. Panel B reports the breakdown of
corporate fraud types. Panel C reports the top five industries of fraudulent firms in the
final sample.
Panel A: Fraud Statistics
Total Number 2,580
Total no. of unique firms 2,010
Avg no. of fraud events per firm 1.28
No. of fraud events matched to supplier-customer link data 693
Panel B: Distribution of Fraud Types in the Final Sample
Types of Corporate Fraud # of Events Percentage
Financial Reporting 672 96.97%
Breach of Contracts 14 2.02%
Product & Service Liability 5 0.72%
Patent and Copyright Related 1 0.14%
Operational Malpractice 1 0.14%
Total 693 100.00%
Panel C: Top Five Industries of Fraudulent Firms in the Final Sample
Industry # of Events Percentage
Pharmaceutical Products 113 16.31%
Business Services 93 13.42%




Table 4.2: Summary Statistics on Supplier-Customer Links of Fraudulent Firms
This table presents summary statistics on supplier-customer links of fraudulent
firms. Panel A reports summary statistics on linkages. Panel B reports top five
industries of suppliers in the final sample. Panel C reports top five industries of
customers in the final sample.
Panel A: Average Link Statistics
Total no. of Links 7,156
Total no. of Suppliers 4,175
Total no. of Customers 2,981
Avg no. of Links per firm 10.33
Avg no. of Suppliers per firm 7.88
Avg no. of Customers per firm 5.83
Panel B: Top Five Industries of Suppliers in the Final Sample
Industry # of Suppliers Percentage
Business Services 1039 24.89%
Electronic Equipment 679 16.26%
Pharmaceutical Products 360 8.62%
Computers 343 8.22%
Communication 167 4.00%
Panel C: Top Five Industries of Customers in the Final Sample
Industry # of Customers Percentage
Retail 508 17.04%





Table 4.3: Summary Statistics on Firm Characteristics of Fraudulent Firms’ Sup-
pliers and Customers
This table presents summary statistics on firm characteristics of fraudulent firms’
suppliers and customers. Total assets is firms’ total assets in millions of dollars.
B/M is the book value of equity divided by market value of equity. ROA is defined
as operating income before depreciation scaled by total assets. Book Leverage is
defined as the sum of current liabilities and long-term debt divided by total assets.
Analyst Coverage Rank is the decile rank of the number of analysts following the
firm. Forecast Dispersion Rank is the vigintile rank of the firm’s earnings forecast
dispersion (standard deviation of analyst earnings forecasts scaled by prior year-end
stock price). Stock Return Volatility is the standard deviation of the firm’s monthly
returns in past one year. CSR is the firms’s CSR score computed as the sum of the
number of CSR strengths minus the sum of the number of CSR concerns.
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Table 4.4: Stock Market Reactions to Fraud Revelation
This table presents the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) of fraudulent
firms (Panel A), suppliers (Panel B), and customers (Panel C) around the date
of fraud revelation. We consider four different windows surrounding the date of
fraud revelaton (Day 0). Abnormal returns are calculated as the return in excess
of expected return predicted by Carhart four-factor model. We also report the
associated test statistics. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Fraudulent Firms
Window N CAAR t-statistics
[-1,1] 678 -17.40%*** -24.30
[-1,2] 678 -17.70%*** -24.13
[-1,0] 678 -5.38%*** -10.30
[-2,1] 678 -17.80%*** -23.66
Panel B: Suppliers
Window N CAAR t-statistics
[-1,1] 4099 -0.49%*** -5.99
[-1,2] 4099 -0.55%*** -6.00
[-1,0] 4099 -0.21%*** -3.16
[-2,1] 4099 -0.45%*** -4.79
Panel C: Customers
Window N CAAR t-statistics
[-1,1] 2946 -0.30%*** -3.16
[-1,2] 2946 -0.36%*** -3.53
[-1,0] 2946 -0.07% -0.91
[-2,1] 2946 -0.39%*** -3.83
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Table 4.5: Stock Market Reactions after Elimination of Clustered Company Events
This table presents the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) of fraudulent
firms (Panel A), suppliers (Panel B), and customers (Panel C) around the date
of fraud revelation after eliminating events that are preceded by another event in
the same company within two-year window prior to the event date. We consider
four different windows surrounding the date of fraud revelaton (Day 0). Abnormal
returns are calculated as the return in excess of expected return predicted by Carhart
four-factor model. We also report the associated test statistics. *, **, *** indicate
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Fraudulent Firms
Window N CAAR t-statistics
[-1,1] 603 -18.20%*** -23.91
[-1,2] 603 -18.60%*** -23.71
[-1,0] 603 -5.32%*** -9.59
[-2,1] 603 -18.70%*** -23.33
Panel B: Suppliers
Window N CAAR t-statistics
[-1,1] 3391 -0.56%*** -6.09
[-1,2] 3391 -0.68%*** -6.66
[-1,0] 3391 -0.25%*** -3.31
[-2,1] 3391 -0.53%*** -5.10
Panel C: Customers
Window N CAAR t-statistics
[-1,1] 2603 -0.24%** -2.29
[-1,2] 2603 -0.31%*** -2.76
[-1,0] 2603 -0.02% -0.28
[-2,1] 2603 -0.32%*** -2.83
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Table 4.6: Comparison with Matched Suppliers (Customers)
This table presents the comparison of suppliers’ (Panel A and B) and customers’ (Panel C
and D) CAAR against matched suppliers’ and customers’ CAAR. Matched suppliers and
customers are in same industry and year as event suppliers and customers. Panel A (Panel
C) reports the comparison of pre-event abnormal returns between suppliers (customers)
and matched suppliers (customers). Panel B (Panel D) reports the comparison of event
abnormal returns between suppliers (customers) and matched suppliers (customers). We
report levels, differences, and their associated test statistics. *, **, *** indicate statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Comparison of pre-event abnormal return between suppliers and matched firms
Variables Suppliers Matched Firms Difference
(1) (2) (1) - (2)
CAAR[-10,-5] -0.24%** -0.41%*** 0.17%
[-2.03] [-3.04] [0.96]
Panel B: Comparison of event abnormal return between suppliers and matched firms
Variables Suppliers Matched Firms Difference
(1) (2) (1) - (2)
CAAR[-1,1] -0.51%*** 0.01% -0.51%***
[-6.08] [0.07] [-4.03]
CAAR[-1,2] -0.56%*** 0.01% -0.57%***
[-6.07] [0.07] [-3.97]
CAAR[-1,0] -0.24%*** 0.04% -0.29%***
[-3.62] [0.52] [-2.72]
CAAR[-2,1] -0.46%*** -0.08% -0.38%**
[-4.82] [-0.75] [-2.57]
Number of Observations 3,977 2,875 —
Panel C: Comparison of pre-event abnormal return between customers and matched firms
Variables Customers Matched Firms Difference
(1) (2) (1) - (2)
CAAR[-10,-5] -0.02% -0.07% 0.04%
[-0.20] [-0.42] [0.22]
Panel D: Comparison of event abnormal return between customers and matched firms
Variables Customers Matched Firms Difference
(1) (2) (1) - (2)
CAAR[-1,1] -0.30%*** -0.13% -0.18%
[-3.09] [-1.25] [-1.21]
CAAR[-1,2] -0.34%*** -0.23%* -0.12%
[-3.26] [-1.93] [-0.72]
CAAR[-1,0] -0.07% -0.03% -0.04%
[-0.93] [-0.39] [-0.33]
CAAR[-2,1] -0.38%*** -0.10% -0.28%*
[-3.60] [-0.87] [-1.77]
Number of Observations 2,801 1,873 —
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Table 4.7: Reporting Party and Market Reactions
This table examines the effect of link reporting party on linked firms’ stock market
reactions. Suppliers (Customers) are divided into two categories: those with links
reported by themselves and those with links not reported by themselves but reported
by fraudulent firms. Panel A and C present the composition of supplier-customer
links in terms of link reporting party. Panel B and D present market reactions of the
above two types of suppliers and customers and their differences. Abnormal returns
are calculated as the return in excess of expected return predicted by Carhart four-
factor model. We also report the associated test statistics. *, **, *** indicate
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Link Statisitcs of Suppliers (event study)
# of Links Percentage
Links reported by suppliers 3,518 85.58%
Links not reported by suppliers 593 14.42%
Total number of links 4,111 100.00%
Panel B: Market Reactions (Suppliers)
[-1,1] [-1,2] [-1,10]
Links reported by suppliers -0.56%*** -0.63%*** -0.62%***
[-6.06] [-6.15] [-3.47]
Links not reported by suppliers -0.07% -0.04% -0.47%*
[-0.44] [-0.23] [-1.71]
Difference -0.49%** -0.59%** -0.15%
[-2.09] [-2.26] [0.34]
Panel C: Link Statisitcs of Customers (event study)
# of Links Percentage
Links reported by customers 1,254 42.41%
Links not reported by customers 1,703 57.59%
Total number of links 2,957 100.00%
Panel D: Market Reactions (Customers)
[-1,1] [-1,2] [-1,10]
Links reported by customers -0.47%** -0.55%*** -0.33%
[-2.55] [-2.77] [-1.07]
Links not reported by customers -0.15%* -0.20%** -0.32%*
[-1.70] [-2.03] [-1.95]
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